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ABSTRACT 
ESSAYS IN OPEN ECONOMY MACROECONOMICS 
 
by 
 
Amr Sadek Hosny 
 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, May 2013 
Under the Supervision of Professor Mohsen Bahmani-Oskooee 
 
 
This dissertation is comprised of three chapters in applied open-economy 
macroeconomics. The first chapter examines the autonomy of domestic monetary policy 
in the context of the renowned macroeconomic policy trilemma in open economies. The 
contribution is in using a time-varying parameter methodology that examines the 
dynamics of monetary policy independence over time and thus improves on existing 
literature that only provides a single estimate for the coefficients of interest, whereas it is 
shown that these coefficients significantly change over time as countries exhibit different 
exchange rate regimes and capital mobility positions, especially during the post Bretton-
Woods period. The second chapter uses the Autoregressive Distributed Lag technique to 
investigate the exchange rate disconnect puzzle and examines how exchange rates are 
determined by fundamentals such as output, money supply, interest rates and prices in the 
context of the monetary approach to exchange rate determination. Finally, chapter three 
examines the effects of exchange rate depreciation on the trade balance in the case of a 
small open economy; Egypt using three different methods; namely the Marshall-Lerner 
condition, the J-curve, and the S-curve. 
 
 
iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To My Parents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1 
Chapter 1: Understanding Dynamics of the Macroeconomic Trilemma in History ........... 4 
1.1. Motivation and Literature..................................................................................... 4 
1.2. Data ...................................................................................................................... 9 
1.2.1. Exchange Rate Regimes ............................................................................... 9 
1.2.2. Capital Control Status ................................................................................. 10 
1.2.3. Monetary Policy .......................................................................................... 11 
1.3. Econometric Methodology and Results ............................................................. 12 
1.3.1. The Difference Regressions ........................................................................ 13 
1.3.2. The Times-Series Evidence: A Bounds Testing Approach ........................ 17 
1.3.3. The Time-Varying Trilemma: A State-space Approach ............................. 26 
1.4. Summary and Conclusion .................................................................................. 41 
1.5. References .......................................................................................................... 44 
Chapter 2: The Exchange Rate Disconnect Puzzle Revisited ........................................... 61 
2.1. Motivation and Literature................................................................................... 61 
2.2. Monetary Approach to Exchange Rate Determination: Theory & Empirics ..... 63 
2.2.1. Monetary Approach to Exchange Rate Determination: Theory ................. 64 
2.2.1.1. The Flexible-price Monetary Model.................................................... 64 
2.2.1.2. The Sticky-price Monetary Model ...................................................... 66 
2.2.2. Monetary Approach to Exchange Rate Determination: Empirics .............. 69 
2.3. Econometric Methodology and Results ............................................................. 71 
2.3.1. The Time-Series Properties ......................................................................... 71 
2.3.2. The ARDL Methodology ............................................................................ 72 
2.3.3. The ARDL Results ...................................................................................... 77 
2.3.4. Granger Causality Tests .............................................................................. 82 
2.4. Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 86 
2.5. References .......................................................................................................... 88 
v 
 
Chapter 3: Exchange Rate Depreciation and the Trade Balance in Egypt ....................... 91 
3.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................ 91 
3.2. ML Condition ..................................................................................................... 92 
3.2.1. Motivation and Literature ........................................................................... 92 
3.2.2. The Model and the Method ......................................................................... 94 
3.2.3. The Results.................................................................................................. 97 
3.2.4. Summary and Conclusion ......................................................................... 105 
3.3. J-curve .............................................................................................................. 107 
3.3.1. Motivation and Literature ......................................................................... 107 
3.3.2. The Model and the Method ....................................................................... 109 
3.3.3. The Results................................................................................................ 111 
3.3.4. Summary and Conclusion ......................................................................... 122 
3.4. S-Curve............................................................................................................. 124 
3.4.1. Motivation and Literature ......................................................................... 124 
3.4.2. The Methodology and Results .................................................................. 125 
3.4.3. Summary and Conclusion ......................................................................... 132 
3.5. References ........................................................................................................ 134 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.1: Time-Varying Parameters in the Gold Standard Era ...................................... 29 
Figure 1.2: Time-Varying Parameters in the Bretton Woods Era .................................... 33 
Figure 1.3: Time-Varying Parameters in the Post-Bretton Woods Era ............................ 36 
Figure 3.4.1: The S-Curves for Nine Industries and For Total Egypt-US Trade ............ 129 
Figure 3.4.2: The S-Curves for 10 Industries and For Total Egypt-EU Trade ............... 132 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vii 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1.1: Difference Regressions on Annual Data .......................................................... 14 
Table 1.2: Difference Regressions on Annual Pooled Data ............................................. 16 
Table 1.3: ARDL Regressions .......................................................................................... 20 
Table 1.4: Appendix Table A1: Gold Standard Data ........................................................ 47 
Table 1.5: Appendix Table A2: Bretton Woods Data ....................................................... 48 
Table 1.6: Appendix Table A3: Post-Bretton Woods Data .............................................. 50 
Table 1.7: Appendix Table A4: Individual Country ARDL Regressions ......................... 55 
Table 2.1: Summary of Monetary Models of the Exchange Rate..................................... 69 
Table 2.2: Unit Root Tests ................................................................................................ 74 
Table 2.3: Results from the ARDL Model........................................................................ 78 
Table 2.4: Granger Causality Tests ................................................................................... 85 
Table 3.2.1: Empirical Results & Diagnostic Tests – Import Equation ............................ 99 
Table 3.2.2: Empirical Results & Diagnostic Tests – Export Equation .......................... 100 
Table 3.2.3: Effect of Exchange Rate Depreciation on Trade Balance in Egypt ............ 101 
1 
 
 
Introduction 
This dissertation is comprised of three chapters in applied open-economy 
macroeconomics. Specifically, the focus is on exchange rates and their interlinkages with 
the economy. Chapter one examines the choice of different exchange rate regimes on the 
conduct of monetary policy of an open economy, while Chapter two studies the 
determinants of exchange rate movements. Chapter three examines the effects of an 
exchange rate depreciation on the trade balance in the case of a small open economy; 
Egypt.  
 
In Chapter one, we test the autonomy of domestic monetary policy in the context 
of the renowned macroeconomic policy trilemma in open economies. The trilemma 
hypothesis basically stipulates that policymakers cannot achieve the following three 
objectives simultaneously; 1) a fixed exchange rate, 2) free international capital markets 
and 3) an independent domestic monetary policy. We, therefore, examine how closely 
domestic interest rates follow their base country interest rate, using monthly observations 
of a large dataset of developed and developing countries during three different time 
periods characterized by different exchange rate regimes and capital controls; namely the 
gold standard (1870-1914), Bretton Woods (1959-1970), and post-Bretton Woods (1973-
2009) eras. The contribution is in using a time-varying parameter model to examine the 
dynamics of the regression coefficient examining the independence of monetary policy, 
as well as the error correction term reflecting the adjustment speed of domestic interest 
rate following any short-run disequilibrium. The time-varying parameter methodology 
employed in this study tries to improve on existing literature that only provides a single 
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estimate for the coefficients of interest, whereas it is shown that these coefficients 
significantly change over time as countries exhibit different exchange rate regimes and 
capital mobility positions, especially during the post Bretton-Woods period. 
 
In Chapter two, we aim at explaining the fundamental determinants of movements 
in exchange rates. In section one, we investigate the exchange rate disconnect puzzle and 
examine how exchange rates are determined by fundamentals such as output, money 
supply, interest rates and prices in the context of the monetary approach to exchange rate 
determination. We use the same dataset of the seminal paper of Engel and West (2005) 
covering six industrialized countries with quarterly data from 1974Q1- 2001Q3, but 
employ different econometric techniques: the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) 
approach to cointegration, we establish cointegration between exchange rates and 
fundamentals. Furthermore, we show that fundamentals Granger cause exchange rates, 
both in the short-run and the long-run. These results significantly improve on those of 
Engel and West which found no cointegration and Granger causality going in the 
opposite direction. 
 
Finally, in Chapter three, we have a number of papers studying the effects of 
exchange rate depreciation on the trade balance in the case of a small open economy; 
Egypt. More specifically, we use three methods identified in the literature; namely the 
Marshall-Lerner (ML) condition, the J-curve, and the S-curve. The ML condition asserts 
that if the import and export demand elasticities sum up to more than unity, currency 
depreciation will have a favorable impact on trade balance. The J-curve phenomenon 
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states that a country's trade balance, following currency depreciation, may first worsen in 
the short-run before improving in the long-run. Finally, the S-curve effect states that 
while cross-correlation coefficients between past values of the trade balance and current 
exchange rate could be negative, its future values could be positive. We use industry level 
bilateral trade data covering the period from 1994Q1 to 2007Q4 disaggregated according 
to the SITC classification into 59 industries (36 industries) that trade between Egypt-EU 
(and Egypt-US), respectively. First, we estimate price and income elasticities using 
cointegration techniques and find evidence for the ML condition in 39 industries for the 
Egypt-EU case as well as 28 industries in the Egypt-US case. In the second paper, we 
find evidence for the J-curve phenomenon in 24 industries that trade between Egypt-EU 
and 16 industries that trade between Egypt-US. Finally, we find support for the S-Curve 
hypothesis in 20, mostly small, industries out of the total 95 industries that trade between 
Egypt-EU and Egypt-US. 
 
The following is a detailed description of the three chapters. Every chapter is 
discussed in three steps; the motivation and contribution, the model and results, and the 
conclusion. 
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Chapter 1: Understanding Dynamics of the 
Macroeconomic Trilemma in History 
 
1.1. Motivation and Literature 
Benefits of globalization do not come without cost. One example is the renowned 
macroeconomic policy trilemma facing policymakers in open economies. Typically, a 
country would like to achieve three macroeconomic policy goals. These are (1) a stable 
exchange rate, (2) free international capital markets and (3) independent domestic 
monetary policy. These three goals, however, cannot be attained simultaneously, hence 
the term “macroeconomic trilemma” or “impossible trinity”. Theoretical underpinnings 
of this “Mundell-Fleming” model of fiscal and monetary policy in open economies are in 
Mundell (1963) and Fleming (1962). A direct implication is that countries pegging their 
exchange rates and unrestricting their international capital flows will not be able to 
independently conduct a monetary policy oriented towards domestic goals. Such 
country’s monetary policy will have to follow that of its base country; the country to 
which its exchange rate is pegged.  
 
When it comes to empirically testing the implications of the trilemma, a number 
of questions arise. First, what is the definition or measure of the three policy goals? We 
classify exchange rates into pegs and non-pegs, international capital markets into open 
and closed, and we examine how closely local interest rates follow the world (base 
country) interest rates as our measure of domestic monetary policy independence. The 
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second, and more important, question has to do with the appropriate econometric 
methodology to be used? Our empirical test examines how different exchange rate 
regimes and international capital controls influence domestic monetary policy, by 
examining the degree to which domestic interest rates follow their base country interest 
rate. 
 
We test the trilemma hypothesis for a large dataset of developing and developed 
countries during three different time periods characterized by different exchange rate 
pegs and capital controls; namely the gold standard (1870-1914), Bretton Woods (1959-
1970), and post-Bretton Woods (1973-2000) eras. We test the trilemma predictions using 
three different approaches. The first is a simple regression equation of domestic interest 
rates (Rit) on base country interest rates (BRit), both expressed in their first-difference to 
avoid problems of non-stationarity as follows: 
 
ΔRit = α +β ΔBRit + εit  
 
Obstfeld et al (2005a,b) run this simple OLS under the three different eras 
grouping observations by exchange rate regime and capital control status and examine the 
magnitude and significance of the regression coefficient and the overall model fit. As 
such, one would expect the highest regression coefficient to be reported under periods or 
observations characterized by pegged exchange rates and open capital markets as this 
combination would lead to the lowest autonomy of domestic monetary policy as 
conjectured by the trilemma. While this approach is desirable in its simplicity, it leaves a 
(1.1) 
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number of unanswered questions. First, results for averages across countries within every 
era, not individual countries, are reported as observations are pooled in a panel form. And 
second, there is no distinction in the analysis between the long-run versus the short-run. 
 
Some studies in the literature including Frankel et al (2004) and Obstfeld et al 
(2005b) examine the level relationship between domestic and base country interest rates 
in an attempt to avoid the drawbacks of the OLS approach. As such, they employ 
cointegration and error correction analyses to examine the long-run level relationship 
between the two interest rates versus the short-run dynamics and adjustment speed of the 
domestic rate. The focus here is on the short-run regression coefficient and the lagged 
error correction term from the error correction equation. The sign, magnitude and 
significance of the coefficient on the lagged error correction term indicate the speed of 
adjustment of the local interest rate following any shock to the base rate. A faster speed 
of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium path implies a less independent domestic 
monetary policy. 
 
In this chapter, we are interested in the dynamics of the regression coefficient 
examining the independence of monetary policy over time, as well as the dynamics of the 
coefficient on the error correction term reflecting the adjustment speed of domestic 
interest rate following any short-run disequilibrium from the long-run path. The trilemma 
hypothesis stipulates that monetary policy independence changes if the exchange rate 
regime and capital control status change. Thus, our argument is that the existing literature 
that uses methodologies that only report a single estimate for the above two coefficients 
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of interest is rather impractical. This is especially true during the post-Bretton Woods era, 
which covers more than thirty years of data, where we report evidence that countries 
alternated between open and closed capital markets over time. We also present evidence, 
throughout all three periods, that countries have continuously shifted from flexible to 
fixed exchange rate regimes and vice versa. We extend the post-Bretton Woods period 
studied in Obstfeld et al (2005b) to include data up to 2009 and re-test the trilemma 
hypothesis using OLS and error correction techniques. We then test the stability of the 
estimated coefficients over time and show that they exhibit significant structural breaks 
and are indeed unstable, thus re-enforcing our argument against existing findings in the 
literature. Our contribution is that we employ a new approach to test the implications of 
the macroeconomic trilemma hypothesis; a time-varying parameter (TVP) methodology 
that can capture changes in the autonomy of monetary policy, given changes in the 
exchange rate regime and capital control status over time.  
 
The TVP methodology uses maximum likelihood and the Kalman filter to 
estimate coefficients that can vary over time. A general finding is that the time-varying 
coefficients for monetary policy independence show higher volatility in periods of 
flexible rather than fixed exchange rates. This observation holds true over the three time 
periods under investigation and regardless of the capital control status. For the gold 
standard and Bretton Woods eras, most of the variation in monetary policy independence 
was due to variations in the exchange rate regime rather than changes in capital control 
conditions. Specifically, we were able to capture the effect of a change in the exchange 
rate regime on the autonomy of monetary policy in a number of countries within each era. 
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An example is the weakening of monetary policy autonomy in the case of France during 
the gold standard era, where we show that the French Franc has been weakly pegged to 
the Sterling pound in the early years of the gold standard era, with the peg gaining 
strength as we move to the end of the period. Germany and the United Kingdom, on the 
other hand, are two countries that experienced increasing monetary independence over 
time during the Bretton Woods era as their peg against the US dollar weakened over time.  
  
Our methodology also becomes pertinent when analyzing the post-Bretton Woods 
era as countries freely switched exchange rate regimes and capital control conditions, 
unlike the rather rigid nature of the previous two periods. We are able to identify periods 
of increasing and decreasing monetary policy independence as countries experienced 
different exchange rate regimes and international capital mobility restrictions over time. 
One example is Austria, where we were able to capture the weakening in the country’s 
monetary autonomy over time as its initial non-peg and closed capital market policies 
switched to a pegged exchange rate and more open capital markets near the end of the 
period. We also present evidence of “fear of floating” in some countries. According to 
Calvo and Reinhart (2002), these are countries that continue to follow their base country 
interest rates even after they switch from a fixed to a more flexible exchange rate regime. 
In sum, this paper presents evidence in support of a “time-varying macroeconomic 
trilemma” in history. 
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1.2. Data 
This section describes the data definitions and sources used in this study. The 
macroeconomic policy trilemma rests on three pillars, and we discuss each in detail 
below. 
 
1.2.1. Exchange Rate Regimes 
As mentioned earlier, we have three distinct eras. We use monthly end-of-period 
exchange rates in all periods. In the Gold Standard era starting from 1870M1-1914M6, 
we determine the exchange rate coding in two alternative ways. On one hand, a de jure 
classification is based on the country’s announcement of its legal commitment to gold. 
On the other hand, the de facto classification is based on the actual behavior of the 
exchange rate of a country against the exchange rate of its base country. The base country 
for the gold standard era is the United Kingdom. Specifically, we follow the de facto 
coding methodology developed by Shambaugh (2004) and used by Obstfeld et al 
(2005b), where we check whether the end-of-month exchange rate of each country stays 
within a ±2% band over a whole year against the Sterling pound. We have data available 
for 15 countries during the gold standard era.
1
  
 
During the Bretton Woods period between 1959M1-1970M12, and following the 
de facto classification of Shambaugh (2004) with the U.S.A. being the base country, we 
collect data for 16 countries from the IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
                                                          
1
 The de jure and de facto classification systems are in general very similar. For Denmark, France, 
Germany, Norway, Switzerland and Sweden they are exactly the same.   
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database. Most countries are pegged to the U.S. dollar during this period, with the 
exception of Brazil and only a year or two for a few other countries as listed in Table (2) 
in the appendix. For the post-Bretton Woods era, we follow the de facto exchange rate 
classification of Shambaugh (2004) for data extracted from the IFS and available from 
1973M1-2009M12.
2
 Again, a particular country is considered to have a fixed exchange 
rate (peg) with its base country in any given year if its bilateral exchange rate stays within 
a ±2% band. Base countries include major countries such as the United States, Germany, 
France and the United Kingdom, as well as those that are important within a given 
region, such as Australia, Malaysia and South Africa. We have data for 88 countries in 
this era. Appendix Tables (A1)-(A3) at the end of this chapter show the exchange rate 
regimes classification for the three periods, respectively. 
 
1.2.2. Capital Control Status 
Due to lack of sufficient data before the post-Bretton Woods era, we follow Obstfeld et al 
(2005b) and assume that all capital markets are open during the Gold Standard era, and 
all are closed/controlled during the Bretton Woods era. During the post-Bretton Woods 
era, we adopt information on capital restrictions from various issues of the IMF Annual 
Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions annual reports, as done by 
Shambaugh (2004) and Obstfeld et al (2005b). 
 
                                                          
2
 Obstfeld et al’s (2005b) paper uses data up to 2000 only for the post-Bretton Woods period. 
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1.2.3. Monetary Policy 
In order to measure monetary policy dependence or independence based on the 
hypothesis of the macroeconomic policy trilemma, we examine how closely the domestic 
interest rate of a country follows the interest rate of its base country. Base countries are 
the United Kingdom for the gold standard era, the U.S.A. for the Bretton Woods era, and 
they differ across countries as mentioned above, and shown in table (A3) in the appendix 
at the end of this chapter, for the post-Bretton Woods era.  
 
Monthly interest rate data for the gold standard era comes from Neal and 
Weidenmier (2003) and were made available by Shambaugh (2004). Monthly interest 
rates for the other two periods are either money market rates or treasury bill rates, both 
collected from the IMF’s IFS database. In deciding which rate to choose, we depend on 
data availability or choose the interest rate with the longer time series. We express all 
interest rates as ln(1+R), where R is the interest rate reported from the data source. As 
explained by Obstfeld et al (2005), this transformation reduces the impact of country 
outliers. In addition, episodes with hyperinflation are dropped from our data set, as they 
might distort the regression results. Specifically, countries experiencing hyperinflation 
periods are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico, Poland, Romania, Turkey, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. 
 
The above information for the three elements of the macroeconomic policy 
trilemma is presented in tables (A1) through (A3) in the appendix at the end of this 
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chapter, where each table presents data for one of the three different eras under 
investigation. 
 
1.3. Econometric Methodology and Results 
We examine three alternative approaches to test for monetary policy independence in the 
context of the macroeconomic policy trilemma. Since our objective lies in examining the 
behavior of a country’s interest rates, we are likely to face the problem of spurious 
regressions if we run the regressions in levels as interest rates are macroeconomic 
variables that are mostly non-stationary.
3
 Therefore, in our first econometric exercise, we 
apply first-difference regressions on pegged versus non-pegged observations across and 
over the different time periods. Secondly, we make use of recent developments in the 
time-series techniques that allow us to test for level relationships between cointegrated 
variables, regardless of the order of their cointegration. For this purpose, we use the 
Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) approach to cointegration developed by Pesaran 
et al (2001). This procedure, although attractive from an econometric point of view, still 
delivers a single estimated coefficient for every regression, some of which cover periods 
of more than 40 years. We present evidence, as detailed below, that such estimates do not 
accurately reflect the dynamics of monetary autonomy of any given country as countries 
have experienced different capital control conditions and exchange rate regimes over 
time. The third approach that we suggest is, therefore, a time-varying parameter 
methodology that allows our estimate of monetary independence to vary over time.  
 
                                                          
3
 Obstfeld et al (2005b) applied unit root tests on country interest rates over the three periods, and found 
evidence of both stationary and non-stationary interest rates. 
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1.3.1. The Difference Regressions 
A major problem with nominal interest rates is that they are usually non-stationary time-
series processes. In order to avoid the possibility of spurious regression, we first-
difference the data and estimate the following equation:
4
 
 
ΔRit = α +β ΔBRit + εit  
 
where R is the domestic interest rate of country i at time t, BR is country i’s base 
country interest rate as defined above and Δ is the difference operator. The idea is to test 
the degree to which a country’s domestic interest rate follows its base country’s interest 
rate over three different time periods that are characterized with different exchange rate 
and capital control systems. Therefore, examining the significance and sign of  ̂ above, 
serves as a simple yet subtle test for the hypothesis that a country can only 
simultaneously achieve two of the three objectives in context of the macroeconomic 
policy trilemma. In other words, in a country with an open capital market and a pegged 
exchange rate, we expect  ̂ to be close to 1 and statistically significant implying low 
monetary autonomy. If, on the other hand, the country exhibits a controlled capital 
market and/or a flexible exchange rate system, then one would expect a statistically 
insignificant  ̂, regardless of its sign. 
 
Results are presented in Tables (1.1) and (1.2) below. We start with across and 
within era comparisons. Then, we pool the data across the three eras, and directly test the 
                                                          
4
 If a variable has a unit root (is non-stationary), then the OLS estimates will be biased downward and the 
reported standard errors will be tighter than the actual, leading to over-rejection. 
(1.2) 
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influence of exchange rate regimes and the capital control status on the autonomy of 
domestic monetary policy. Considering across era variations, we can see that although the 
 ̂ coefficients on pegged observations are always higher than non-pegged ones, they are 
only significantly different from zero in the gold standard and post-Bretton Woods eras. 
This implies that the capital controls that characterized the Bretton Woods era allowed 
countries significant control over their domestic monetary policies. Results also reveal 
that the  ̂ coefficient during the gold standard era is higher than during the post-Bretton 
Woods period. This can be easily explained by the fact that capital markets, the third 
element of the macroeconomic policy trilemma, were open for all countries during the 
gold standard era, whereas there were significant capital controls during the post-Bretton 
Woods era. The within-era comparisons will help reveal information about the influence 
of the exchange rate regime on the extent to which a country follows the base-interest 
rate. The across-era comparisons show the role of capital controls and of different 
attitudes toward macroeconomic management. These results are presented in Table (1.1). 
 
Table 1.1: Difference Regressions on Annual Data 
 
Statistic Pool Pegs  Non-pegs 
 Gold Standard – De Jure Classification 
No. of observations 491 351 139 
β .391 *** .511 *** .079 
std error (.040) (.045) (.063) 
R
2
 .19 .30 .012 
    
 Gold Standard – De Facto Classification 
No. of observations 491 380 58 
β .391 *** .482 *** .100 
std error (.040) (.042) (.122) 
R
2
 .19 .29 .013 
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Statistic Pool Pegs  Non-pegs 
 Bretton Woods 
No. of observations 130 115 15 
β .001 .056 -.016 
std error (.202) (.134) (.917) 
R
2
 .0001 .001 .000 
    
 Post-Bretton Woods 
No. of observations 2226 910 1316 
β .279 *** .392 *** .199 *** 
std error (.038) (.040) (.058) 
R
2
 .02 .12 .006 
*** Significant at the 1% significance level, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10% 
Robust standard errors are in () 
 
Secondly, we pool the data across the three eras, and directly test the influence of 
exchange rate regimes and the capital control status on the autonomy of domestic 
monetary policy. Specifically, we run regression equation (1.2) under the four possible 
combinations of our exchange rate regimes (pegged and non-pegged) and capital control 
status (open and closed). Results in Table (1.2) are perfectly in line with the 
macroeconomic trilemma hypothesis and indicate that the countries with a combination 
of pegged exchange rates and closed capital markets experience the highest monetary 
policy independence. Domestic monetary autonomy decreases if different regimes are 
adopted. Specifically, non-pegs with open capital markets and pegs with closed markets 
provide some domestic interest-rate autonomy. Furthermore, countries with pegged 
exchange rate regimes and open capital markets suffer the least monetary policy 
autonomy of all.  
 
 
 
16 
 
 
Table 1.2: Difference Regressions on Annual Pooled Data 
 
Statistic 
Peg and  
Open Capital 
Peg and  
Closed Capital 
Non-peg and  
Open Capital 
Non-peg and  
Closed Capital 
No. of 
observations 
634 787 581 845 
β .404 *** .395 *** .273 *** .159 ** 
std error (.075) (.041) (.101) (.069) 
R
2
 .143 .141 .010 .004 
*** Significant at the 1% significance level, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10% 
Robust standard errors are in () 
 
A final observation from the above results is the statistically significant  ̂ 
coefficient for the non-peg and open capital regime in the fourth column in Table (1.2). 
This is the so called “fear of floating” concept originally studied by Calvo and Reinhart 
(2002). Similar results have been found by Obstfeld et al (2005b) and Frankel et al 
(2004). According to this view, many countries, even if formally floating their exchange 
rates, may in fact follow the monetary policy of their base countries or major trading 
partners, much as those with direct pegs. This fear of floating or more generally the fear 
of large currency swings, as argued by Calvo and Reinhart (2002), are more prevalent in 
emerging market economies facing credibility problems, inflation targets and/or a high 
exchange rate pass through effects from exchange rates to domestic prices. These 
practices are also seen for countries coming out of currency crises or episodes of high 
inflation, so they tend to control their interest rates to smooth fluctuations in their 
exchange rates in fear of falling once again in the same economic downturns. Of course, 
this fear of floating would be more apparent in countries with open capital markets, than 
in countries with strict capital controls. Our results from Table (1.2) do confirm this ( ̂ 
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coefficients and R
2
 are 0.2733 and 0.01 for non-peg open capital regimes as opposed to 
0.159 and 0.004 for non-peg closed capital regimes).  
 
1.3.2. The Times-Series Evidence: A Bounds Testing Approach 
After getting an initial understanding of how changes in domestic interest rates follow 
changes in their base country rates, we now turn to the estimation of the level relationship 
between the two variables. For this purpose, we use cointegration and error correction 
analyses to differentiate between the long-run as well as the short-run relationship 
between the two variables. We can also explain the adjustment process of the domestic 
interest rate of a country towards its base country rate shedding light on the degree of 
independence of monetary policy of the country in the context of the macroeconomic 
trilemma. We follow the methodology developed by Pesaran et al (2001) and begin by 
estimating the following long-run model using the Autoregressive Distributed Lag 
(ARDL) procedure as follows: 
 
Rit = c + γ BRit + uit 
 
Again, R is the domestic interest rate of country i at time t, BR is country i’s base 
country interest rate, and γ represents the long-run levels relationship between the two 
variables. Since we are interested in studying the cointegration relationship between the 
domestic and base country interest rates, we re-write equation (1.3) in a constrained 
error-correction format. In doing so, we are able to distinguish the long-run from the 
short-run effects of base country rates on domestic interest rates. Specifically, the bounds 
(1.3) 
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testing approach of Pesaran et al (2001) specifies the following ARDL(n1,n2) 
specification:    
  
ΔRit = α + ∑  
  
   μ ΔRi,t-k + ∑  
  
   β ΔBRi,t-k + ζ1Rit-1 + ζ2 BRit-1 + εit  
 
In this framework, the short-run coefficients (attached to first-differenced 
variables) and the long-run coefficients (attached to lagged level variables) are 
simultaneously estimated by applying Ordinary Least Squares to equation (1.4). The 
long-run coefficients are produced by using  ̂2 and normalizing it by  ̂1.
5
 Of course, we 
need to establish cointegration among the variables for the long-run coefficients to be 
valid. Pesaran et al (2001) propose the standard F-test for the joint significance of lagged 
level variables for the cointegration test, with new non-standard critical values that they 
tabulate in their paper.  
 
An advantage of this procedure is that it is applied irrespective of whether the 
variables are I(1) or I(0). We can thus avoid all pre-unit-root testing associated with the 
standard cointegration approach of Johansen and Juselius (1990). Specifically, Pesaran et 
al (2001) report two sets of critical values; an upper bound critical value assuming all 
variables are I(1), and a lower bound assuming all are I(0). If the calculated F-statistic is 
above the upper bound, then the variables are jointly significant indicating long run 
cointegration. If the calculated statistic is below the lower bound critical value, there is no 
                                                          
5
 See Bahmani-Oskooee and Tanku (2008) for a step-by-step explanation of the method and normalization 
procedure. It is worth noting that the standard error of the ratio of two coefficients is not the ratio of two 
standard errors. Pesaran and Pesaran (1997, pp.394-404) illustrate how the standard errors of normalized 
coefficients are calculated using non-linear least squares and the Delta method. 
(1.4) 
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cointegration. If, however, the calculated F-statistic lies in between these two bounds, 
then the results are inconclusive. Following Pesaran et al (2001), we calculate an error 
correction term, ECT, from the long-run equation (1.3), replace the linear combination of 
lagged level variables in equation (1.4) by ECTit–1 and estimate each model after 
imposing the same optimum lags.  
 
ΔRit = α + ∑  
  
   μ ΔRi,t-k + ∑  
  
   β ΔBRi,t-k + ζ ECTit-1+ εit 
 
In this specification, one can examine the direction and speed of adjustment in the 
model following any short-run disequilibrium by examining the sign and statistical 
significance of the ECTit-1 coefficient. The ECTit-1 basically links the long-run 
equilibrium implied by the cointegration relationship with the short-run adjustment 
process describing the mechanism by which the variables react following any shock that 
takes them off the long-run equilibrium. In the context of equation (1.5) above, a negative 
and statistically significant ̂, indicates adjustment of the domestic interest rate toward its 
long-run equilibrium as indicated by the base country interest rate following any short-
run disequilibrium. Also, the higher the absolute value of  ̂, the faster the adjustment 
process or the convergence rate, which would imply less monetary independence in the 
context of the macroeconomic trilemma.  
 
We now estimate equations (1.3)-(1.5) above. In choosing the number of lags, one 
usually minimizes the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), imposing a maximum of 6 
lags since we’re using quarterly data following Bahmani-Oskooee and Tanku (2008) 
(1.5) 
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among others. In what follows, we restrict the ARDL(n1,n2) to an ARDL(1,1) for 
simplicity and for purposes of estimating the time-varying model, as will be shown in the 
fourth section of this chapter. The results, however, are very similar if we impose no 
restrictions.
6
 Results for country averages are reported in Table (1.3) below, while 
detailed individual country regressions are in Table (A4) in the appendix.   
 
Table 1.3: ARDL Regressions 
 γ β θ Half life F Stability Adj R2 
  
 Gold Standard – De Jure Classification 
        
Pegs (average) 0.40 0.23 -0.17 8.80 24.80 26.11 0.18 
Occ. pegs (average) 0.51 0.07 -0.14 9.03 37.35 22.36 0.12 
Non-pegs (average) 0.65 0.09 -0.18 3.49 34.30 23.66 0.15 
        
 Gold Standard – De Facto Classification 
        
Pegs (average) 0.47 0.18 -0.17 8.90 29.56 20.86 0.17 
Occ. pegs (average) 0.16 0.08 -0.10 11.96 27.42 22.39 0.08 
        
 Bretton Woods 
        
Pegs (average) 0.57 0.06 -0.12 5.42 3.55 4.64 .08 
Non-pegs (average) 0.70 -0.64 -0.04 16.98 1.30 3.58 .03 
        
 Post-Bretton Woods 
ERR        
Pegs (average) 0.60 0.17 -0.10 10.68 10.12 10.11 0.11 
Occ. pegs (average) 0.80 -0.01 -0.09 22.36 9.32 13.04 0.08 
Non-pegs (average) 1.31 0.36 -0.05 36.74 6.70 8.96 0.04 
Capital Market        
Open (average) 1.22 0.07 -0.14 19.65 9.29 10.15 0.20 
Occ. (average) 1.22 0.18 -0.08 29.64 8.71 12.69 0.05 
Closed (average) 0.75 0.26 -0.07 24.40 8.15 9.03 0.07 
        
*** Significant at the 1%, ** at the 5% and * at the 10% significance level 
The Average Wald F-statistic is reported for the stability (Quandt-Andrews breakpoint) test   
Half-life is calculated as follows: ln(0.5)/ln(1-| |) 
                                                          
6
 Full results are available from the authors. 
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 Due to the vast amount of individual country results, we have grouped countries 
into pegs, occasional pegs and non-peg countries. Pegged countries are countries whose 
exchange rates are pegged throughout the entire period under consideration. Likewise, 
non-pegged countries are those with non-pegged exchange rates across the whole period. 
Finally, we define a group of countries under the occasional peg category, and those are 
countries whose exchange rates experience both and/or flip back and forth between peg 
and non-peg activity. This classification is based on the data available in Tables (A1) 
through (A3) in the appendix. We then average the respective coefficients for all 
countries in the same category and report that average at the end of each era. Table (1.3) 
reports estimates of the long-run coefficients ( ̂), short-run coefficients ( ̂), speeds of 
adjustment ( ̂) and overall explanatory power of the model (Adjusted R2). We also report 
half-life estimates, which tell how quickly local interest rates adjust to restore their long-
run equilibrium relationship with their base country interest rates following any short-run 
disequilibrium or shocks to the base rate.
7
 
  
The gold standard era is an era characterized by open capital markets. Therefore, 
one would expect pegged countries to show the least monetary independence, followed 
by occasional peg countries, and finally non-peg countries should exhibit the highest 
monetary dependence. This should be reflected by the magnitudes and statistical 
significance of the long-run (γ), short-run coefficients ( ̂), speeds of adjustment ( ̂), half-
life estimates and explanatory power (Adj. R
2
). According to the macroeconomic policy 
                                                          
7
 Half-life is calculated as: ln(0.5)/ln(1-| ̂|) where | ̂| is the absolute value of the coefficient on the lagged 
error correction term, ECTit-1. 
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trilemma, one would expect pegged and open capital market countries to show the 
highest ( ̂) and ( ̂), (| ̂|), (Adj. R2) and fastest half-life estimates.  
 
Looking at the findings from table (1.3), one can notice a considerable difference 
in the results between the de jure and de facto classifications. The de jure classification 
results do not seem to follow the predictions of the trilemma, as the long-run 
cointegrating coefficients are the lowest for pegged countries, and highest for non-pegged 
countries (0.40 for pegged, 0.51 for occasional peg and 0.65), the exact opposite of what 
one would expect. Similarly, the speeds of adjustment as indicated by the half-life 
estimates are slow for pegged countries and fastest for the non-pegged ones (8.80 months 
for pegged, 9.03 months for occasional peg and 3.49 months for non-pegged countries). 
Again, the opposite of what one would expect. Results of the de facto classification, 
however, are more consistent with the trilemma hypothesis. The ( ̂) coefficients 
representing the cointegrating (long-run) relationship between the local and base country 
interest rates are 0.47 and 0.16 for pegged and occasional pegged countries, respectively. 
Short-run coefficients, on average, are also larger for pegged countries, and local interest 
rates adjust to their long-run path faster in pegged versus occasional pegged countries 
(half-life estimates are 8.90 months and 11.96 months for pegged and occasional pegged 
countries, respectively). Moreover, changes in base country interest rates have more 
explanatory power in explaining changes in local rates in pegged versus occasional 
pegged countries as evident from the reported Adj. R
2
 (0.17 for pegged and 0.08 for 
occasional pegged countries, on average). This finding, consistent with the “fear of 
floating” concept of Calvo and Reinhart (2002), leads one to conclude that what countries 
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announce as their official exchange rate regimes (de jure classifications) may not be 
entirely accurate, and that one should look into the actual behavior of countries’ exchange 
rates (de facto classifications) and use that to be able to accurately define different 
exchange rate regimes over time.
8
  
 
Moving to the Bretton Woods era, we do not find much within era variation, as 
almost all countries pegged their exchange rates against the U.S. dollar along with 
controls on their capital markets. The only exception is Brazils’ non-pegged exchange 
rate regime throughout the entire period, and indeed, Brazil shows significant monetary 
independence. Its estimated coefficient on the long-run level relationship, ( ̂), is 
insignificantly different from zero, its speed of adjustment is rather slow (half-life of 
16.98 months) as indicated by the magnitude of the estimated coefficient on the lagged 
error correction term, ( ̂) and finally the explanatory power of the model is rather weak 
as indicated by the model’s poor fit (Adj. R2 of 0.03). For the remaining sample of 
countries, one would expect the degree of monetary independence to differ with the 
degree of capital control. Strict capital controls were in place in countries like Austria, 
India, Jamaica, Japan, Pakistan, South Africa and Trinidad and Tobago due to their slow 
adjustment speeds and since their estimated level relationship, ( ̂), is either negative or 
statistically insignificant. Finally, averaging over all countries, we can see that pegged 
countries show significant long-run relations ( ̂), positive short-run coefficients ( ̂ is 0.06 
versus -0.64 for non-pegs), faster speeds of adjustment ( ̂ is -0.12 versus -0.04 for non-
pegs), lower half-life estimates (5.42 versus 16.98 months for non-pegs) and higher 
                                                          
8
 This is apparent in countries like Austria, Italy, Netherlands and Spain, which de jure are on a non-pegged 
or occasional pegged regime, but de facto follow their base country interest rate quite closely as shown by 
stronger level relationships and faster speeds of adjustment. 
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explanatory power (Adj. R
2
 is 0.08 versus 0.03 for non-pegs) as one would expect 
following the hypothesis of the macroeconomic policy trilemma.  
 
Regarding the post-Bretton Woods era, we have a big number of countries with 
different exchange rate and capital control regimes allowing for significant within era 
variation. Regarding the exchange rate regime, pegged countries, on average, are reported 
to have the fastest speed of adjustment (half-life of 10.68 versus 22.36 and 36.74 months 
for occasional pegs and non-pegs, respectively) and biggest model fit (Adj. R
2
 of 0.11 
versus 0.08 and 0.04 for occasional pegs and non-pegs, respectively).
9
 These results 
concur with the trilemma predictions. It is also worth noting that negative long-run level 
relations, mostly all belonging to non-pegged and occasionally pegged regimes, are all 
insignificantly different from zero. 
 
Across eras, pegged countries had the fastest adjustment speed during the de facto 
gold standard era ( ̂ is -0.17 compared to  -0.12 and -0.10 during the Bretton Woods and 
post-Bretton Woods eras, respectively). This seems obvious as that period was 
characterized by perfectly open capital markets for all countries involved, while they 
were completely and partially closed during the Bretton Woods and post-Bretton Woods 
periods, respectively. When it comes to occasional peg and non-pegged countries, 
adjustments speeds are slower for the post-Bretton Woods era (22.36 and 36.74 months) 
than in any other (16.98 and 13.16 months for the Bretton Woods and gold standard eras, 
respectively). We can also note from Table (1.3) that in almost all equations reported, the 
                                                          
9
 Similar results are obtained if we only include significant estimated coefficients to calculate averages 
across the different exchange rate regimes. 
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( ̂) coefficient on the lagged error correction term, ECTit-1, has been negative and highly 
statistically significant. This implies that following any shock or disequilibrium from the 
long-run path, it is the local interest rate that adjusts to restore the equilibrium not the 
base rate. Furthermore, we have performed a number of diagnostic tests along the lines of 
Bahmani et al (2005) to show that our models are correctly specified. Results reveal that 
the models are mostly free from serial correlation and misspecification as indicated by 
the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) and Ramsey’s RESET tests. 
 
Finally, we use the Andrews (1993) and Andrews and Ploberger (1994) 
methodology to test for parameter instability over time. This test basically performs a 
Chow breakpoint type of test at every observation between two dates. These Chow test 
statistics are then summarized into a single statistic that tests against the null hypothesis 
of no structural breakpoints between the dates.
10
 Results, as can be seen from the Quandt-
Andrews test statistic reported in Table (1.3) mostly reject the null hypothesis of no 
structural breaks indicating that most parameters are unstable.
11
 This is true for all three 
eras under investigation, but especially evident for the post-Bretton Woods period. Such a 
result is expected as this relatively long period must have witnessed changing economic 
conditions for different countries over time. This result motivates our contribution to the 
literature in the following section, and highlights our effort to conduct a time-varying 
                                                          
10
 The average Wald F-statistic that we report in Table (3) is computed as the simple average of the 
individual F-statistics which in turn are computed from a Wald test of the restriction that the coefficients on 
the equation parameters are the same in all subsamples examined. Distribution of these tests is non-
standard and the asymptotic p-values are provided in Hansen (1997). 
11
 We have also performed the cumulative sum (CUSUM) and the cumulative sum of squares (CUSUMSQ) 
tests of Brown et al (1975) as tests of parameter instability. They largely concur with those of the Quandt-
Andrews test. 
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parameter methodology to more accurately capture the dynamics of the macroeconomic 
policy trilemma over time. 
 
1.3.3. The Time-Varying Trilemma: A State-space Approach  
We now allow all the parameters to vary with time following the procedure developed by 
Kalman (1960) and explained in Kim and Nelson (1998). Kim and Nelson (1989) were 
among the first to apply this methodology to model a time-varying monetary reaction 
function of the Federal Reserve. In the context of the trilemma, we estimate the following 
set of equations for every country: 
 
ΔRt = αt + μt ΔRt-1 + βt ΔBRt-1 + ζt ECTt-1+ et 
 
αt = αt-1 + vt, μt = μt-1 + ut, βt = βt-1 + εt and ζt = ζt-1 + δt 
 
The only difference between equations (1.5) and (1.6) is the addition of a 
subscript t to the parameters in equation (1.6). Equations (1.7) represent the dynamics of 
the time-varying parameters. We use the ECTit-1 series estimated from the previous 
section, and now shift our attention to the behavior of the parameters over time. In doing 
so, we aim to capture the essence of the macroeconomic policy trilemma in a more 
dynamic setting. The extensive flipping back and forth between flexible and fixed 
exchange rate regimes, the strengthening and loosening of capital controls over time as 
evident from the data presented in Tables (A1) through (A3) in the appendix and the 
(1.6) 
(1.7) 
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results of the Quandt-Andrews parameter instability tests motivate our analysis in this 
section.  
 
 We apply the Kalman filter within the context of a state space approach to model 
the dynamic time-series in equations (1.6) and (1.7) and estimate the time-variation in the 
parameters. The state space representation of the above equations is as follows:  
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In matrix form, equations (1.8) and (1.9) can be more compactly written as: 
 
ΔRt   =  Xt-1    βt   +   et 
(n×1) (n×m) (m×1) (n×1) 
 
βt = F βt-1 + vt with F = Im 
 
et ~ iid N (0,  
 ), vt ~ iid N (0,  
 ) and E[et   
 ] = 0 
 
(1.8) 
(1.9) 
(1.10) 
(1.11) 
(1.12) 
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Specifically, a state space model for an n−dimensional time series (in our case 
ΔRt) consists of a measurement equation (1.10) relating the observed data to an 
m−dimensional state vector (βt), and a transition equation (1.11) describing the dynamics 
of the state vector over time. The transition equation, as shown above, takes the form of a 
first-order difference equation in the state vector. The Xt-1 vector contains the four right-
hand-side variables from equation (1.6). Equations (1.12) define the errors as iid and 
assumes that the measurement equation errors are independent of the transition equation 
errors for all s=t. 
 
The Kalman filter is the tool that deals with state space models. A Kalman filter 
basically uses a recursive procedure for computing the optimal estimates of the state 
vector (βt), using all available information up to time t. The filter consists of two sets of 
equations as described in Kim and Nelson (1998). The first is the prediction equations at 
the beginning of time t which are used to predict an optimal estimate of the 
n−dimensional time series (ΔRt) defined above using all available information up to time 
t-1, ΔRt|t-1. This requires the estimation of the state vector (βt) using information up to t-1, 
βt|t-1. In the second step, once (ΔRt) is realized at the end of time t, we can form a more 
accurate inference about our state vector, βt|t, through a set of updating equations after 
calculating a prediction error. Specifically, βt|t is now our updated estimate of βt based on 
the appropriate weights assigned to the new information, contained in the prediction 
error, up to time t. These weights, or the Kalman gain, are a function of the prediction 
error variance due to uncertainty in βt|t-1 and shocks to the measurement equation error, et. 
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Results are presented in Figures (1.1) through (1.3), each representing one of our 
three time periods under investigation.
12
 The figures contain two panels for every country 
reported. The first panel is the estimated time-varying short-run regression coefficient,  ̂t, 
on the changes in a country’s base rate, while the second panel represents the estimate of 
the time-varying  ̂t coefficient on the lagged error correction term.
13
 
 
Results are informative and reveal rather interesting patterns. Some general 
observations are in order. The first is that the short-run regression coefficient,  ̂t, and the 
lagged error correction coefficient,  ̂t, generally move opposite to each other, as one 
would expect following the hypothesis of macroeconomic policy trilemma. Periods of 
high or increasing  ̂t’s are accompanied by low or decreasing  ̂t’s, and vice versa. A 
second observation is that periods of non-pegged exchange rates mostly show higher 
volatility than periods with pegged exchange rates.  
 
Figure 1.1: Time-Varying Parameters in the Gold Standard Era 
Belgium: 1870M12-1914M6 
 
Denmark: 1884M5-1914M6 
 
                                                          
12
 Results are obtained by modifying GAUSS codes available from Kim and Nelson (1998). 
13
 Results of the other time-varying coefficients,  ̂t and  ̂t, are not reported for space considerations. 
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France: 1872M4-1914M6 
 
Norway: 1894M1-1914M6 
 
Portugal: 1885M1-1914M6 
 
Spain: 1883M1-1914M6 
 
Sweden: 1892M12-1914M6 
 
Switzerland: 1892M12-1914M6 
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For the gold standard era, one can see that non-pegged periods are indeed more 
volatile than pegged periods. This is evident from the frequent volatility in the reported  ̂t 
and  ̂t coefficients during non-pegged periods. France and Norway, on the other hand, 
have experienced decreasing monetary independence over time. This is shown from the 
fact that the short-run regression coefficient,  ̂t, and the (absolute value) of the lagged 
error correction coefficient,  ̂t, are both increasing over time indicating lower monetary 
independence and a faster speed of adjustment (shorter half-life). This result is supported 
by the data. In the case of France, we can notice that the French Franc has been weakly 
pegged to the Sterling pound in the early years of the gold standard era, with the peg 
gaining strength as we move to the end of the period. This fact becomes more evident if 
we redefine a pegged exchange rate in the de facto classification as one staying within a 
±0.5% band instead of a ±2% band against the Sterling pound over a whole year. Under 
this strict definition, it is apparent that France has experienced a number of non-pegged 
periods early in time during the gold standard era, slowly moving to complete pegs over 
time towards the end of the era. Such an observation has also been noted by Tullio and 
Wolters (2004), where they show that the Bank of France kept their interest rate 
unchanged at 3% for 5 years at the beginning of the gold standard era from 1883 to 1888, 
despite the fact that the Bank of England changed their interest rate 35 times during the 
same period. 
 
Using the same de facto definition, one can also explain why Belgium has 
experienced increasing monetary independence over the course of the gold standard era. 
As can be seen from the graphs, Belgium clearly witnessed a decreasing  ̂t coefficient 
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and an increasing  ̂t coefficient over time. A similar observation has been made by Morys 
(2011), where he estimated central bank reaction functions for a number of countries 
during the Gold Standard era. Using a probit model, his findings suggest that in the case 
of Belgium there have been many other factors determining its interest rate setting 
behavior other than following the interest rate set by the Bank of England. 
 
Portugal and Spain show the predicted movements in the  ̂t and  ̂t coefficients as 
they switch from peg to non-peg to peg over the course of the gold standard era. During 
the initial peg (1883M1-1891M7), one can notice the increasing  ̂t coefficients, they then 
flatten as the countries go through their non-peg period (1891M8-1901M11), and pick up 
once again during their late peg period (1910M6-1914M6). Finally, a few countries show 
no clear pattern over the course of the gold standard era. These are Denmark, Germany 
(except for spark in 1905), Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States. 
 
We now consider results from the Bretton Woods period (see Figure (1.2)) 
characterized by closed capital markets and (mostly) pegged exchange rate regimes. 
Generally, countries or periods of pegged exchange rates show less monetary 
independence, or at  ̂t coefficients above the zero dashed line in the graphs of Figure 
(1.2). Our single country with a non-pegged exchange rate throughout the entire Bretton 
Woods period, Brazil, shows considerable monetary policy autonomy. The short-run  ̂t 
coefficient is either negative or very close to zero implying no relationship with the local 
and base country interest rates.  
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Figure 1.2: Time-Varying Parameters in the Bretton Woods Era 
Austria: 1967M2-1970M12 
 
Brazil: 1964M2-1970M12 
 
France: 1964M2-1970M12 
 
Germany: 1960M2-1970M12 
 
 
Japan: 1959M2-1970M12 
 
 
Pakistan: 1964M2-1970M12 
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Sweden: 1960M4-1970M12 
 
United Kingdom: 1964M2-1970M12 
 
 
 Again, non-pegged periods seem to exhibit more volatility in the time-varying 
parameters reported. This is clear in the case of Germany (1969M6-1970M12). Other 
countries, for example France, show the expected trends as the country switches from a 
peg to non-peg at the very end of the period. Specifically, the short-run regression  ̂t 
coefficient has been increasing steadily during the peg period (1964M1-1968M12) 
indicating low monetary independence, but dropped near the end of the period (1969M1-
1970M12) indicating more independence from the base country interest rate. 
 
Austria and Japan are two countries that have experienced decreasing monetary 
independence over time, as seen from their steadily increasing short-run regression  ̂t 
coefficients. Although both countries pegged their exchange rates to the U.S. dollar over 
the entire Bretton Woods period, these pegs became stronger over time. This is clearly 
seen when we strict our definition of a pegged exchange rate as one staying within a 
±0.5% band instead of a ±2% band against the U.S. dollar over a whole year. These 
recalculations show that Austria and Japan have indeed witnessed some weak pegging 
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during the beginning of the period, turning to a stronger peg as we move towards the end 
of the Bretton Woods era. In the case of Japan, fixing the yen-dollar exchange rate served 
the country’s trade balance well as Japanese inflation did not increase in line with that of 
the U.S. towards the end of the Bretton Woods period (see Hetzel 1999). This lead to an 
undervaluation of the Japanese yen, helping Japan’s exports and explaining why Japan 
favored pegging its exchange rate to that of the U.S. during that period. 
 
The exact opposite is true for Germany, Pakistan and the United Kingdom. These 
countries have experienced increasing monetary independence over time as evident by 
their decreasing short-run regression  ̂t coefficients over time closely approaching zero at 
the end of the period. Indeed, we can see that these countries’ exchange rates have been 
witnessing weaker pegs (non-pegs if we apply the strict ±0.5% band) over time towards 
the end of the Bretton Woods period. In the case of Germany, as argued by Hetzel 
(2002), it could not maintain its peg with the dollar as this required it to match the 
increasing inflation rates in the U.S. in the second half of the 1960’s. During that period, 
the U.S. adopted inflationary monetary policies that eventually lead to the destruction of 
the Bretton Woods system in 1971. Regarding the United Kingdom, its steady departure 
from the peg with U.S. dollar was driven by different reasons. As argued by Bordo 
(1993), the United Kingdom’s problem was a slower growth rate than that of its trading 
partners along with higher inflation, ultimately threatening the competitiveness of the 
Sterling pound. This eventually forced a discretionary devaluation of the Sterling pound 
in 1967, thus moving away from the dollar peg towards the end of the Bretton Woods 
period. Other countries in our sample during this period have shown no clear pattern over 
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time. It seems that the capital controls applied by these countries have completely 
blocked any effect an exchange peg can have on monetary policy. 
 
Figure (1.3) reports results from the post-Bretton Woods era. Due to the large 
number of countries in this period, we only report the major findings.  
 
Figure 1.3: Time-Varying Parameters in the Post-Bretton Woods Era 
 
Austria: 1973M2-1998M12 
 
Belgium: 1973M2-2009M11 
 
Bolivia: 1994M2-2009M8 
 
Brazil: 1973M2-2009M10 
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Canada: 1973M2-2009M11 
 
France: 1973M2-2009M12 
 
Grenada: 1980M2-2009M10 
 
Lesotho: 1980M4-2009M10 
 
Malta: 1987M12-2009M8 
 
Namibia: 1991M1-2009M8 
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Netherlands: 1973M2-1998M12 
 
Singapore: 1973M5-2009M6 
 
 
Once again, non-pegged countries or periods exhibit, on average, higher volatility 
in their conduct of monetary policy as illustrated by the frequent movements of a the 
short-run regression  ̂t lagged error correction  ̂t coefficients over time.
14
 It is also worth 
noting that Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote D’Ivoire, Mali and Senegal all displayed the same 
spark in the 1992-1994 period.
15
 These countries are all part of the West African 
Monetary Union and they peg their currency to the French Franc. In January 1994, 
member countries of the union sharply devalued their currency in an attempt to help the 
union’s export sectors. This was reflected in the conduct of the union’s monetary policy 
leading to the spark. 
 
Some countries have experienced decreasing monetary independence over the 
course of the post-Bretton Woods period, as evident by the steady rise in the short-run  ̂t 
coefficient and corresponding decline in the  ̂t coefficient over time. An example is 
Grenada. On the other hand, some countries experienced increasing monetary autonomy 
                                                          
14
 Examples include the non-peg periods of Brazil (1973M1-2009M10), Israel (1984M6-2009M3), Italy 
(1973M1-2009M11), Kuwait’s early non-peg (1979M1-1993M1), Malaysia’s early non-peg (1973M1-
1999M9), Spain (1974M1-1995M12), Sri Lanka (1978M1-2008M12) and Sweden (1973M1-2009M4).  
These results are not shown for space considerations. 
15
 Results are not shown for space considerations but are available upon request. 
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over time as they witnessed a decreasing  ̂t and increasing  ̂t coefficient over time. Recall 
our definition of an exchange rate peg as staying within a ±2% band against the base 
country exchange rate over twelve months. Looking at Bolivia, one can notice that its 
exchange rate was within a ±2% to ±4% range at the beginning of the period, but then the 
non-peg moved further away from the border line of our definition into the ±6% to ±8% 
range. This increase in the flexibility of the exchange rate may help explain the growing 
monetary independence over time, as the country’s local interest rate has been moving 
further and further away from the base rate.  
 
The time-varying parameter methodology also captures the effects of changes in 
exchange rate regimes and capital controls on the autonomy of domestic monetary policy 
over time. Austria’s initial non-peg (1973M1-1975M5) and closed capital market policies 
are accompanied by near zero  ̂t and  ̂t coefficients. However, once the country switched 
to a pegged exchange rate in 1975M6, the short-run  ̂t coefficient starts to pick up 
gradually and rises even more as the country opens its capital markets near the end of the 
period. These movements in the  ̂t coefficient are accompanied by a movement of the  ̂t 
coefficient in the opposite direction, as the trilemma predicts. A very similar pattern is 
found in the case of France. France’s initial non-peg (1973M1-1983M1) and closed 
capital market (1973-1989) was a period of near zero  ̂t and  ̂ coefficients. But as soon as 
France switched to a pegged exchange rate regime (1983M2-2009M12) and an open 
capital market (1990-2009), the short-run  ̂t coefficient started rising, and the lagged 
error correction  ̂t coefficient started declining. Canada’s monetary dependence reached 
its maximum in 1994 as illustrated by the peak in the short-run  ̂t coefficient and trough 
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in the  ̂t coefficient. This can be explained by the fact that Canada fixed its exchange rate 
against the U.S. dollar during the period (1990M2-1997M2) along with open capital 
markets. The steady decline (rise) that we observe in the  ̂t coefficient ( ̂t coefficient) 
following that period is a consequence of the abolishment of this peg (the 1997M3-
2009M11 non-peg). The same analysis applies to Namibia with monetary dependence 
reaching the peak in 1992 which can be explained by the fact that Namibia fixed its 
exchange rate during 1991M9-1992M9, and then liberalized it afterwards (1992M9-
2009M8) which is when we start observing the steady decline (rise) in the  ̂t coefficient 
( ̂t coefficient). 
 
Changing capital control conditions also seem to have significant impact on the 
conduct and autonomy of monetary policy, putting the effect of exchange rate regime 
aside. Malta, for example, has had a flexible exchange rate system throughout the whole 
period, but it removed capital restrictions in 2002. Looking at Figure (1.3), we can see 
that Malta’s initial closed capital market period (1987-2001) witnessed a near zero  ̂t 
coefficient, but a steadily rising coefficient starting 2002 till the end of the period. 
Netherlands fixed its exchange rate throughout the whole period (1973M1-1998M12), 
but only opened its capital markets from 1975-1998 after restricting international capital 
transactions for 1973-1974. This information is accurately reflected in the time-varying 
coefficients of Netherlands where the short-run  ̂t coefficient started picking up only 
after 1975. 
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Belgium’s coefficients over time clearly show that the country had experienced 
“fear of floating”. During the country’s initial peg (1973M1-1981M1) with an open 
capital market, we can see that the short-run  ̂t coefficient was steadily increasing, but 
continued to rise even after the country liberated its exchange rate (1982M2-2009M11). 
A similar pattern is seen for Lesotho during its initial peg (1980M3-1995M9) and non-
peg (1995M10-2009M10) afterwards, as well as Singapore’s non-peg (1984M2-1994M1) 
period that continued to witness monetary policy dependence.  
 
Overall, results from the time-varying parameter methodology have improved our 
insight and understanding of the dynamics of the macroeconomic policy trilemma over 
time. Findings for most countries are rather informative using the time-varying approach 
as explained above. For a number of other countries, however, there has been no 
significant time variation in the short-run  ̂t and lagged error correction  ̂t coefficients, so 
we do not report graphs for these countries. Since the biggest majority of these countries 
are ones which did not experience any changes in their exchange rate regimes and/or 
capital control statuses, it is not surprising that there has not been much variation in their 
coefficients over time. 
 
1.4. Summary and Conclusion 
Do exchange rate regimes and capital control conditions affect the autonomy of domestic 
monetary policy? Results from this paper suggest that the answer is “Yes”. Our objective 
was to examine whether the exchange-rate and capital-control regimes influence the 
degree to which domestic interest rates follow the world (base country) interest rate. The 
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macroeconomic policy trilemma seems to explain a great deal of the movements in local 
interest rates. We have examined the implications of the trilemma using an extended 
dataset of developing and developed countries that covers three different time periods, 
characterized by different exchange rate regimes and capital flow restrictions allowing 
significant within and across era comparisons.  
 
Based on first-difference regressions and cointegration analysis, our findings 
suggest that, on average, pegged exchange rates result in lower monetary independence 
compared to non-pegs as evident by the high magnitudes and significance of the first-
difference or short-run regression coefficients and fast speeds of adjustment. This is 
especially true during the gold standard era because all countries in that period had 
perfectly open capital markets, while they were completely and partially closed during 
the Bretton Woods and post-Bretton Woods periods, respectively. Furthermore, the 
transmission of world interest rate changes to domestic rate changes was higher for 
countries/episodes with unrestricted capital markets than ones with controlled capital 
markets. We have also found evidence of “fear of floating”, where countries are non-
pegged de jure, but de facto follow their base country interest rate as indicated by 
stronger level relationships and faster speeds of adjustment. Overall, countries with 
pegged exchange rates and unrestricted international capital markets exhibit the lowest 
monetary independence of all. Giving up one or both policy options leads to higher 
independence. 
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Results from parameter instability tests reveal that the estimated coefficients using 
the fixed-coefficient bounds testing methodology suffer from structural breaks over the 
long periods of data that we use. This result motivates our application of a time-varying 
parameter methodology to better understand the dynamics of the trilemma over time. 
Results reveal considerable time variation in the reported coefficients. Non-pegged 
periods, on average, exhibit higher volatility in domestic interest rates compared to 
pegged periods. Some countries have experienced increasing monetary independence 
over time, others experienced decreasing independence. We have also been able to 
capture changes in monetary policy autonomy as countries switch between different 
exchange rate regimes and/or capital control restrictions over time allowing a more 
accurate test of the macroeconomic policy trilemma. 
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Table 1.4: Appendix Table A1: Gold Standard Data 
 
Country 
Exchange Rate Capital 
Controls De Jure Classification De Facto Classification Base Country 
Austria Non-peg: 1871M2-1892M7, Peg: 1879M6-1888M8, U.K. Open 
 Peg: 1893M9-1914M6 Peg: 1894M5-1914M6   
     
Belgium Peg: 1870M1-1914M6 Peg: 1872M12-1914M6 U.K. Open 
     
Denmark Peg: 1884M5-1914M6 Peg: 1884M5-1914M6 U.K. Open 
     
France Peg: 1872M4-1914M6 Peg: 1872M4-1914M6 U.K. Open 
     
Germany Peg: 1872M12-1914M6 Peg: 1872M7-1914M6 U.K. Open 
     
India Non-peg: 1884M5-1897M12, Non-peg 1890M10-1897M12, U.K. Open 
 
Peg: 1899M1-1914M6 Peg: 1899M1-1914M6   
     
Italy Peg: 1885M1-1893M12, Peg: 1885M1-1892M2, U.K. Open 
 
Non-peg: 1894M1-1914M6 Peg: 1902M10-1914M6   
     
Netherlands Non-peg: 1871M3-1875M5, Peg: 1870M1-1914M6 U.K. Open 
 Peg: 1876M6-1914M6    
     
Norway Peg: 1894M1-1914M6 Peg: 1894M1-1914M6 U.K. Open 
     
Portugal Peg: 1885M1-1891M6, Peg: 1885M1-1891M7, U.K. Open 
 Non-peg: 1891M7-1914M6 Non-peg: 1891M8-1901M11,   
  Peg: 1910M6-1914M6   
     
Russia Non-peg: 1871M2-1896M12, Non-peg: 1875M12-1882M2, U.K. Open 
 Peg: 1897M1-1900M8 Non-peg: 1887M11-1893M9,   
  Peg: 1894M6-1900M8   
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Country 
Exchange Rate Capital 
Controls De Jure Classification De Facto Classification Base Country 
     
Spain Non-peg: 1883M1-1914M6 Peg: 1883M1-1891M7, U.K. Open 
  Non-peg: 1891M8-1901M11,   
  Peg: 1910M6-1914M6   
     
Sweden Peg: 1892M12-1914M6 Peg: 1892M12-1914M6 U.K. Open 
     
Switzerland Peg: 1892M12-1914M6 Peg: 1892M12-1914M6 U.K. Open 
     
United States Peg: 1880M11-1914M6 Peg: 1883M1-1914M6 U.K. Open 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.5: Appendix Table A2: Bretton Woods Data 
 
Country Interest rate 
Exchange Rate 
Capital Controls 
ERR Base country 
Austria Money market Peg: 1967M1-1970M12 U.S.A. Closed 
     
Barbados Treasury Bill 
Non-peg: 1967M1-1967M12, Peg: 
1968M1-1970M12 
U.S.A. Closed 
     
Belgium Treasury Bill Peg: 1959M1-1970M12 U.S.A. Closed 
     
Brazil Money market Non-peg: 1964M1-1970M12 U.S.A. Closed 
     
Canada Treasury Bill Peg: 1959M1-1959M12, U.S.A. Closed 
  
Non-peg: 1960M1-1961M12, 
Peg: 1962M1-1969M12,  
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Country Interest rate 
Exchange Rate 
Capital Controls 
ERR Base country 
Non-peg: 1970M1-1970M12 
     
France Money market Peg: 1964M1-1968M12, U.S.A. Closed 
  Non-peg: 1969M1-1970M12   
     
Germany Money market Peg: 1960M1-1969M5, U.S.A. Closed 
  Non-peg: 1969M6-1970M12   
     
India Money market Peg: 1959M1-1970M12 U.S.A. Closed 
     
Jamaica Treasury Bill Peg: 1961M5-1970M12 U.S.A. Closed 
     
Japan Treasury Bill Peg: 1959M1-1970M12 U.S.A. Closed 
     
Netherlands Money market Peg: 1960M1-1970M12 U.S.A. Closed 
     
Pakistan Money market Peg: 1964M1-1970M12 U.S.A. Closed 
     
South Africa Treasury Bill Peg: 1959M1-1970M12 U.S.A. Closed 
     
Sweden Treasury Bill Peg: 1960M3-1970M12 U.S.A. Closed 
     
Trinidad and Tobago Treasury Bill 
Peg: 1964M12-1966M12, 
Non-peg: 1967M1-1967M12, 
Peg: 1968M1-1970M12 
U.S.A. Closed 
     
United Kingdom Treasury Bill 
Peg: 1964M12-1966M12, 
Peg: 1968M1-1970M12 
U.S.A. Closed 
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Table 1.6: Appendix Table A3: Post-Bretton Woods Data 
 
Country Interest rate 
Exchange Rate 
Capital Controls 
ERR Base country 
Algeria Treasury bill Non-peg: 1980M1-2009M11 France Closed 
Antigua and Barbuda Treasury bill Peg: 1980M1-2009M10 U.S.A. Open 
Argentina Money market 
Non-peg: 1979M3-1991M3, 
Peg: 1992M4-2003M4, 
Non-peg: 2003M5-2009M11 
U.S.A. 
Closed 1979-1992, 
Open 1993-2004, 
Closed 2005-2009 
Australia Money market Non-peg: 1973M1-2009M11 U.S.A. 
Closed 1973-1983, 
Open 1984-2009 
Austria Money market 
Non-peg: 1973M1-1975M5, 
Peg: 1975M6-1998M11 
Germany 
Closed 1973-1990, 
Open 1991-1998 
Bahamas, The Treasury bill Peg: 1973M1-2009M11 U.S.A. Closed 
Bahrain, Kingdom of Treasury bill Peg: 1987M6-2009M10 U.S.A. Open 
Belgium Treasury bill 
Peg: 1973M1-1981M1, 
Non-peg: 1982M2-2009M11 
Germany Open 
Belize Treasury bill Peg: 1978M12-2009M10 U.S.A. 
Closed 1978-1985, 
Open 1986-1999, 
Closed 2000-2009 
Benin Money market Peg: 1975M7-2009M10 France Closed 
Bolivia Treasury bill Non-peg: 1994M1-2009M8 U.S.A. Open 
Brazil Money market Non-peg: 1973M1-2009M10 U.S.A. Closed 
Burkina Faso Money market Peg: 1975M7-2009M10 France Closed 
Canada Treasury bill 
Non-peg: 1973M1-1990M1, 
Peg: 1990M2-1997M2, 
Non-peg: 1997M3-2009M11 
U.S.A. Open 
China, P.R. Treasury bill Peg: 1993M12-2009M11 U.S.A. Closed 
Colombia Money market Non-peg: 1995M3-2009M11 U.S.A. Closed 
Côte d'Ivoire Money market Peg: 1975M7-2009M10 France Closed 
Denmark Money market Non-peg: 1973M1-2009M11 Germany 
Closed 1973-1987, 
Open 1988-2009 
Dominica Treasury bill Peg: 1980M1-2009M9 U.S.A. Closed 
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Country Interest rate 
Exchange Rate 
Capital Controls 
ERR Base country 
Dominican Republic Money market 
Peg: 1996M2-2001M6, 
Non-peg: 2001M7-2009M12 
U.S.A. Closed 
Egypt Treasury bill 
Peg: 1997M2-2000M7, 
Non-peg: 2000M8-2004M5, 
Peg: 2004M6-2009M10 
U.S.A. 
Closed 1997-1999, 
Open 2000-2009 
El Salvador Money market Peg: 1997M2-2006M6 U.S.A. Open 
Ethiopia Treasury bill 
Peg: 1985M6-1993M12 
Non-peg: 1994M1-2002M3, 
Peg: 2002M4-2007M4, 
Non-peg: 2007M5-2009M1 
U.S.A. Closed 
Fiji Treasury bill Non-peg: 1975M1-2009M7 U.S.A. Closed 
Finland Money market Non-peg: 1977M12-2009M12 Germany 
Closed 1977-1990, 
Open 1991-2009 
France Treasury bill 
Non-peg: 1973M1-1983M1, 
Peg: 1983M2-2009M12 
Germany 
Closed 1973-1989, 
Open 1990-2009 
Germany Money market Non-peg: 1973M1-2009M12 U.S.A. Open 
Ghana Treasury bill 
Peg: 1978M1-1983M8, 
Non-peg: 1983M9-2004M12, 
Peg: 2005M1-2009M4 
U.S.A. Closed 
Grenada Treasury bill Peg: 1980M1-2009M10 U.S.A. Closed 
Guatemala Money market 
Non-peg: 1997M2-2000M7, 
Peg: 2000M8-2006M5 
U.S.A. Open 
Indonesia Money market Non-peg: 1983M1-2009M11 U.S.A. 
Open 1983-1999, 
Closed 2000-2009 
Israel Treasury bill Non-peg: 1984M6-2009M3 U.S.A. 
Closed 1984-2000, 
Open 2001-2009 
Italy Money market Non-peg: 1973M1-2009M11 Germany 
Closed 1973-1989, 
Open 1990-2009 
Jamaica Treasury bill 
Peg: 1973M1-1983M10, Non-
peg: 1983M11-2009M11 
U.S.A. Closed 
Japan Treasury bill Non-peg: 1973M1-2009M11 U.S.A. Closed 1973-1978, 
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Country Interest rate 
Exchange Rate 
Capital Controls 
ERR Base country 
Open 1979-2009 
Kenya Treasury bill 
Non-peg: 1973M1-2001M6, 
Peg: 2001M7-2004M1,  
Non-peg: 2004M2-2009M8 
U.S.A. Closed 
Korea, Republic of Money market Non-peg: 1976M5-2009M10 U.S.A. 
Closed 1976-2005, 
Open 2006-2009 
Kuwait Money market 
Non-peg: 1979M1-1993M1, 
Peg: 1993M2-2007M7, 
Non-peg: 2007M8-2009M10 
U.S.A. Open 
Lao People's Dem. Rep. Treasury bill Non-peg: 1994M12-2009M10 U.S.A. Closed 
Lebanon Treasury bill 
Non-peg: 19821M1-1994M1, 
Peg: 1994M2-2009M10 
U.S.A. 
Open 1994-1999, 
Closed 2000-2009 
Lesotho Treasury bill 
Peg: 1980M3-1995M9,  
Non-peg: 1995M10-2009M10 
South Africa Closed 
Luxembourg Money market Peg: 1990M1-1994M4 Belgium Open 
Madagascar Money market Non-peg: 1990M12-2009M7 France Closed 
Malawi Treasury bill Non-peg: 1983M1-2009M10 U.S.A. Closed 
Malaysia Money market 
Non-peg: 1973M1-1999M9, 
Peg: 1999M10-2006M1, Non-
peg: 2006M2-2009M6 
U.S.A. 
Open 1973-1997, 
Closed 1998-2009 
Mali Money market 
Peg: 1975M7-1995M1,  
Non-peg: 1995M2-2009M10 
France Closed 
Malta Treasury bill Non-peg: 1987M11-2009M8 France 
Closed 1987-2002, 
Open 2003-2009 
Mauritius Money market Non-peg: 1979M1-2009M10 U.K. 
Closed 1979-2001, 
Open 2002-2009 
Mexico Treasury bill 
Non-peg: 1978M1-1991M1, 
Peg: 1991M2-2009M11 
U.S.A. 
Open 1978-1981, 
Closed 1982-2009 
Morocco Money market Non-peg: 1980M12-2009M9 France Closed 
Mozambique Money market Non-peg: 1998M1-2009M8 U.S.A. Closed 
Namibia Treasury bill Peg: 1991M9-1992M9, South Africa Closed 
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Country Interest rate 
Exchange Rate 
Capital Controls 
ERR Base country 
Non-peg: 1992M10-2009M8 
Nepal Treasury bill Peg: 1981M1-2009M6 U.S.A. Closed 
Netherlands Money market Peg: 1973M1-1998M12 Germany 
Closed 1973-1974, 
Open 1975-1998 
Netherlands Antilles Treasury bill Peg: 1982M1-2009M9 U.S.A. Closed 
New Zealand Treasury bill Non-peg: 1978M1-2009M11 Australia 
Closed 1978-1983, 
Open 1984-2009 
Niger Money market Peg: 1975M7-2009M10 France 
Closed 1975-1994, 
Open 1995-1999, 
Closed 2000-2009 
Nigeria Treasury bill Non-peg: 1991M7-2009M6 U.S.A. Closed 
Norway Money market Non-peg: 1973M1-2009M9 Germany 
Closed 1973-1994, 
Open 1995-2009 
Pakistan Money market 
Peg: 1973M1-1981M1,  
Non-peg: 1981M2-2009M11 
U.S.A. Closed 
Paraguay Money market 
Peg: 1990M10-1999M1, Non-
peg: 1999M2-2009M10 
U.S.A. 
Closed 1990-1999, 
Open 2000-2009 
Philippines Treasury bill Non-peg: 1976M1-2009M10 U.S.A. Closed 
Poland Money market Non-peg:1990M12-2009M11 Germany Closed 
Portugal Money market 
Non-peg: 1983M1-1995M1, 
Peg: 1995M2-2000M3 
Germany 
Closed 1983-1992, 
Open 1993-2000 
Romania Money market Non-peg: 1995M1-2009M10 U.S.A. 
Closed 1995-2004, 
Open 2005-2009 
Senegal Money market Peg: 1975M7-2009M10 France Closed 
Seychelles Treasury bill 
Non-peg: 1979M7-2004M3, 
Peg: 2004M4-2006M11, Non-
peg: 2006M12-2009M10 
U.S.A. Open 
Singapore Treasury bill 
Peg: 1973M4-1984M1,  
Non-peg: 1984M2-1994M1, 
Peg: 1994M2-2009M11 
Malaysia 
Closed 1973-1977, 
Open 1978-2009 
South Africa Treasury bill Non-peg: 1973M1-2009M11 U.S.A. Closed 
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Country Interest rate 
Exchange Rate 
Capital Controls 
ERR Base country 
Spain Money market 
Non-peg: 1974M1-1995M12,  
Peg: 1996M1-2009M11 
Germany 
Closed 1973-1993, 
Open 1994-2006, 
Closed 2007-2009 
Sri Lanka Money market Non-peg: 1978M1-2008M12 U.S.A. Closed 
St. Kitts and Nevis Treasury bill Peg: 1980M1-2009M9 U.S.A. Closed 
St. Lucia Treasury bill Peg: 1980M1-2009M9 U.S.A. Closed 
St. Vincent & Grens. Treasury bill Peg: 1980M1-2009M11 U.S.A. Closed 
Swaziland Treasury bill Peg: 1981M12-2009M9 South Africa Closed 
Sweden Treasury bill Non-peg: 1973M1-2009M4 Germany 
Closed 1973-1992, 
Open 1993-2006, 
Closed 2007-2009 
Switzerland Money market Non-peg: 1975M9-2009M10 Germany 
Closed 1973-1989, 
Open 1990-2006, 
Closed 2007-2009 
Tanzania Treasury bill Non-peg: 1993M12-2009M10 U.S.A. Closed 
Thailand Money market 
Peg: 1977M1-2000M3,  
Non-peg: 2000M4-2004M12, 
Peg: 2005M1-2009M11 
U.S.A. Closed 
Togo Money market Peg: 1975M7-2009M10 France Closed 
Tunisia Money market Non-peg: 1984M1-2009M11 France Closed 
Turkey Money market Non-peg: 1986M4-2009M11 U.S.A. Closed 
Uganda Treasury bill Non-peg: 1980M1-2009M11 U.S.A. 
Closed 1980-1996, 
Open 1997-2009 
United Kingdom Treasury bill Non-peg: 1973M1-2009M11 Germany 
Closed 1973-1978, 
Open 1979-2009 
Uruguay Money market Non-peg: 1992M12-2009M8 U.S.A. 
Closed 1992-1995, 
Open 1996-2009 
Venezuela, Rep. Bol. Money market 
Non-peg: 1996M1-2006M3, 
Peg: 2006M4-2009M11 
U.S.A. 
Open 1996-2004, 
Closed 2005-2009 
Zambia Treasury bill Non-peg: 1978M1-2009M8 U.S.A. 
Closed 1978-1995, 
Open 1996-2009 
  
5
5
 
Country Interest rate 
Exchange Rate 
Capital Controls 
ERR Base country 
Zimbabwe Treasury bill Non-peg: 1978M12-2007M12 U.S.A. Closed 
 
 
Table 1.7: Appendix Table A4: Individual Country ARDL Regressions 
 
 No. of obs. γ β θ Half life F Stability Adj R2 
 
 Gold Standard – De Jure Classification 
         
Austria 521 0.61** 0.019 -0.04*** 16.98 8.79*** 4.55 .03 
Belgium 533 0.52*** 0.26*** -0.12*** 5.42 19.4*** 48.21*** .18 
Denmark 362 -0.63 0.24*** -0.06*** 11.20 7.7*** 14.53*** .12 
France 507 0.61*** 0.13*** -0.11*** 5.95 16.8*** 15.56*** .09 
Germany 499 0.29 0.21*** -0.08*** 8.31 10.2*** 28.94*** .16 
India 362 1.15** 0.11 -0.12*** 5.42 13.56*** 7.97** .07 
Italy 354 0.08* 0.002 -0.42*** 1.27 108.51*** 49.48*** .40 
Netherlands 520 0.89*** 0.08*** -0.07*** 9.55 17.77*** 12.29*** .07 
Norway 246 0.44*** 0.11*** -0.31*** 1.87 44.5*** 42.72*** .27 
Portugal 354 0.18 0.24* -0.04** 16.98 60.00*** 54.59*** .08 
Russia 355 0.16 -0.05 -0.16*** 3.98 15.48*** 5.25* .08 
Spain 378 0.65*** 0.09** -0.18*** 3.49 34.3*** 23.66*** .15 
Sweden 259 0.79*** 0.07*** -0.02*** 34.31 16.5*** 5.43* .04 
Switzerland 259 0.56*** 0.32*** -0.33*** 1.73 39.2*** 12.48*** .34 
U.S.A. 404 0.62*** 0.53*** -0.35*** 1.61 44.1*** 41.03*** .21 
         
Pegs (average)  0.40 0.23 -0.17 8.80 24.80 26.11 0.18 
Occ. pegs (average)  0.51 0.07 -0.14 9.03 37.35 22.36 0.12 
Non-pegs (average)  0.65 0.09 -0.18 3.49 34.30 23.66 0.15 
         
 Gold Standard – De Facto Classification 
         
  
5
6
 
 No. of obs. γ β θ Half life F Stability Adj R2 
Austria 421 0.72** 0.1 -0.05*** 13.51 6.26*** 12.26* .03 
Belgium 499 0.41** 0.19*** -0.09*** 7.35 12.3*** 29.02*** .14 
Denmark 362 -0.63 0.24*** -0.06*** 11.20 7.7*** 14.53*** .12 
France 507 0.61*** 0.13*** -0.11*** 5.95 16.8*** 15.56*** .09 
Germany 504 0.28 0.21*** -0.08*** 8.31 10.6*** 29.70*** .17 
India 285 0.47 -0.04 -0.03** 22.76 3.29** 5.31* .02 
Italy 354 0.08* 0.002 -0.42*** 1.27 108.51*** 16.37*** .40 
Netherlands 528 0.87*** 0.11*** -0.09*** 7.35 21.9*** 18.64*** .10 
Norway 246 0.44*** 0.11*** -0.31*** 1.87 44.5*** 42.72*** .27 
Portugal 354 0.18 0.24* -0.04** 16.98 60.00*** 54.59*** .08 
Russia 297 0.40 -0.11 -0.14*** 4.60 12.09*** 6.01** .08 
Spain 378 0.65*** 0.09** -0.18*** 3.49 34.3*** 23.66*** .15 
Sweden 259 0.79*** 0.07*** -0.02*** 34.31 16.5*** 5.43* .04 
Switzerland 259 0.56*** 0.32*** -0.33*** 1.73 39.2*** 12.48*** .34 
U.S.A. 378 0.7*** 0.57*** -0.35*** 1.61 40.9*** 32.75*** .21 
         
Pegs (average)  0.47 0.18 -0.17 8.90 29.56 20.86 0.17 
Occ. pegs (average)  0.16 0.08 -0.10 11.96 27.42 22.39 0.08 
         
 Bretton Woods 
         
Austria 47 0.50 0.30* -0.12 5.42 1.29 7.52** .13 
Barbados 47 0.58*** -0.07 -0.13* 4.98 3.13** 2.16 .09 
Belgium 143 0.53*** 0.04 -0.12*** 5.42 5.62*** 4.07** .06 
Brazil 83 0.70 -0.64 -0.04 16.98 1.30 3.58 .03 
Canada 143 0.70*** 0.59*** -0.12*** 5.42 3.94** 2.71 .13 
France 83 1.56*** 0.44** -0.13** 4.98 3.38** 3.01 .12 
Germany 131 1.14*** -0.20 -0.14*** 4.60 7.02*** 12.25* .09 
India 143 0.28 -0.82** -0.27*** 2.20 12.29*** 1.57 .15 
Jamaica 115 -0.07 0.014 -0.03 22.76 1.08 2.79 .002 
Japan 143 0.05 0.02 -0.02* 34.31 1.37 10.45*** .02 
Netherlands 131 1.40*** 0.43*** -0.14*** 4.60 5.81*** 2.74 .11 
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 No. of obs. γ β θ Half life F Stability Adj R2 
Pakistan 83 -0.04 -0.15 -0.05* 13.51 1.48 1.53 .02 
South Africa 143 0.44 -0.03 -0.013 52.97 0.47 4.45** .001 
Sweden 129 0.91*** 0.007 -0.28*** 2.11 11.31*** 3.53 .14 
Trinidad and Tobago 72 0.14 0.13 -0.12* 5.42 1.83 2.25 .05 
United Kingdom 83 0.54*** 0.29** -0.14*** 4.60 4.52** 9.11*** .13 
         
Pegs (average)  0.57 0.06 -0.12 5.42 3.55 4.64 .08 
Non-pegs (average)  0.70 -0.64 -0.04 16.98 1.30 3.58 .03 
         
 Post-Bretton Woods 
         
Algeria 358 2.46 0.03 -0.004 172.94 1.36 12.59* .002 
Antigua & Barbuda 357 0.02 0.004 -0.12*** 5.42 11.24*** 6.47** .05 
Argentina 225 -0.77 -1.21 -0.35*** 1.61 49.94*** 48.95*** .31 
Australia 442 1.15*** -0.03 -0.04*** 16.98 9.37*** 6.35** .04 
Austria 311 0.64*** 0.067** -0.05*** 13.51 3.44** 14.15*** .02 
Bahamas, The 442 0.76*** 0.02 -0.06*** 11.20 13.26*** 6.10** .05 
Bahrain, Kingdom 268 1.05*** 0.75*** -0.18*** 3.49 15.40*** 24.08*** .45 
Belgium 442 1.70** 0.03* -0.01*** 68.97 1.87 21.04*** .007 
Belize 370 1.02*** 0.007 -0.03*** 22.76 9.42*** 2.58 .04 
Benin 411 0.73*** 0.30*** -0.07*** 9.55 8.13*** 13.12*** .09 
Bolivia 187 4.81 0.06 -0.02** 34.31 3.21** 3.25 .02 
Brazil 441 4.15 0.24 -0.05*** 13.51 5.98*** 2.24 .02 
Burkina Faso 411 0.74*** 0.31*** -0.11*** 5.95 11.71*** 16.30*** .09 
Canada 442 1.34*** 0.60*** -0.06*** 11.20 13.45*** 5.31* .36 
China, Hong Kong 191 1.17*** 0.79*** -0.21*** 2.94 10.79*** 4.83 .13 
Colombia 176 3.26** -0.69 -0.08*** 8.31 4.36** 13.33*** .04 
Côte d'Ivoire 411 0.73*** 0.30*** -0.07*** 9.55 8.13*** 13.13*** .09 
Denmark 442 1.31*** 0.35*** -0.13*** 4.98 16.19*** 10.19*** .08 
Dominica 356 0.01*** 0.00019 -0.02*** 34.31 3.28** 3.29 .01 
Dominican Republic 165 -1.29 0.05 -0.03 22.76 1.25 24.07*** .004 
Egypt 152 -0.15 0.31 -0.14*** 4.60 6.16*** 1.22 .07 
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 No. of obs. γ β θ Half life F Stability Adj R2 
El Salvador 112 1.02*** -0.65 -0.29*** 2.02 9.79*** 6.80** .14 
Ethiopia 283 -0.28 -0.20 -0.01 68.97 1.21 9.26*** .006 
Fiji 414 0.38** 0.02 -0.08*** 8.31 9.10*** 5.09* .04 
Finland 384 1.48*** 0.25*** -0.04*** 16.98 10.01*** 8.37*** .05 
France 443 1.65*** 0.06*** -0.03*** 22.76 7.37*** 20.32*** .04 
Germany 442 0.69*** 0.07 -0.09*** 7.35 13.33*** 16.06*** .06 
Ghana 375 2.06 0.016 -0.006 115.18 1.20 15.20*** .001 
Grenada 357 0.06 0.0001 -0.05*** 13.51 5.55*** 3.12 .03 
Guatemala 111 0.31 -1.16 -0.34*** 1.67 11.56*** 3.68 .16 
Indonesia 322 1.02 -0.12 -0.06*** 11.20 5.66*** 2.13 .03 
Israel 297 4.16 4.59** -0.05*** 13.51 8.86*** 6.29** .08 
Italy 442 2.64*** 0.046 -0.02*** 34.31 7.58*** 11.81*** .03 
Jamaica 442 -0.67 -0.03 -0.02** 34.31 2.65* 3.18 .007 
Japan 442 0.93*** -0.001 -0.01*** 68.97 6.56*** 2.66 .03 
Kenya 439 0.73 -0.007 -0.02** 34.31 2.42* 6.20** .006 
Korea, Republic 398 1.34** 0.15* -0.02** 34.31 2.54* 2.24 .01 
Kuwait 369 0.82*** 0.41*** -0.06*** 11.20 7.64*** 7.15** .19 
Lao People's Rep 169 1.68* 0.43 -0.07*** 9.55 3.92** 4.25 .04 
Lebanon 333 1.52* -0.14 -0.03*** 22.76 3.53** 18.64*** .02 
Lesotho 353 0.93*** 0.28*** -0.12*** 5.42 17.76*** 16.23*** .14 
Luxembourg 111 0.96*** 0.79*** -0.37*** 1.50 13.21*** 7.32** .75 
Madagascar 223 0.70 0.20 -0.02* 34.31 1.57 6.40** .01 
Malawi 321 -0.41 -0.20 -0.03** 22.76 2.28 1.83 .01 
Malaysia 437 0.27** -0.04 -0.12*** 5.42 14.63*** 8.60*** .06 
Mali 411 0.74*** 0.31*** -0.07*** 9.55 8.13*** 13.13*** .09 
Malta 261 -0.56 0.07** 0.01** 68.97 2.32 55.44*** .03 
Mauritius 369 0.71*** -0.02 -0.05*** 13.51 5.29*** 2.97 .03 
Mexico 382 5.74** 0.18 -0.02*** 34.31 3.65** 35.01*** .01 
Morocco 188 0.31 0.09 -0.03** 22.76 2.86* 8.51*** .02 
Mozambique 139 6.44 -0.15 -0.03*** 22.76 7.38*** 1.56 .09 
Namibia 215 1.06*** 0.76*** -0.19*** 3.29 16.01*** 10.97*** .65 
Nepal 329 0.20 0.01 -0.04*** 16.98 3.84** 18.91*** .02 
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 No. of obs. γ β θ Half life F Stability Adj R2 
Netherlands 311 0.88*** 0.06 -0.21*** 2.94 22.48*** 7.01*** .12 
Netherlands Antilles 332 0.58*** 0.02 -0.08*** 8.31 9.98*** 5.59* .05 
New Zealand 382 1.06*** 0.15** -0.07*** 9.55 9.71*** 6.44** .05 
Niger 411 0.73*** 0.28*** -0.07*** 9.55 7.82*** 12.01*** .08 
Nigeria 215 2.29 -0.40 -0.02* 34.31 1.59 2.22 .01 
Norway 440 0.85*** 0.04 -0.09*** 7.35 11.13*** 7.92** .04 
Pakistan 442 0.10 -0.17 -0.29*** 2.02 37.43*** 9.43*** .14 
Paraguay 228 1.50* 0.44 -0.16*** 3.98 9.71*** 6.74** .07 
Philippines 405 1.85*** 0.07 -0.03*** 22.76 6.68*** 12.74*** .03 
Poland 227 1.70 1.35** -0.04*** 16.98 4.08** 8.54*** .04 
Portugal 206 1.72** 0.23 -0.09*** 7.35 5.16*** 20.05*** .04 
Romania 177 6.36* 0.34 -0.08*** 8.31 3.67** 8.78*** .03 
Senegal 411 0.73*** 0.27*** -0.07*** 9.55 7.81*** 11.43*** .08 
Seychelles 363 0.69 -0.08 -0.01* 68.97 1.49 10.46*** .008 
Singapore 434 -0.06 0.02 -0.04*** 16.98 4.34** 8.08** .02 
South Africa 442 3.37* 0.08* -0.01*** 68.97 12.02*** 8.04** .05 
Spain 430 1.35*** -0.17 -0.10*** 6.58 11.30*** 11.31*** .05 
Sri Lanka 371 0.30 -0.18 -0.24*** 2.53 26.16*** 6.69** .12 
St. Kitts and Nevis 356 -0.01 -0.005 -0.02* 34.31 1.85 12.17*** .006 
St. Lucia 356 0.02 -0.002 -0.13*** 4.98 11.75*** 11.37*** .06 
St. Vincent & Grens. 358 0.09** 0.006 -0.09*** 7.35 9.65*** 9.68*** .05 
Swaziland 333 0.92*** 0.25*** -0.09*** 7.35 16.84*** 11.27*** .16 
Sweden 435 1.30*** -0.10** -0.03*** 22.76 5.12*** 6.88** .04 
Switzerland 409 0.55*** -0.017 -0.09*** 7.35 9.53*** 17.67*** .04 
Tanzania 190 0.70 2.46*** -0.06*** 11.20 4.21** 9.85*** .06 
Thailand 394 1.40*** 0.46*** -0.09*** 7.35 10.53*** 5.95* .08 
Togo 411 0.73*** 0.28*** -0.07*** 9.55 7.85*** 12.17*** .08 
Tunisia 310 0.80*** 0.06 -0.04*** 16.98 8.90*** 2.31 .05 
Turkey 283 3.88** 3.58 -0.22*** 2.79 17.30*** 10.36*** .11 
Uganda 358 3.11 0.08 -0.01** 68.97 3.01* 14.39*** .01 
United Kingdom 442 -1.43 0.004 -0.002 346.23 0.33 13.26*** .0001 
Uruguay 200 1.02 1.05 -0.09 7.35 4.81*** 17.50*** .04 
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 No. of obs. γ β θ Half life F Stability Adj R2 
Venezuela, Rep. 166 -0.45 -0.43 -0.28*** 2.11 13.79*** 8.81*** .14 
Zambia 379 -1.08 -0.28 -0.01* 68.97 1.74 6.71* .006 
Zimbabwe 349 -14.01 0.23 -0.01* 68.97 1.70 5.69* .004 
         
ERR         
Pegs (average)  0.60 0.17 -0.10 10.68 10.12 10.11 0.11 
Occ. pegs (average)  0.80 -0.01 -0.09 22.36 9.32 13.04 0.08 
Non-pegs (average)  1.31 0.36 -0.05 36.74 6.70 8.96 0.04 
         
Capital Market         
Open (average)  1.22 0.07 -0.14 19.65 9.29 10.15 0.20 
Occ. (average)  1.22 0.18 -0.08 29.64 8.71 12.69 0.05 
Closed (average)  0.75 0.26 -0.07 24.40 8.15 9.03 0.07 
         
*** Significant at the 1%, ** at the 5% and * at the 10% significance level 
The Average Wald F-statistic is reported for the stability (Quandt-Andrews breakpoint) test   
Half-life is calculated as follows: ln(0.5)/ln(1-| |) 
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Chapter 2: The Exchange Rate Disconnect Puzzle 
Revisited 
 
2.1. Motivation and Literature 
The exchange rate disconnect puzzle has been widely studied in the international 
macroeconomic literature. Theories stipulate that, in the long-run, exchange rates are 
determined by fundamentals such as output, money supply, interest rates and prices. 
Empirical results, however, do not support such a relationship. This chapter tries to fill 
this gap using new econometric techniques. In order to motivate the significance of our 
findings, we use the same dataset of the seminal paper of Engel and West (2005) which 
studied the same puzzle, and compare our results to theirs. 
 
Engel and West (2005) employed the standard Johansen and Juselius (1990) 
approach to cointegration to test for a long-run relationship between the exchange rate of 
six industrialized countries and a number of fundamental variables as hypothesized by the 
monetary approach to exchange rate determination. Specifically, they conduct six 
multivariate equations, one for each country against the whole set of fundamentals; 
relative money supplies, relative output, the interest rate differential and the inflation 
differential of each country against the United States which is considered the base 
country. They also conduct bivariate equations of the exchange rate of each country 
against each and every fundamental variable separately. An important precondition in the 
Johansen approach is that variables need all be I(1) in levels and I(0) in first-differences. 
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We show that we fail to reject the null of a unit root in some of the above mentioned 
variables, while the null is rejected in some other variables.   
 
In this chapter, we use the same dataset as in Engel and West (2005), but the 
difference is that we suggest using the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) approach 
to cointegration developed by Pesaran et al (2001) as opposed to the standard Johansen 
approach. The advantage of this approach is that it is directly applicable irrespective of 
whether the variables of interest are purely stationary, or first-difference stationary or 
mutually cointegrated. This property helps avoid some econometric problems that arise 
when using the traditional Johansen approach as will be discussed below in detail.  
 
This chapter presents strong support for the monetary model of exchange rate 
determination. Specifically, an ARDL model is first estimated to study the long-run and 
short-run relationship between exchange rates and fundamentals. Using Pesaran et al’s 
(2001) F-statistic procedure to test for the significance of lagged level variables in a 
conditional error-correction format, as well as examining the sign and significance of the 
lagged error correction term we find evidence of cointegration in 20 bivariate 
relationships between exchange rates in the six countries and each of the four 
fundamentals as opposed to only 5 in the Engel and West paper. We also find 
cointegration based on multivariate relationships in all 6 countries as opposed to almost 
none in the Engel and West paper.  
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Furthermore, we conduct a number of Granger causality tests examining the 
direction of causality between exchange rates and fundamentals, both in the short-run and 
the long-run. Again, our results improve on those of Engel and West (2005), as we find 
evidence that fundamentals help predict exchange rates in all six countries, in both the 
short-run and long-run. This finding contrasts with that of Engel and West as they mainly 
find evidence of Granger causality going in the opposite direction. 
 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the 
alternative theories and reviews the literature. Section 3 presents the econometric 
methodologies and results. Finally, section 4 concludes. 
 
2.2. Monetary Approach to Exchange Rate Determination: Theory & 
Empirics 
At the start of the post Bretton-Woods era, the monetary (or asset) approach to the 
exchange rate emerged as the dominant exchange rate model; that exchange rates move 
to equilibrate any disequilibrium in the international money (asset) markets.
16
 There are 
generally two versions of the monetary approach to the exchange rate, and this section 
will outline both the theory and the empirics behind them. 
 
 
                                                          
16
 See Taylor (1995), Rogoff (1999) and Neely and Sarno (2002) for a comprehensive review of the theory 
and evidence. 
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2.2.1. Monetary Approach to Exchange Rate Determination: Theory 
The first version of the monetary approach is the so-called “Chicago” theory or the 
flexible-price monetary model introduced by Frenkel (1976) and Bilson (1978a, 1978b). 
The second is the “Keynesian” theory or the sticky-price monetary model developed by 
Dornbusch (1976), which was later modified by Frankel (1979) and termed the real 
interest differential model.  
 
2.2.1.1. The Flexible-price Monetary Model 
The flexible-price monetary theory is based on two core building blocks: a simple money 
demand function and the purchasing power parity (PPP) condition. The quantity theory of 
money posits that prices are determined by equilibrium in the money market. This is 
represented by the following money demand functions, one for the domestic and the other 
for the foreign country: 
 
mt – pt = ϕyt - λit 
 
m
*
t  – p
*
t = ϕy
*
t – λi
*
t 
 
where m, p and y represent the log of the domestic stock of money, price level, 
and output, while i is the interest rate and an asterisk denotes the corresponding variables 
of the foreign country. The income elasticity of money demand is represented by ϕ, while 
λ represents the interest rate semi-elasticity of money demand. 
  
(2.1) 
(2.2) 
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The second equation is the PPP condition where the spot nominal exchange rate, 
st, defined as the price of foreign currency, equals the difference between the domestic, 
pt, and the foreign price levels, p
*
t 
 
st = pt – p
*
t 
  
Solving equations (2.1) and (2.2) for pt and p
*
t, substituting into equation (2.3) 
and adding an error term yields the flexible-price monetary theory of exchange rate: 
 
st = (mt – m
*
t) – ϕ(yt –  y
*
t) + λ(it – i
*
t) + ut 
  
Equation (2.4) assumes that the domestic and foreign countries both have the 
same money demand coefficients. This flexible-price monetary equation adopted by 
Bilson (1978a, 1978b) basically says that, in equilibrium, the spot exchange rate is a 
function of the relative money supplies, relative incomes and the relative price levels. As 
such, an increase in domestic money supply over that of the foreign country leads to 
exchange rate depreciation of the domestic currency, while an increase in the domestic 
over the foreign output level leads to an appreciation of the domestic currency, and 
finally an increase in the domestic interest rate leads to a depreciation of the domestic 
currency.  
  
(2.3) 
(2.4) 
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Frenkel (1976), on the other hand, assumes a Cagan-type money demand 
function, in which he uses the expected inflation rate instead of the interest rate as 
follows: 
 
mt – pt = ϕyt - λπt 
  
with a similar equation for the foreign country. Going through the exact same 
procedure as above, we arrive at Frenkel’s (1976) exchange rate equation for the flexible-
price monetary model, that is very similar to the one derived in Bilson’s (1978a, 1978b) 
framework, except that we replace the interest rate differential with the expected inflation 
rate differential 
 
st = (mt – m
*
t) – ϕ(yt –  y
*
t) + λ(πt – π
*
t) + ut  
 
2.2.1.2.  The Sticky-price Monetary Model 
The alternative class of monetary models to exchange rate due originally to Dornbusch 
(1976), and later on modified by Frankel (1979), assumes that prices are rigid, and thus 
the adjustment process of the exchange rate to its long-run level is slow following any 
short-run disequilibrium. Specifically, this sticky-price monetary approach stipulates that 
the nominal exchange rate in the short-run will overshoot its long-run level associated 
with the PPP condition. These models assume the following Uncovered Interest Parity 
(UIP) condition 
E(st-1 – st) = it – i
*
t 
(2.5) 
(2.6) 
(2.7) 
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Frankel (1979) then assumes that the above equation is a function of the gap 
between the spot nominal exchange rate and its long-run equilibrium level, and of the 
long-run inflation differential between the domestic and foreign countries. Using bars to 
indicate equilibrium (long-run) levels, this is represented as follows: 
 
E(st-1 – st) = - ζ(st –   ̅) + (πt – π
*
t) 
 
According to Frankel (1979), the above equation simply says that in the short-run 
the exchange rate will return to its long-run equilibrium level at a rate that is proportional 
to the current gap as defined by ζ, the speed of adjustment in the goods market. Putting 
equation (2.7) into (2.8) and solving for (st –   ̅) yields 
 
(st –   ̅) = - 
 
 
 [(it – πt) – (i
*
t – π
*
t)] 
  
Frankel (1979) describes the expression in brackets on the RHS as the real interest 
differential. Then, writing the PPP equation in its long-run form 
 
 ̅ =  ̅ –  ̅* = ( ̅ – ̅ *) – ϕ( ̅ –   ̅*) + λ(  ̅–  ̅*) 
 
In the long-run when st =  ̅, we’ll have (  ̅–  ̅
*
)= (πt – π
*
t), this along with the 
assumption that the equilibrium levels of money supply and income are given by their 
current period values, yields the following equation 
(2.8) 
(2.9) 
(2.10) 
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 ̅ = pt – p
*
t  = (mt – m
*
t) – ϕ(yt –  y
*
t) + λ(πt – π
*
t) 
  
Substituting the equilibrium exchange rate level defined by equation (2.11) into 
equation (2.9) yields 
 
st = (mt – m
*
t) – ϕ(yt –  y
*
t) – 
 
 
 (it –  i
*
t) + (
 
 
 + λ) (πt – π
*
t) 
 
Adding an error term, we get the Frankel (1979) real interest differential equation: 
 
st = (mt – m
*
t) – ϕ(yt –  y
*
t) – γ (it –  i
*
t) + β (πt – π
*
t) + ut 
 
where γ = (- 
 
 
) and β = ( 
 
 
 + λ), and β is assumed greater than α in absolute value. 
Dornbusch’s (1976) model is of exactly the same framework except that it assumes that 
the inflation rate differential is equal to zero in the above equation. 
 
Our main equations of interest are equations (2.4) and (2.6) of the flexible-price 
model, and equation (2.13) of the sticky-price model. The major difference is in the 
relationship between the exchange rate and the nominal interest rate differential. In the 
Chicago theory, since prices are flexible, a rise in the domestic relative to the foreign 
interest rate reflects a corresponding rise in the domestic relative to the foreign inflation 
rates. As such, an increase in domestic interest rates leads to a fall in the demand for the 
(2.11) 
(2.12) 
(2.13) 
69 
 
 
domestic relative to the foreign currency, causing it to depreciate. Thus, there is a positive 
relationship between the exchange rate and the interest rate differential. 
 
On the other hand, in the Keynesian theory, since prices are sticky, posits that a 
rise in the domestic relative to the foreign interest rate reflects a drop in domestic money 
supply. Prices in the goods market will not adjust instantaneously, but will gradually fall. 
As such, an increase in domestic interest rates relative to its foreign counterpart will 
cause capital inflow, causing an appreciation in the domestic currency. Thus, there is a 
negative relationship between the exchange rate and the interest rate differential. Table 
(2.1) below provides a concise summary of the alternative monetary theories to exchange 
rate determination. 
 
Table 2.1: Summary of Monetary Models of the Exchange Rate 
 
 
st = η(mt – m
*
t) + ϕ(yt –  y
*
t) + γ (it –  i
*
t) + β (πt – π
*
t) 
Money 
Supply 
Differential 
Output 
Differential 
Interest 
Rate 
Differential 
Expected 
Inflation 
Differential 
Flexible-price models     
Frenkel (1976) ε = 1 ϕ < 0 γ = 0 β > 0 
Bilson (1978a, 1978b) ε = 1 ϕ < 0 γ > 0 β = 0 
Sticky-price models     
Dornbusch (1976) ε = 1 ϕ < 0 γ < 0 β = 0 
Frankel (1979) ε = 1 ϕ < 0 γ < 0 β > 0 > | | 
Source: Based on Frenkel and Koske (2004) and Frankel (1979) 
 
2.2.2.  Monetary Approach to Exchange Rate Determination: Empirics 
Bahmani-Oskooee et al (2010) listed two conditions if one is to present empirical support 
for the monetary model to exchange rate determination; evidence of cointegration (long-
run co-movement) between the exchange rate and fundamentals, as well as parameters 
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showing the proper sign and significance in the long-run relationship. The majority of 
studies to date have applied the Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1990) 
approach to cointegration to test the different versions of the monetary exchange rate 
model.  
 
Rapach and Wohar (2002) using a sample of 14 countries tested the coefficients 
of the relative money supplies and income levels, but did not study those of the interest 
rate and inflation differentials. Frankel (1979) found support for the real interest 
differential model on the mark/dollar exchange rate using monthly data between 
1974M7-1978M2. Frenkel and Koske (2004) test the monetary model for the euro against 
six major currencies using quarterly data covering the period 1980Q1-2003Q2. Using 
trace and maximum eigenvalue tests, they were able to report evidence of a cointegrating 
relationship in the currencies of five out of the six countries. Their estimates show that 
the Euro versus the Canadian dollar and Swiss Franc support the real interest differential 
version of the model, while results for the rest of their sample are inconclusive as 
coefficients do not always show the appropriate sign and significance. 
 
A number of studies have reported support for the flexible-price version of the 
monetary model. Tawadros (2001) found such evidence for the flexible for the Australian 
dollar against the US dollar using monthly observations over the period 1984M1-
1996M1. Islam and Hasan (2006) for the dollar-yen exchange rate over the period 
1974Q1-2003Q1. The Canadian versus US dollar has been widely studied, but the results 
are mixed. Francis et al (2001) and Diamandis et al (1996) during the periods 1974-1993 
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and 1970-1994, respectively, used the Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1990) 
approach to cointegration. Cushman (2000), however, did not find support for the 
monetary exchange rate model since 1970 till end 1990’s. 
 
2.3. Econometric Methodology and Results 
Empirical literature presented in the previous section show that results are mixed at best. 
In this section, we make use of recent developments in the time-series techniques that 
allow us to better test our theories. We use the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) 
approach to cointegration developed by Pesaran et al (2001) and empirically test the 
validity of the monetary theories to exchange rate determination. To provide direct 
comparison with the Johansen methodology, we compare our results to those in the 
seminal study by Engel and West (2005).  
 
2.3.1. The Time-Series Properties 
Engel and West (2005) use a dataset of six industrialized countries, covering quarterly 
data from 1974Q1 to 2001Q3.
17
 Specifically, they examine the relationship between the 
exchange rates, (sit), of i=1, ... 6 countries; Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and 
the United Kingdom against the U.S. exchange rate, and the set of fundamentals 
identified above; money supply differential (m – m*)it, output differential (y – y
*
)it, 
interest rate differential (i – i
*
)it, and they use consumer prices as a proxy for the expected 
inflation differential (π – π*)it, between each domestic country and the U.S. as the foreign 
country. Data sources are shown in their paper (see Engel and West (2005, pp.499-500)).  
                                                          
17
 The dataset is available online on Charles Engel’s website. 
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Before running any regressions, an examination of the order of integration of the 
time-series variables is required.18 The Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) unit root test is 
used to establish the stationarity of the variables used in the empirical analysis. All 
variables, except the interest rate, are expressed in log terms. Results reported in Table 
(2.2) show that we have a combination of variables being I(1) and I(0). This finding 
creates an econometric concern if one would to utilize the Johansen approach to 
cointegration as all variables need to be I(1) in levels and I(0) in first-differences. We 
argue that this econometric detail may be driving the weak cointegration results reported 
in Engel and West (2005), and propose using the ARDL approach to cointegration of 
Pesaran et al (2001). As mentioned earlier, the ARDL methodology can be applied 
irrespective of the order of the integration of the variables, and thus is very useful in our 
preset context.  
 
 
2.3.2. The ARDL Methodology 
As in Engel and West (2005), we examine 6 multivariate equations, one for each country, 
between the exchange rate and the whole set of fundamentals. Moreover, we estimate 24 
bivariate equations, four per country, between the exchange rate and every fundamental. 
We begin by estimating the following long-run model for our 6 countries using the ARDL 
procedure: 
 
sit = α + ε(m – m
*
)it + ϕ(y – y
*
)it + γ(i –  i
*
)it + β(π – π
*
)it + uit 
                                                          
18
 If a variable has a unit root (is non-stationary), then the OLS estimates will be biased downward, and the 
reported standard errors will be tighter than the actual, leading to over-rejection. 
(2.14) 
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Since we are interested in studying the cointegration relationship between the 
exchange rate and the fundamentals, we re-write equation (2.14) in a constrained error-
correction format. In doing so, we are able to distinguish the long-run from the short-run 
effects of fundamentals on the exchange rate. We follow the bounds testing approach of 
Pesaran et al (2001) as outlined by the ARDL(n1,n2,n3,n4,n5) specification (2.15): 
 
Δsit = α + ∑  
  
   ωik Δsi,t-k + ∑  
  
   εik Δ(m – m
*
)i,t-k +∑  
  
   ϕik Δ(y – y
*
)i,t-k  
+ ∑       γik Δ(i – i
*
)i,t-k + ∑  
  
   βik Δ(π – π
*
)i,t-k + δ1sit-1 + δ2(m–m
*
)it-1  
+ δ3(y–y
*
)it-1 + δ4(i –i
*
)it-1 + δ5(π–π
*
)it-1 + εit  (2.15) 
  
7
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Table 2.2: Unit Root Tests 
 
 
Levels First Differences 
(s) (m-m
*
) (y-y
*
) (i-i
*
) (π-π*) (s) (m-m*) (y-y*) (i-i*) (π-π*) 
Canada -1.153 0.249 -0.928 -2.58* -1.798 -10.59*** -4.79*** -11.24*** -15.33*** -6.23*** 
France -1.399 -1.36 -0.432 -2.74* -2.063 -9.27*** -3.89*** -8.53*** -11.86*** -6.41*** 
Germany -1.767 -0.267 -1.172 -1.636 -1.901 -9.63*** -3.84*** -9.52*** -6.30*** -3.16** 
Italy -1.664 -4.36*** 0.317 -1.467 -2.69* -8.94*** -7.27*** -8.97*** -4.41*** -1.419 
Japan -1.185 -0.986 -0.515 -2.77* -0.696 -9.03*** -3.99*** -9.74*** -5.68*** -3.32** 
UK -2.370 -1.295 -1.199 -4.18*** -3.26** -8.95*** -5.37*** -10.84*** -12.21*** -4.79*** 
*** Significant at the 1% significance level, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10% 
Numbers reported are the computed t-statistics for ADF tests, and p-statistic for ERS test. The null hypothesis in both tests is the series contains a unit 
root.
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In this framework, the short-run coefficients (attached to first-differenced 
variables) and the long-run coefficients (attached to lagged level variables) are 
simultaneously estimated by applying Ordinary Least Squares to (2.15). The long-run 
coefficients are produced by using  ̂2,  ̂3,  ̂4 and  ̂5 which are normalized by  ̂1.
19
 Of 
course, we need to establish cointegration among the variables for the long-run 
coefficients to be valid. Pesaran et al (2001) propose the standard F-test for the joint 
significance of lagged level variables for the cointegration test, with new non-standard 
critical values that they tabulate in their paper.  
 
An advantage of this procedure is that it is applied irrespective of whether the 
variables are I(1) or I(0). We can thus avoid all pre-unit-root testing associated with the 
standard cointegration approach of Johansen and Juselius (1990), which was applied in 
the Engel and West (2005) paper. When applying the Johansen methodology in their 
paper, they started with the Dickey-Fuller unit root tests and were unable to reject the null 
of a unit root in any of their measures of fundamentals, yet they conduct their analysis 
using both interest rate differentials in levels and first-differences arguing that they are 
uneasy using interest rate differentials only in the differenced form. In the ARDL 
methodology, however, this problem would not arise.  
 
                                                          
19
 See Bahmani-Oskooee and Tanku (2008) for a step-by-step explanation of the method and normalization 
procedure. It is worth noting that the standard error of the ratio of two coefficients is not the ratio of two 
standard errors. Pesaran and Pesaran (1997, pp.394-404) illustrate how the standard errors of normalized 
coefficients are calculated using non-linear least squares and the Delta method. 
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Specifically, Pesaran et al (2001) report two sets of critical values; an upper 
bound critical value assuming all variables are I(1), and a lower bound assuming all are 
I(0). If the calculated F-statistic is above the upper bound, then the variables are jointly 
significant indicating long-run cointegration. If the calculated statistic is below the lower 
bound critical value, there is no cointegration. If, however, the calculated F-statistic lies 
in between these two bounds, then the results are inconclusive, and we can perform an 
alternative test by forming a lagged error-correction term in place of the linear 
combination of lagged level variables in equation (2.15). Each model is then re-estimated 
using the same number of optimum lags derived from above: 
 
Δsit = α + ∑  
  
   ωik Δsi,t-k + ∑  
  
   εik Δ(m – m
*
)i,t-k +∑  
  
   ϕik Δ(y – y
*
)i,t-k  
+ ∑       γik Δ(i – i
*
)i,t-k 
+ ∑       βik Δ(π – π
*
)i,t-k + ρi ECMit-1+ εit 
 
In this new specification, one can examine the direction and speed of adjustment 
in the model following any short-run disequilibrium by examining the sign and 
significance of the ECMit-1 coefficient. The ECMit-1 basically links the long-run 
equilibrium implied by the cointegration relationship with the short-run adjustment 
process describing the mechanism by which the variables react following any shock that 
takes them off the long-run equilibrium. In the context of equation (2.16) above, a 
negative and significant  ̂i, indicates adjustment of the exchange rate toward the long-run 
equilibrium following any short-run disequilibrium. Finally, the higher the absolute value 
of  ̂i, the faster the adjustment process or the convergence rate. 
(2.16) 
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2.3.3.  The ARDL Results 
We estimate two versions of equations (2.14)-(2.16) above. In the first, we examine the 
multivariate relationship between the exchange rate and our four fundamentals, for each 
of the six countries in our dataset. In the second, we examine the bivariate relationship 
between the exchange rate and each of the four fundamentals separately. So we estimate 
24 (6 countries and 4 fundamentals) regressions in this step. In choosing the number of 
lags, we follow Bahmani-Oskooee and Tanku (2008) and minimize the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC), imposing a maximum of 4 lags since we’re using quarterly 
data. We report the long-run coefficient estimates and cointegration tests in Table (2.3).
20
 
                                                          
20
 We do not report the short-run coefficient estimates for brevity, but results are available upon request. 
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Table 2.3: Results from the ARDL Model 
 
 Model Data ARDL cons (m-m
*
) (y-y
*
) (i-i
*
) (π-π*) F ECMt-1 Adj R
2
 
Canada 
multivariate 76Q1-01Q3 
ARDL(1,0,
0,0,0) 
1.33 .09 -2.48* -1.71 -.42 1.87 -.07*** .05 
(m-m
*
) 75Q1-01Q3 ARDL(1,0) -180.1 .53    1.79 -.03* .016 
(y-y
*
) 75Q1-01Q3 ARDL(1,0) 39.5***  -3.1***   2.82* -.05** .04 
(i-i
*
) 76Q1-01Q3 ARDL(1,0) 40.6***   -5.9  2.35 -.04** .02 
(π-π*) 75Q1-01Q3 ARDL(1,3) 40.1**    -2.38 1.49 -.02* .04 
France 
multivariate 79Q1-98Q4 
ARDL(4,1,
3,0,3) 
156.7*** .38* -.59 -1.32* 1.63*** 5.18*** -.31*** .34 
(m-m
*
) 79Q1-98Q4 ARDL(4,2) 140.9*** .67    2.63* -.08** .13 
(y-y
*
) 75Q1-01Q3 ARDL(4,0) 182.7***  -.39   2.16 -.06** .05 
(i-i
*
) 75Q1-01Q3 ARDL(4,1) 185.5***   -3.33  2.54* -.05** .09 
(π-π*) 75Q1-01Q3 ARDL(1,1) 180.15***    .14 1.33 -.04 .04 
Germany 
multivariate 75Q1-98Q4 
ARDL(1,4,
0,0,2) 
27.34 -.35 7.14 -17.44 -1.52 2.48** -.05*** .18 
(m-m
*
) 75Q1-98Q4 ARDL(4,4) 173.9 .98    1.29 -.04 .11 
(y-y
*
) 75Q1-01Q3 ARDL(4,0) 67.1***  .41   1.76 -.05* .05 
(i-i
*
) 75Q1-01Q3 ARDL(4,0) 55.9***   -5.3**  3.21** -.07** .09 
(π-π*) 75Q1-01Q3 ARDL(4,0) 62.2***    .41 2.0 -.07** .06 
Italy 
multivariate 79Q3-98Q4 
ARDL(4,3,
4,0,2) 
650.9* .12 -1.37 -1.35 .13 3.64*** -.16*** .36 
(m-m
*
) 76Q1-98Q4 ARDL(2,1) 588.1** .24    3.96** -.07*** .08 
(y-y
*
) 75Q1-01Q3 ARDL(2,0) 746.6***  -1.99   1.79 -.04* .03 
(i-i
*
) 79Q3-01Q3 ARDL(4,1) 746.8***   -2.19  2.26 -.05** .15 
(π-π*) 75Q1-01Q3 ARDL(2,1) 742.1***    1.03*** 2.13 -.07** .06 
Japan 
multivariate 79Q3-01Q3 
ARDL(3,0,
0,2,1) 
-724.7 2.25 9.97 -21.12 .85 4.36*** -.06*** .27 
(m-m
*
) 75Q1-01Q3 ARDL(1,1) -722.1 2.33    .61 -.01 .05 
(y-y
*
) 75Q1-01Q3 ARDL(4,1) 483.4***  -2.52   1.89 -.03* .07 
(i-i
*
) 79Q3-01Q3 ARDL(1,0) 379.2***   -28.3  7.79*** -.03*** .13 
(π-π*) 75Q1-01Q3 ARDL(4,1) 460.9***    1.44** 1.34 -.06 .11 
UK multivariate 75Q1-01Q3 
ARDL(4,1,
0,0,0) 
-251.1 .34 .06 -3.96 -.97 3.34*** -.12*** .19 
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 Model Data ARDL cons (m-m
*
) (y-y
*
) (i-i
*
) (π-π*) F ECMt-1 Adj R
2
 
(m-m
*
) 75Q1-01Q3 ARDL(4,2) -116.9* .11    4.68** -.12*** .17 
(y-y
*
) 75Q1-01Q3 ARDL(4,0) -46.1***  -1.16**   5.04*** -.13*** .13 
(i-i
*
) 75Q1-01Q3 ARDL(4,0) -41.56***   -3.56*  5.40*** -.09*** .15 
(π-π*) 75Q1-01Q3 ARDL(4,0) -46.1***    .42 4.53** -.12*** .12 
Notes: *** significant at the 1% significance level, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%
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If we first consider the multivariate equations, we find evidence of a long-run 
relationship between exchange rate and its fundamentals in 5 out of 6 countries using the 
F-test, and in all six countries if we look at the negative and significant lagged error 
correction term. Looking at the coefficients of the fundamentals to see whether they show 
the proper sign or not, we can see that the coefficient on the money supply differential 
shows the correct positive sign in 5 countries, but is only significant in the case of France. 
Output differential coefficients show the correct negative sign twice, and is only 
significant once in the case of Canada. The coefficients on the interest rate differential are 
correct in all six countries, but show significance only in France. Finally, the coefficient 
on the consumer price differential shows the correct sign in three cases, but is only 
significant in France. As such, if we contrast these results to the ones hypothesized in 
Table (2.1) above, we find that France strongly follows Frankel’s (1979) version of the 
sticky-price monetary approach to exchange rate determination. Italy shows all the signs 
predicted by Frankel’s (1979) real interest differential model, yet no coefficients are 
statistically significant. Canada and Japan slightly follow the predictions of sticky-price 
models, while Germany and the UK do not seem to follow any clear hypothesis. 
 
If we now turn to the bivariate equations, we can see evidence of cointegration in 
10 out of 24 cases using the F-test, and 20 out of 24 by examining the sign and 
significance of the lagged error correction term. Regarding the signs and significance of 
the coefficients on each of the fundamentals, we find that all, except the inflation 
differential in Canada and output differential in Germany, show the signs hypothesized 
by the real interest differential model introduced by Frankel (1979). Out of these 22 
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equations, however, only 6 are statistically significant. Moreover, we report the adjusted 
R
2
 for each model, and they all show a reasonable fit. Finally, it is worth mentioning that 
we performed a number of diagnostic tests along the lines of Bahmani et al (2005) to 
show that our models are correctly specified. Our results reveal that the models are 
mostly free from serial correlation, misspecification and parameter instability as indicated 
by the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test, Ramsey’s RESET test and the cumulative sum 
(CUSUM) and CUSUM of squares (CUSUMSQ) tests of Brown et al (1975), 
respectively.
21
 
 
A final note to make is that in all our equations, multivariate or bivariate, the 
coefficient on the lagged error correction term has been negative and highly significant. 
This implies that following any disequilibrium from the long-run path, it is the exchange 
rate that adjusts to restore the equilibrium not the fundamentals. 
 
These findings present a significant improvement over comparable results from 
Engel and West (2005). In their paper, using trace and maximum eigenvalue statistics 
from the Johansen approach to cointegration, they find almost no evidence of 
cointegration in the multivariate case, and only 5 out of 24 cases in the bivariate cases. 
However, using the exact same dataset but employing the ARDL approach to 
cointegration, we report cointegration in all 6 multivariate cases, and 20 out of 24 
bivariate cases.  
 
                                                          
21
 Again, these results are omitted for space considerations, but they are available upon request.  
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2.3.4. Granger Causality Tests 
Our results so far have confirmed a long-run relationship between the exchange rate and 
fundamental determinants in our dataset of six industrialized countries, re-enforcing the 
predictions of the monetary approach to exchange rate determination. A natural step is 
now to test the adequacy of our estimated model. Following Engel and West (2005), we 
perform multivariate and bivariate Granger causality tests, and compare our results to 
theirs. 
 
Granger (1988) argued that Granger causality must exist in at least one direction 
as long as the variables of the system are cointegrated. This, however, doesn’t tell us 
anything about the direction of causality between the two variables. This is why we need 
to represent the system in an error-correction form. Following the ARDL methodology of 
Pesaran et al (2001, p.293), we can re-write the system as follows 
 
Δsit = α + ∑  
  
   ωik Δsi,t-k + ∑  
  
   εik Δ(fund – fund
*
)i,t-k + ρi ECMit-1+ εit 
 
Δfundt = α +∑  
  
   ω ik Δsi,t-k + ∑  
  
   ε ik Δ(fund – fund
*
)i,t-k + ρ i ECMit-1+ μit 
 
where Δ(fund – fund*) = Δ(m-m
*
), Δ(y-y*), Δ(i-i*) and Δ(π-π*) in the 6 multivariate 
cases, and a single fundamental variable in the 24 bivariate cases. We use the same optimal 
number of lags indicated by AIC from the previous section.  
 
(2.17) 
(2.18) 
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This representation allows us to distinguish between two types of Granger 
causality; short-run and long-run causality. For example, if we consider equation (2.17), 
the coefficients of the lagged dynamic regressors can test for short-run causality from 
variable fundamentals to the exchange rate by testing the null that ∑       εik = 0. While, 
long-run causality from fundamentals to the exchange rate could be examined by testing 
the null that the coefficient of the lagged error correction term, ρi = 0. An equivalent 
analysis could be done for equation (2.18) testing both the short-run and long-run 
Granger causality from exchange rates to fundamentals. Results are presented in Table 
(2.4) below. 
 
In Panel A, the null that Δ(fund – fund*) do not Granger cause Δs in the long-run, 
is rejected in all six countries when performing the multivariate test. In the short-run, this 
null hypothesis is rejected in all countries but Canada. In the 24 bivariate tests, the null is 
rejected in 20 instances in the long-run and 10 instances in the short-run. These results 
provide further support to the monetary model of exchange rate determination, and 
significantly improve on the comparable findings of the study by Engel and West (2005). 
They reported short-run causality in only 2 instances in the bivariate equations, and none 
in the multivariate cases. They, however, do not report results of long-run causality.  
 
Similarly, panel B tests the null that Δs do not Granger cause Δ(fund – fund*) in 
both the long-run and short-run. In the 24 bivariate tests, the null is rejected in only 4 
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instances in the long-run and 4 instances in the short-run.
22
 Our panels A and B of Table 
(2.4) are directly comparable to panels B and A of Table (2.3) in Engel and West (2005, 
p.503). Again, if we contrast our results to those of Engel and West (2005), we find that 
they reported 8 cases where there was short-run causality from the exchange rate to the 
relevant fundamental bivariate equations, while we only report 4 cases. These findings, 
along with those from panel A, provide much stronger support to the monetary approach 
to exchange rate determination. 
 
                                                          
22
 The null is actually rejected in 6 instances in the long-run. However, 2 of them report a positive t-statistic 
implying that the coefficient on the lagged error correction term is positive. This means that, in the long-
run, it is the fundamental variable that is Granger causing the exchange rate. 
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Table 2.4: Granger Causality Tests 
 
 Panel A. H0: Fundamentals do not Granger cause Exchange Rate 
 Short-run Causality (H0: ∑  
  
   εik = 0) Long-run Causality (H0:ρi = 0) 
 Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK 
multivariate 1.54 43.3*** 24.9*** 40.9*** 12.72** 10.07** -2.9*** -5.1** -3.60*** -4.29*** -4.8*** -4.17*** 
(m-m
*
) .16 4.53 9.86** 2.34 5.51** 6.59** -1.90* -2.3** -1.61 -2.81*** -1.11 -3.07*** 
(y-y
*
) .93 .32 .11 .69 1.85 .31 -2.38** -2.1** -1.88* -1.91* -1.96* -3.19*** 
(i-i
*
) .25 6.48** 3.96** 7.76*** 1.65 2.34 -2.15** -2.2** -2.54** -2.13** -3.9*** -3.31*** 
(π-π*) 6.61* 4.18** .31 5.41** 4.67** .13 -1.74* -1.55 -2.00** -2.06** -1.64 -3.01*** 
             
 Panel B. H0: Exchange Rate does not Granger cause Fundamentals 
 Short-run Causality (H0: ∑  
  
   ω ik = 0) Long-run Causality (H0  ρ i = 0) 
 Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK 
multivariate             
(m-m
*
) .16 7.04 1.76 9.22 3.51** 4.99 .46 -.06 -1.43 -2.97*** -1.62 .22 
(y-y
*
) .84 1.57 .54 .11 1.47 2.37 -1.44 -.96 -.64 -1.36 1.56 .63 
(i-i
*
) .36 11.15** 6.21 6.13 1.71 8.29** -2.06** -1.41 -.61 -1.64 -2.27** -.55 
(π-π*) .53 2.16 9.06** .03 1.32 3.89 -1.79* .29 -.03 1.71* 2.45** -1.47 
*** Significant at the 1% significance level, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10% 
Numbers are computed Chi-square-statistics for short-run causality tests, and computed t-statistics for long-run causality tests. 
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2.4. Conclusion 
Numerous studies have attempted to explain the disconnect puzzle between exchange 
rates and their fundamental determinants. In this paper, we employ a new econometric 
technique in an attempt to connect some pieces of this puzzle. The contribution of this 
paper is in the fact that we use the exact same dataset of Engel and West (2005), which is 
considered a seminal paper in this line of research. Employing the standard Johansen 
approach to cointegration, Engel and West did not find support for the monetary 
approach to exchange rate determination. Here, using Pesaran et al’s (2001) ARDL 
approach to cointegration, we find evidence of a long-run relationship between exchange 
rates and fundamentals in all multivariate and most bivariate equations of the same six 
industrialized countries used by Engel and West. Furthermore, our Granger causality tests 
report evidence that fundamentals help predict exchange rates in both the short-run and 
long-run.  
 
These results suggest that, in the long-run, the monetary approach to exchange 
rate determination does provide a useful explanation of the behavior of exchange rates. 
The relationship between the exchange rate and its fundamentals are, however, not very 
clear in the short-run. Thus, in terms of the relevance for policy making, one should only 
consider the monetary model as a useful benchmark so as to understand the evolution of 
exchange rate in the long-run. However, it should not be used as a definite tool for fully 
understanding short-run exchange rate movements, especially in this era of high 
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exchange rate volatility where there is a big possibility that a number of other variables, 
possibly even unobserved, may come to play in influencing the spot exchange rate.  
 
A future area of research could investigate the forecasting performance of the 
monetary model using the ARDL methodology, possibly using a more updated sample 
period than the one used in this paper. A number of papers have already investigated the 
forecasting performance of the monetary model as suggested by their cointegrating 
equations against that of a simple random walk. Studies of Meese and Rogoff (1983a, 
1983b) and Mark (1995) are among the most cited in this area. The two former studies 
were the first to establish the weak forecasting performance of the monetary model 
against a naïve random walk model. Mark (1995) revived the monetary approach when 
he reported evidence of predictability of the exchange rate at longer horizons for four 
major currencies. These papers first investigate the cointegrating relationship between the 
variables, and then use that equation to perform their forecasting exercises. It would be 
noteworthy to re-evaluate the forecasting performance of the monetary model as 
suggested by the ARDL approach to cointegration against that of the random walk. 
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Chapter 3: Exchange Rate Depreciation and the 
Trade Balance in Egypt 
  
3.1. Introduction 
Three concepts within international economics summarize the response of the trade 
balance to changes in the real exchange rate. The first and most common concept, known 
as the Marshal Lerner condition (ML), asserts that currency depreciation will have a 
favorable impact on trade balance only if the import and export demand elasticities sum 
up to more than unity. The other two concepts have to do with the short-run response of 
the trade balance to a change in a country’s exchange rate. More specifically, due to lag 
structure, a devaluation or depreciation does not have to affect the trade balance 
immediately. Thus, if the trade balance is deteriorating, it continues to deteriorate until 
the favorable effects of depreciation emerge. The J- and the S-Curves summarize this 
response pattern. While the J-Curve relies upon a trade balance model and regression 
analysis, the S-Curve adheres to a cross-correlation function. A recent survey by 
Bahmani-Oskooee and Hegerty (2010) provides a detailed explanation of both curves as 
well as their application to any country that they have been applied.
23
  
 
A common theme about studies under all three strands of the literature mentioned 
above is that they fall into three categories. The first employs trade data between one 
country and rest of the world. The second, in an attempt to remove this aggregation bias, 
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 For a detailed explanation of the J-Curve see Bahmani-Oskooee (1985). 
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studies the relationship between exchange rate depreciation and international trade at the 
bilateral level. Indeed, Marquez (1990) concludes that "reliance on multilateral 
elasticities entails an important loss of information for the questions receiving attention in 
the literature whereas reliance on bilateral elasticities entails no such loss." Studies in this 
second group may also suffer from aggregation bias in different commodity flows 
between two countries may react differently to price changes, hence have different 
elasticities. Again, this is recognized by Marquez (1990) who recommends strengthening 
his findings at the bilateral level by disaggregating across commodities. Therefore, the 
third category of the literature has very recently moved in this direction. In our case, we 
use industry level bilateral trade data covering the period from 1994Q1 to 2007Q4 
disaggregated according to the SITC classification into 59 industries (36 industries) that 
trade between Egypt-EU (and Egypt-US), respectively. By doing this, we aim at 
introducing the first comprehensive study in this third category with regards to Egypt. 
 
3.2. ML Condition 
Standard textbook in international economics provide mathematical proof that if a 
devaluation or depreciation is to improve the difference between inpayments and 
outpayments or the trade balance, sum of export and import demand elasticities must 
exceed unity, a condition known as the Marshall-Lerner condition (ML hereafter). 
 
3.2.1. Motivation and Literature 
Previous studies that estimated the ML condition used aggregate trade data between one 
country and rest of the world and provided mixed results. For example, Houthakker and 
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Magee (1969) who estimated the ML condition for 15 developed and 14 developing 
countries did not find support for the ML condition in most cases. However, Khan (1974) 
who estimated the condition for only 15 developing countries did find support for the 
condition in most cases. Both studies were conducted during fixed exchange rate period 
prior to 1973. The same could be said when we shift to post 1973 period of floating 
exchange rates. For example, Warner and Kreinin (1983) who considered the experience 
of 19 industrial countries during both periods concluded that the in most countries the 
condition is met during the floating exchange rate period. However, when developing 
countries were considered during floating period by Bahmani-Oskooee (1986), not much 
support for the ML condition was provided.  
 
It should be mentioned that since the above mentioned studies did not account 
neither for degree of integration of each variable, nor for cointegration among the 
variables in their models their results could be considered spurious. For this reason, more 
recent studies have employed different cointegration techniques and provided support for 
the ML condition in most countries. Examples include Bahmani-Oskooee (1998), 
Bahmani-Oskooee and Niroomand (1998), and Bahmani-Oskooee and Kara (2005).  
Failure to support the ML condition for a given country in any of these studies is said to 
be due to aggregation bias. To remove the bias, Marquez (1990) and Bahmani-Oskooee 
and Brooks (1999) concentrate on bilateral trade flows between two countries rather than 
aggregate trade flows between one country and rest of the world and provide support for 
the ML condition. In cases the ML condition is not satisfied, Marquez (1990) 
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recommends further disaggregation of bilateral trade flows by commodity. However, not 
much work has been done at commodity level due to lack of data on commodity prices.  
 
Now that we have come across commodity prices between two countries (US and 
Egypt), we like to add to the literature on the ML condition by considering the trade 
flows of 36 industries that trade between the two countries and estimate the price 
elasticity of export and import demand for each industry to judge the ML condition.
24
      
 
3.2.2. The Model and the Method 
A common practice in estimating price elasticities in trade, hence the ML condition is to 
relate volume of trade to a scale variable measuring economic activity and a relative price 
term. Since data are reported by Egypt, we specify the import and export demand 
models from Egypt’s perspective. After modifying the models used by Houthakker and 
Magee (1969) and Bahmani-Oskooee (1986) to conform to commodity level data, we 
adopt the following specification for Egypt’s import of commodity i from the U.S.:  
 
(3.2.1)    ε)
PD
PM
(ln  λYln  βαMln tt
EG
i
tEG,
i
t   
 
Where M
i
 is quantity of commodity i imported by Egypt from U.S. As mentioned 
above, one driving force of imports in any country is the level of economic activity in 
that country. This, Egypt’s real income or output, YEG, is included in the specification 
and is expected to exert positive impact on her imports of commodity i. Therefore, an 
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 It should be mentioned that Egypt is not included in any of the studies mentioned above.  
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estimate of β is expected to be positive. Assuming some degree of substitution between 
imports and domestically produced goods, import price of commodity i, PMi relative to 
domestic price level, PDEG, is included as another determinant. It is expected that an 
estimate λ to be negative. 
 
 Due to symmetry between import and export demand models, we assume U.S. 
demand for Egypt’s export of commodity ii (Xit) depends positively on the U.S. income 
(YUS,t) and negatively on Egypt’s export price (PXi) relative to the domestic price level in 
the U.S. (PDU.S.) as in equation (3.2.2):    
 
(3.2.2)    ε)
PD
PX
(ln  λYln  βαXln tt
US
i
tUS,
i
t
  
 
Once (3.2.1) and (3.2.2) are estimated, the ML condition will be met if
1ˆˆ   .  
  
Estimates of (3.2.1) and (3.2.2) by any method only yield the long-run income 
and relative price elasticities. In order to estimate the short-run elasticities and make sure 
that the variables are converging toward their long-run equilibrium values, we 
incorporate the short-run dynamics into both specifications and express them as error-
correction models. Pesaran et al. (2001) offer a unique approach where there is no need 
for pre-unit-root testing and all short-run and long-run coefficients could be estimated in 
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one step as opposed to two-step procedure of Engle and Granger (1987). The error-
correction models following Pesaran et al. (2001) are as follows:    
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Without lagged level variables in (3.2.3) and (3.2.4) the two models will be no 
more than standard VAR models. Pesaran et al. (2001) propose adding the linear 
combination of lagged level variables as a proxy for lagged error term in Engle-Granger 
(1987) specification. They then propose using the standard F test to establish their joint 
significance. If lagged level variables are jointly significant, then they are said to be 
cointegrated. Although the application of the F test follows standard procedure from the 
literature, i.e., using the sum of squared residuals from restricted versus unrestricted 
models, it has new critical values that Pesaran et al. (2001) tabulate. A lower bound 
critical value is provided when all variables in a given model are integrated of order zero 
or I(0). An upper bound critical value is provided when all variables are integrated of 
order one or I(1).  They then demonstrate that the upper bound could also be used to 
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establish joint significance even if some variables are I(0) and some I(1). Since almost all 
macro variables are either I(0) or I(1), there is no need for pre-unit-root testing under this 
approach.  
 
 Models (3.2.3) and (3.2.4) are estimated by applying OLS. The short-run effects 
are then inferred by the coefficient estimates obtained for the first-differenced variables. 
The long-run income and price elasticities in (3.2.3) are obtained by the estimates of σ1 
and σ2 that are normalized on σ0. By the same token, the long-run income and price in 
(3.2.4) are calculated by the estimates of θ1 and θ2 normalized on θ0.
25
    
   
3.2.3. The Results  
In this section we estimate the two error-correction models using trade flows of 36 
industries that trade between Egypt and the U.S. Quarterly data over the period 1994I-
2007IV are used to carry out the estimation. Following the literature a maximum of six 
lags are imposed on each first differenced variable and Akaike’s Information Criterion 
(AIC) is sued to select the optimum lags. The results for each optimum Egypt’s import 
demand model along with diagnostics are reported in Table (3.2.1). Due to the volume of 
the results we refrain from reporting the short-run coefficient estimates. However, they 
are available upon request from the authors. 
 
Concentrating on long-run coefficient estimates, we gather that the relative import 
price term carries its expected negative coefficient in almost all cases. The coefficient is 
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 For details of normalization see Bahmani-Oskooee and Tanku (2008). 
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significant at least at the 10% level in 27 out of 36 industries, as identified by * above 
each coefficient. The income elasticity is positive and significant in only six industries 
coded 03, 05, 12, 22, 55, and 89. It is significant and negative in nine industries coded 17, 
26, 29, 33, 65, 74, 75, 77, and 81. These are industries that as Egypt’s economy grows 
they produce more of import-substitute goods and therefore import less of these goods 
(Bahmani-Oskooee, 1986). These long-run coefficients will not be considered spurious 
only if we establish cointegration among variables. As the results of the F test reveal 
since our calculated F statistic is significant in almost all cases, the variable do have long 
run relationship.  
  
 
9
9
 
Table 3.2.1: Empirical Results & Diagnostic Tests – Import Equation 
 
 SITC Description cons ln YEG ln PM F ECMt-1 LM 
RESE
T 
CUSU
M (SQ) 
Adj 
R
2
 
00 Live animals other than animals of division 03 20.13** -.91 -.94*** 9.71*** -.73*** 3.56 .0009 S (S) .84 
02 Dairy products and birds' eggs 20.40 -1.24 -2.99* 2.99** -.41*** 2.77 .27 S (S) .36 
03 Fish, crustaceans, aquatic invertebrates -13.21* 1.92*** -1.41*** 10.15*** -.76*** 4.36 .21 S (S) .77 
04 Cereals and cereal preparations 18.76*** -.26 -1.04*** 7.89*** -.91*** 4.98 1.58 S (S) .51 
05 Vegetables and fruit 7.16*** .15 -1.82*** 12.68*** -1.18*** .91 .21 S (S) .55 
06 Sugars, sugar preparations and honey -6.09 .89** -2.54*** 21.77*** -1.18*** 5.69 .001 S (S) .84 
07 Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices, and manufactures thereof 6.12 .02 -1.75*** 16.70*** -1.04*** 5.92 .37 S (S) .63 
09 Miscellaneous edible products and preparations 18.61*** -.64* -.78 6.12*** -.52*** 1.44 1.43 S (S) .71 
11 Beverages  192.60 -7.73 28.92 3.25** -.04*** 4.23 2.91* S (S) .48 
12 Tobacco and tobacco manufactures 3.66 .97*** 1.81*** 13.82*** -.96*** 2.39 1.68 S (S) .54 
22 Oil-seeds and oleaginous fruits -21.59 2.87* -1.33** 2.91** -.66*** 3.13 .26 S (S) .81 
24 Cork and wood 5.74 .46 -1.21*** 2.74* -.36*** 4.39 .009 S (S) .95 
26 Textile fibers and their wastes 34.59** -2.03* -.13 9.46*** -.74*** 8.70 .28 S (S) .37 
27 Crude fertilizers, and crude minerals  .71 .91*** -.66 15.34*** -.93*** 6.50 .13 U (S) .67 
29 Crude animal and vegetable materials 18.02*** -.64* -1.39*** 13.34*** -.95*** 4.61 .54 S (S) .71 
33 Petroleum, petroleum products & related materials 19.08*** -1.02* -1.74*** 12.46*** -.84*** 2.53 .39 S (S) .72 
42 Fixed vegetable fats and oils, crude, refined -.07 -.001 -4.61*** 2.87** -.40*** 2.13 .72 S (S) .87 
52 Inorganic Chemicals  10.08*** .06 -1.02*** 9.56*** -.75*** 3.75 2.71* S (S) .76 
54 Medicinal and pharmaceutical products 11.46 -.06 .63 2.85** -.22*** 2.80 .02 S (S) .94 
55 Essential oils & perfume materials; polishing -.18 1.03*** -.77** 8.63*** -.74*** 1.46 5.1** S (S) .83 
56 Fertilizers (other than those of group 27) 5.39 .25 -1.24*** 14.32*** -1.02*** 1.03 .87 S (S) .68 
59 Chemical materials and products 13.95*** -.09 -.88*** 10.58*** -.68*** .75 3.38* S (S) .80 
61 Leather, leather manufactures, and dressed furskins 13.41 -.65 -.71* 2.91** -.30*** 5.16 .10 S (S) .61 
63 Cork and wood manufactures (excluding furniture) 6.13 .42 -.98*** 9.07*** -.74*** 4.25 .91 S (S) .98 
64 Paper, paperboard and articles of paper pulp -.27 .63 -2.65 1.07 -.14* 1.57 1.79 S (S) .52 
65 Textile yarn, fabrics, made-up articles 22.84*** -1.08** -1.33** 5.01*** -.64*** .89 .004 S (S) .47 
66 Non-metallic mineral manufactures 10.67*** -.0065 -1.10*** 17.64*** -1.05*** 4.91 .10 S (S) .91 
67 Iron and steel  10.38** .05 -1.55*** 5.40*** -.45*** 5.32 .43 S (S) .64 
69 Manufactures of metals 15.66*** -.29 -1.32** 2.13 -.40** 2.26 1.77 S (S) .74 
74 General industrial machinery and equipment 16.90*** -.26** -1.37*** 9.47*** -.70*** 2.46 .11 S (S) .75 
75 Office machines and automatic data-processing 9.10*** .35** -.99*** 9.16*** -.72*** 4.44 .20 S (S) .61 
77 Electrical machinery, apparatus & appliances 19.89*** -.56** -.78*** 7.32*** -.64*** 4.82 .06 S (S) .69 
  
 
1
0
0
 
 SITC Description cons ln YEG ln PM F ECMt-1 LM 
RESE
T 
CUSU
M (SQ) 
Adj 
R
2
 
81 Prefabricated buildings; sanitary, plumbing 21.53*** -1.01* -.79 3.74** -.56*** 1.24 .14 S (S) .54 
82 Furniture, and parts thereof; bedding, mattresses 7.88 .21 -1.21* 4.44*** -.35*** 1.49 .99 S (S) .41 
84 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories 11.39 -.31 -.34 2.27* -.49** 9.6** .10 S (S) .33 
89 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 8.92*** .32* -.81*** 8.31*** -.73*** 4.83 .06 S (S) .89 
        *** Significant at the 1% significance level, ** at 5%, * at 10% 
 
Table 3.2.2: Empirical Results & Diagnostic Tests – Export Equation 
 
 SITC Description cons ln YUS ln PX F ECMt-1 LM RESET 
CUSU
M (SQ) 
Adj 
R
2
 
00 Live animals other than animals of division 03 -51.2** 3.64*** -.10 3.77** -.57*** 2.21 .005 S (S) .66 
02 Dairy products and birds' eggs -34.11 2.40 -2.42 4.20** -.46*** 4.51 .02 S (S) .55 
03 Fish, crustaceans, aquatic invertebrates 1.25 .11 -1.94*** 7.67*** -.55*** 2.99 .006 S (S) .39 
04 Cereals and cereal preparations -126.4* 8.32*** -.60 11.93*** -.77*** 11.5** 2.03 S (S) .63 
05 Vegetables and fruit -32.1** 2.65*** -.81* 7.17*** -.62*** 2.79 .09 S (S) .55 
06 Sugars, sugar preparations and honey -78.8** 5.44*** -.39* 23.56*** -1.21*** 3.13 .37 S (S) .64 
07 Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices, and manufactures 44.6** -1.87** .41 13.95*** -1.12*** 7.81* .05 S (S) .49 
09 Miscellaneous edible products and preps -43.7** 3.37*** .34 19.75*** -1.11*** 3.83 4.57** S (S) .61 
11 Beverages  -17.56 1.66 -.03 6.84*** -.63*** 3.29 .36 S (S) .25 
12 Tobacco and tobacco manufactures 38.31 -2.09 -1.50 2.96** -.36*** 4.97 15.8** S (S) .27 
22 Oil-seeds and oleaginous fruits .94 .44 -.58 7.72*** -.62*** 2.96 1.02 S (U) .30 
24 Cork and wood -77.98 5.26*** -.55*** 14.01*** -.90*** 1.63 .10 S (S) .46 
26 Textile fibers and their wastes  .27 1.36 1.36 1.92 -.31** 5.55 1.57 U (S) .46 
27 Crude fertilizers, and crude minerals  -89.9** 6.12*** -1.41*** 9.20*** -.77*** 6.76 5.93 S (U) .94 
29 Crude animal and vegetable materials 21.1** -.49* -.13 18.03*** -1.25*** .67 1.69 S (S) .61 
33 Petroleum, petroleum products -47.46 3.36 -2.42*** 16.34*** -1.01*** 1.20 .06 S (U) .58 
42 Fixed vegetable fats and oils, crude -75.0** 5.09*** -.80*** 10.99*** -.79*** 2.12 .22 S (S) .44 
52 Inorganic Chemicals  86.75 -4.91 -1.26* 3.63** -.33*** 5.13 .54 S (S) .52 
54 Medicinal and pharmaceutical products -10.65 1.04 -.44*** 14.24*** -.91*** 4.63 5.72** S (S) .51 
55 Essential oils & perfume materials; polishing 6.05 .23 -1.29*** 13.96*** -.83*** 2.53 3.19* S (S) .87 
56 Fertilizers (other than those of group 27) -34.75 2.75* -1.37*** 9.22*** -.82*** 1.16 8.22** S (U) .40 
59 Chemical materials and products 29.98 -1.60 -1.89*** 17.30*** -1.01*** 1.21 .04 S (U) .50 
61 Leather, leather manufactures 2.37 .21 -.54*** 15.13*** -.96*** 1.28 6.57 S (S) .54 
  
 
1
0
1
 
 SITC Description cons ln YUS ln PX F ECMt-1 LM RESET 
CUSU
M (SQ) 
Adj 
R
2
 
63 Cork and wood manufactures 62.6** -3.57** -1.01*** 16.94*** -.97*** 4.42 .95 S (S) .60 
64 Paper, paperboard and articles of paper pulp 41.2** -2.11* -.59** 14.06*** -.91*** 2.64 .02 S (S) .48 
65 Textile yarn, fabrics, made-up articles 20.34* -.47 -1.49*** 4.42*** -.33*** 9.17* .19 S (S) .93 
66 Non-metallic mineral manufactures -47.4** 3.29** -1.51*** 10.26*** -.67*** 3.53 1.64 S (S) .64 
67 Iron and steel  -82.82 5.09 -4.20 2.76* -.27*** 1.51 1.29 S (U) .47 
69 Manufactures of metals -5.08 .85* -1.45*** 18.58*** -.90*** 5.17 .89 S (S) .79 
74 General industrial machinery and equipment 10.66 -.24 -.62*** 13.26*** -.88*** 6.47 .30 S (S) .55 
75 Office machines and automatic data-processing 21.88 -1.02 -.88*** 13.28*** -.82*** 4.61 .04 S (S) .62 
77 Electrical machinery, apparatus & appliances -.75 .46 -.90*** 11.42*** -.82*** .80 4.76 S (S) .50 
81 Prefabricated buildings; sanitary, plumbing  -2.28 .62 -.80** 6.33*** -.48*** 2.54 2.91* S (S) .69 
82 Furniture, and parts thereof; bedding -12.2** 1.39*** -1.11*** 21.78*** -.93*** 10.3** 4.94** S (U) .86 
84 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories 31.1** -1.05** -.94*** 9.84*** -.76*** 14.4** .36 S (S) .97 
89 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 1.42 .54 -.24** 29.08*** -1.26*** 4.32 2.60 S (S) .66 
        *** Significant at the 1% significance level, ** at 5%, * at 10% 
 
Table 3.2.3: Effect of Exchange Rate Depreciation on Trade Balance in Egypt 
 
code SITC Description Trade Share |PM|+|PX| ML 
00 Live animals other than animals of division 03 0.05% 0.94  
02 Dairy products and birds' eggs 0.46% 2.99 Yes 
03 Fish, crustaceans, aquatic invertebrates and preparations thereof 0.12% 3.35 Yes 
04 Cereals and cereal preparations 43.06% 1.04 Yes 
05 Vegetables and fruit 0.40% 2.63 Yes 
06 Sugars, sugar preparations and honey 0.06% 2.93 Yes 
07 Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices, and manufactures thereof 0.04% 1.75 Yes 
09 Miscellaneous edible products and preparations 0.09% 0  
11 Beverages  0.002% 0  
12 Tobacco and tobacco manufactures 0.25% 1.81 Yes 
22 Oil-seeds and oleaginous fruits 7.20% 1.33 Yes 
24 Cork and wood 0.27% 1.76 Yes 
26 Textile fibers and their wastes (not manufactured into yarn or fabric) 0.21% 0  
27 Crude fertilizers, and crude minerals (excluding coal and petroleum) 0.22% 1.41 Yes 
  
 
1
0
2
 
code SITC Description Trade Share |PM|+|PX| ML 
29 Crude animal and vegetable materials 0.18% 1.39 Yes 
33 Petroleum, petroleum products and related materials 5.45% 4.16 Yes 
42 Fixed vegetable fats and oils, crude, refined or fractionated 0.05% 5.41 Yes 
52 Inorganic Chemicals  0.11% 2.28 Yes 
54 Medicinal and pharmaceutical products 1.05% 0.44  
55 Essential oils & perfume materials; polishing & cleansing preparations 0.20% 2.06 Yes 
56 Fertilizers (other than those of group 27) 0.85% 2.61 Yes 
59 Chemical materials and products 0.82% 2.77 Yes 
61 Leather, leather manufactures, and dressed furskins 0.001% 1.25 Yes 
63 Cork and wood manufactures (excluding furniture) 0.10% 1.99 Yes 
64 Paper, paperboard and articles of paper pulp 0.67% 0.59  
65 Textile yarn, fabrics, made-up articles, and related products 0.99% 2.82 Yes 
66 Non-metallic mineral manufactures 0.40% 2.61 Yes 
67 Iron and steel  0.24% 1.55 Yes 
69 Manufactures of metals 0.97% 2.77 Yes 
74 General industrial machinery and equipment, and machine parts 3.49% 1.99 Yes 
75 Office machines and automatic data-processing machines 0.86% 1.87 Yes 
77 Electrical machinery, apparatus & appliances and electrical parts 1.10% 1.68 Yes 
81 Prefabricated buildings; sanitary, plumbing, and heating  0.04% 0.8  
82 Furniture, and parts thereof; bedding, mattresses & mattress supports 0.44% 2.32 Yes 
84 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories 1.32% 0.94  
89 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 0.93% 1.05 Yes 
Trade shares are for 2007Q4  
Only statistically significant coefficients are used to calculate |PM|+|PX|  
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Several other diagnostic statistics are also reported in Table (3.2.1). Using the 
long-run coefficient estimates and long-run import demand model (3.2.1) we calculated 
the error-term and lag it by one period. Calling this lagged error-correction term, ECMt-1, 
we then replace the linear combination of lagged level variables in (3.2.3) by ECMt-1 and 
estimate each model after imposing the optimum lags. If adjustment of variables is to be 
toward their long-run values, we expect ECMt-1 to carry a significantly negative 
coefficient which is indeed the case from the results in Table (3.2.2). Reported in Table 
(3.2.2) is also the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) statistics which is sued to test serial 
correlation among the residuals. It is distributed as χ2 with four degrees of freedom since 
data are quarterly. Given its critical value of 9.48, only in the results for industry coded 
84, the residuals suffer from serial correlation. Ramsey’s RESET test which is also 
distributed as χ2 but with one degree of freedom is also reported. This statistic is used to 
judge misspecification of each optimum model.  Given its critical values of 3.84, it is 
significant only in the case of industry 55. Thus, except industry coded 55, all other 
optimum models are correctly specified. To test for stability of all coefficients (i.e., short 
run as well as long run estimates) following the literature we apply Brown et al.’s (1975) 
CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests to the residuals of each optimum model. While stable 
estimates are identified by “S”, unstable ones are identified by “U”. Clearly all estimates 
are stable.
26
 Finally, adjusted R
2
 is also reported to reflect on goodness of fit in each 
optimum model.     
 
Following the same procedure, we turn to estimates of Egypt’s export demand 
model of each industry and again report results similar to Table (3.2.1) in Table (3.2.2).  
                                                          
26
 For graphical presentation of these tests see Bahmani-Oskooee et al. (2005).  
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Clearly, the relative price term carries a negative and significant coefficient in 25 
out of 36 industries. Thus, it appears that Egypt can boost its export of these goods by 
devaluation or cutting export prices. The U.S. income elasticity of significantly positive 
in 12 industries and it is significantly negative in five industries coded 07, 29, 63, 64, and 
84. Once again, as the U.S. economy grows, U.S. produces more of import substitute 
goods and imports less of these goods.  
 
Again, our long-run analysis is only valid if we establish cointegration in any 
optimum model that either income or relative price term carried a significant coefficient. 
The results of the F test indeed supports cointegration in every model in which there was 
at least one significant coefficient. The ECMt-1 carries a significantly negative coefficient 
in all models signifying importance of adjustment toward long run. Again, residuals in 
most models are autocorrelation free as judged by the LM statistic. Reflected by the 
RESET statistic, most optimum models are correctly specified and do not suffer from any 
structural break (per results of CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests). Finally, adjusted R
2
 
reflects a good fit in most models.  
 
We are now in a position to combine results from Tables (3.2.1) and (3.2.2) and 
infer the sum of absolute value of price elasticities so that we can judge the Marshall-
Lerner condition. Note that we only consider the price elasticities that are negative and 
significant. The sum is reported inn Table (3.2.3). We also report trade share of each 
industry to determine whether industry size plays any role. 
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It is clear from Table (3.2.3) that the ML condition is met in 28 out of 36 cases, 
implying that depreciation of Egyptian pound against the U.S. dollar will improve the 
trade balance of these 28 industries in the long run. All large industries, i.e., industries 
coded 04 (with 43 % share of the market), 22 (with 7.20 % of market share), 33 (with 
5.45 % market share), and 74 (with 3.49 % market share) will benefit from currency 
depreciation. These four industries possess almost 60% of market share. All in all, since 
the ML condition is satisfied in most industries, Egypt can devalue its currency and enjoy 
an improvement in its overall trade balance with the U.S. in the long run.  
 
3.2.4. Summary and Conclusion 
Currency devaluation under the fixed exchange rate system or depreciation under the 
floating rate system is said to improve a country’s trade balance in the long run if sum of 
absolute value of import and export demand elasticities exceed unit. This condition is 
known as the Marshall-Lerner condition which traditionally tested for many countries. In 
testing the Marshall-Lerner condition, however, researchers have used trade flows of one 
country with the rest of the world. Since constructing a price index for the rest of the 
world as well as measuring the rest of the world income embodies error and omission, 
such studies are said to suffer from aggregation bias. To remove the bias, a few studies 
have concentrated on using trade data at bilateral level between two countries. However, 
they have also proxied import and export prices since these prices do not exist between 
two countries for their bilateral but aggregate trade flows.  
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These studies at bilateral level suffer from another aggregation bias in that 
different commodities react differently to exchange rate changes and significant effect in 
one industry could be offset by an insignificant effect in another industry yielding an 
overall insignificant outcome. To remove the bias in this second group, one needs to 
concentrate on commodity level data and estimate the ML condition at commodity or 
industry level. 
 
 Since commodity prices are rarely available internationally, no study has 
attempted to test the ML condition at commodity level. Now that we have come across 
export and import prices for 36 industries that trade between Egypt and the U.S., we 
break into the literature by estimating the price elasticities, hence the ML condition at 
commodity level. Using quarterly data over the period 1994-2007 and bounds testing 
approach to cointegration and error-correction modeling, the results revealed that the ML 
condition was met in 28 our of 38 industries. Included among these industries there were 
small as well as the large industries. More specifically, the condition was satisfied in four 
largest industries that account for almost 60% of the market. These were: Cereal and 
cereal preparations; Oil-seeds and oleaginous fruits; Petroleum, petroleum products and 
related materials; and General industry machinery and equipment. Since the condition 
was satisfied in most industries, Egypt can enjoy an improvement in her overall trade 
balance with the U.S. in the long run due to devaluation of Egyptian pound.  
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3.3. J-curve 
3.3.1. Motivation and Literature 
The J-Curve has been tested for Egypt in a number of studies. Bahmani-Oskooee and 
Malixi (1992) employed a trade balance model which included domestic income and 
money supply, world income and money supply, and the real exchange rate as 
determinants of the trade balance. The model was tested for 13 developing countries, 
including Egypt. While no support for the J-Curve was found in the short run, currency 
depreciation seemed to have significant favorable long-run effects on the trade balance of 
Egypt with the rest of the world. These findings could be considered spurious since 
Bahmani-Oskooee and Malixi (1992) did not account for the integrating properties of the 
variables involved. Indeed, when Bahmani-Oskooee and Alse (1994) tested for 
integrating properties of the trade balance and the real exchange rate of 42 countries, the 
two variables were integrated of different orders in the case of Egypt. Hence, 
cointegration analysis could not be applied. However, when the data was extended and 
additional variables included in the trade balance model, Bahmani-Oskooee (2001) who 
applied Engle-Granger and Johansen cointegration methods found that indeed, in the case 
of Egypt the variables are cointegrated and currency depreciation or devaluation has 
favorable effects on Egypt’s trade balance with the rest of the world. There was no 
attempt to test the J-curve using the error-correction modeling approach.
27
 Baharumshah 
and Yol (2005) fill this gap by estimating an error-correction model for Egypt, Morocco, 
and Tunisia. In each case, they actually estimate bilateral models between each country 
                                                          
27
 Note that the real effective exchange rate constructed for Egypt showed considerable depreciation of the 
Egyptian pound over the period 1971-1994. The same was true when El-Ramly (2008) plotted the index 
over the period 1982-2004. 
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and the U.S. first and between each country along with Japan. The J-Curve phenomenon 
received support in the results for the Egypt-Japan trade balance but not in the results for 
the Egypt-U.S. trade balance. Similarly, the long-run results revealed that the real 
exchange rate had significantly favorable effects on the bilateral trade balance between 
Egypt and Japan, but not on the trade balance between Egypt and the U.S.  These 
findings should be viewed with caution since the exchange rate used in the bilateral trade 
balance model was the real effective rate and not the real bilateral exchange rate.     
 
 Estimating a trade balance model using bilateral trade data has more appeal than 
estimating a trade balance model using aggregate trade data between one country and the 
rest of the world, because it reduces the degree of aggregation. Since the introduction of 
the euro and the formation of the euro zone, the relative strength of Egypt’s trading 
partners have shifted more in favor of the euro zone. In recent years 50% of Egypt’s trade 
belongs to EU countries, Arab countries, and the U.S. combined. Among these three 
entities, EU alone has about a 25% share of trade, making it the largest trade partner. 
Therefore, in this study, we concentrate on the trade between Egypt and the EU and 
investigate the short-run and the long-run effects of real depreciation of the Egyptian 
pound against the euro on the bilateral trade balance between the two regions. Suspecting 
that the trade between the two regions could yet suffer from another aggregation bias, we 
disaggregate the trade data between the two regions by commodity and estimate a 
bilateral trade balance model for each of the 59 industries that trade between the two 
regions. These 59 industries engage in almost 100% of the trade between Egypt and the 
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EU, as reflected by their trade shares. Data definition and sources appear in the 
Appendix.  
 
3.3.2. The Model and the Method 
A method for testing the J-Curve phenomenon was originally introduced by Bahmani-
Oskooee (1985) when he introduced a reduced form trade balance model. The 
phenomenon was tested by imposing a lag structure on the real exchange rate as a main 
determinant. Since the introduction of cointegration and error-correction modeling 
techniques, emphasis has shifted to dealing with the integrating properties of the 
variables involved. This has necessitated the application of error-correction techniques to 
test the short-run effects of depreciation, i.e., the J-Curve concept and cointegration 
method which is designed to capture the long-run effects of depreciation on the trade 
balance. Since these methods rely upon a reduced form model, we begin with a reduced 
form trade balance model from the literature outlined by specification (3.3.1):
28
  
  
(3.3.1)    εREX Log λLogY γY Log βαTB Log tttEU,tEG,
i
t   
 
where TB
i
 is a measure of the trade balance of industry i. Since the model is log 
linear, following the literature, the trade balance is defined as the ratio of Egypt’s export 
of industry i to the EU over Egypt’s imports of industry i from the EU.29 Three variables 
are considered to be main determinants of the trade balance. Egypt’s and the EU level of 
                                                          
28
 For application of this model for other countries, see the review article by Bahmani-Oskooee and 
Hegerty (2010). 
29
 This measure is also said to be in real or nominal terms. For more details see Bahmani-Oskooee (1991).  
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economic activities, denoted by YEG and YEU respectively, as well as the real exchange 
rate between the Egyptian pound and the euro. Since an increase in Egypt’s economic 
activity is expected to increase her imports of industry i, we expect an estimate of β to be 
negative. On the other hand, since an increase in the level of economic activity in the EU 
is expected to lead to an increase in Egypt’s exports of industry i, an estimate of γ is 
expected to be positive. As for the effects of the real exchange rate, the estimate of λ is 
expected to be positive given the construction of the real exchange rate.  More precisely, 
an increase in REX reflects a real depreciation Egyptian pound (see Appendix for 
details).  
 
 The trade balance model identified by (3.3.1) is basically a long-run model and 
the coefficient estimates yields long-run estimates. These long-run estimates cannot be 
used to test the J-Curve since the J-Curve is a short-run phenomenon. To test the J-Curve, 
we must incorporate the short-run dynamics into (3.3.1) via error-correction modeling. 
Thus, following Pesaran et al. (2001) and the bounds testing approach we rely upon the 
following specification:     
 
(3.3.2)                    u REX Log Y Log Y LogTB Log
REX Log ΔλY Log ΔγY Log ΔβTB LogαTB Log Δ
t1t41tEU,31-tEG,2
i
1-t1
kt
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Pesaran et al. (2001) demonstrate that one can establish cointegration or a long-
run relationship among the variables by establishing joint significance of lagged level 
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variables. They propose using the familiar F test with new critical values that they 
tabulate. An upper bound critical value is provided when all variables in a given model 
are assumed to be integrated of order one. A lower bound is provided by assuming all 
variables are integrated of order zero or stationary. For cointegration, the calculated F 
statistic must be greater than the upper bound. The most appealing property of this 
approach is the demonstration by Pesaran et al. (2001) that their critical value is also 
valid even if some variables are integrated of order one and some integrated of order 
zero, ruling out pre-unit root testing. Another advantage of specification (3.3.2) is that the 
short-run and the long-run effects are estimated in one step. More precisely, once (3.3.2) 
is estimated, the short-run effects are reflected by the coefficient estimates of the first-
differenced variables. For example, the short-run effects of real depreciation are judged 
by the estimates of k’s. Negative values for initial k’s followed by positive values for 
subsequent k’s will support the J-Curve. The long-run effects of depreciation, however, 
are judged by the size and significance of  4 normalized on  1. The same normalization 
applies to other variables as well.
30
  We estimate the error-correction model in (3.3.2) in 
the next section.
31
   
  
3.3.3. The Results  
In this section we try to estimate the error-correction model (3.3.2) first using the 
aggregate bilateral trade data between Egypt and the EU. Suspecting that the results could 
suffer from aggregation bias, we disaggregate the trade data by commodity and estimate 
                                                          
30
 For more details of normalization, see Bahmani-Oskooee and Tanku (2008). 
31
 For other applications of this approach see Payne (2003), Tang (2007), Mohammadi et al. (2008) and De 
Vita and Kyaw (2008). 
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the model for 59 industries that traded between Egypt and the EU. The first strategy in 
estimating (3.3.2) is the order of the lags. Previous research (e.g., Halicioglu 2007) has 
shown that the results could be sensitive to lags order. Hence, others like Bahmani-
Oskooee and Hegerty (2009) have recommended and employed a set criterion to select 
the optimum lags. Following the literature, we use Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) 
to select the lag order. Since the data are quarterly over the period 1994I-2007IV, a 
maximum of six lags are imposed on each variable and AIC is used to select the optimum 
lags. Therefore, throughout the study, results belong to each optimum model. 
Furthermore, due to the volume of the results, we report them in three tables and discuss 
them one by one.  
 
Since our concern is the short-run response of the trade balance to changes in the 
real exchange rate, in Table (3.3.1), we report the short-run coefficient estimates only for 
the real exchange rate. From the results that belong to the aggregate trade model reported 
in the first row and labeled “TOTAL” we gather that a positive coefficient is followed by 
negative coefficients and then again by positive ones, violating the J-Curve hypothesis. 
The same is true when we consider the coefficient estimates that belong to each industry. 
Like previous research, there is no specific pattern. However, there are 36 industries for 
which there is at least one significant coefficient estimate. These significant coefficients 
are identified by one, two, or three *. These results imply that in 36 industries a real 
depreciation of the Egyptian pound has short-run effects on these industries’ trade 
balances. Thus, the short-run significant effects found in the aggregate bilateral results 
should be attributed to trade by these 36 industries that are coded as: 0, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 26, 
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27, 28, 32, 33, 34, 42, 43, 52, 56, 57, 58, 59, 61, 64, 65, 67, 69, 71, 72, 73, 74, 76, 77, 78, 
79, 82, 83, 88, and 89. A major question now is whether these short-run significant 
effects last in the long run? To this end, we consider the long-run estimates reported in 
Table (3.3.2). 
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Table 3.3.1: Short Run Coefficients of the Real Exchange Rate. 
 
code SITC Description ∆ln REXt ∆ln REXt-1 ∆ln REXt-2 ∆ln REXt-3 ∆ln REXt-4 
  TOTAL 3.25 (2.22) -1.85 (2.29) -6.40 (2.28)*** -2.25 (2.41) 2.31 (2.27) 
0 Live Animals other than Animals of Division 03 -2.62 (3.37) 3.40 (3.82) -7.99 (-3.33)** ..   ..   
1 Meat And Meat Preparations 2.52 (2.95) ..   ..   ..   ..   
2 Dairy Products , Birds Eggs 0.59 (3.02) ..   ..   ..   ..   
3 Fish Crustaceans, Molluscs, Aquatic Invert. 3.26 (1.27)** 0.08 (1.40) 2.07 (1.28) -6.30 (1.29)*** -3.10 (1.42)** 
4 Cereals ,Cereal Preparations 4.72 (2.89) -5.50 (3.12)* -5.02 (2.98) ..   ..   
5 Vegetables , Fruit 2.37 (1.57) -4.28 (1.54)*** ..   ..   ..   
6 Sugars, Sugar Preparations, Honey 12.64 (3.45)*** ..   ..   ..   ..   
7 Coffee.Tea,Cocoa,Spices , Manufs.Thereof. -0.74 (1.12) ..   ..   ..   ..   
8 Feeding Stuff For Animals -2.90 (3.99) -10.47 (4.06)** -14.88 (4.33)*** -3.39 (4.45) -0.92 (4.14) 
9 Miscellaneous Edible Prod and Preparations 5.24 (2.28)** -4.12 (2.23)* ..   ..   ..   
11 Beverages -2.14 (3.68) ..   ..   ..   ..   
12 Tobacco , Tobacco Manufactures 1.20 (2.51) ..   ..   ..   ..   
22 Oil Seeds , Oleaginous Fruits 6.03 (4.09) ..   ..   ..   ..   
23 Crude Rubber 0.41 (2.67) ..   ..   ..   ..   
24 Cork , Wood 1.38 (1.85) ..   ..   ..   ..   
26 Textile Fibres , Their Wastes 3.74 (2.00)* 0.14 (2.28) 7.04 (2.14)*** -3.23 (2.25) 4.38 (2.20)* 
27 Crude Fertilizers And Crude Minerals 3.08 (1.38)** ..   ..   ..   ..   
28 Matalliferous Ores , Metal Scrap -5.76 (2.78)** 77996 (2.88) -2.79 (2.75) 6.30 (2.86)** 5.20 (2.93)* 
29 Crude Matl.Animal Or Veg.Orign. N.E.S 0.39 (0.99) ..   ..   ..   ..   
32 Coal, Coke , Briquettes 9.83 (4.81)** ..   ..   ..   ..   
33 Petroleum,Petboleum Products 5.00 (1.98)** ..   ..   ..   ..   
34 Gas, Natural, Manufactured 6.00 (3.87) 9.31 (4.12)** -13.52 (4.12)*** ..   ..   
42 Fixed Veg. Fats , Oils Crude Pefined  5.01 (5.03) 0.78 (4.97) 12.75 (5.00)** -10.58 (5.14)** ..   
43 Animal Or Veg.Fats, Oils Processed 0.21 (2.57) 0.01 (2.69) -5.30 (2.56)** -0.40 (2.55) -6.93 (2.57)*** 
51 Organic Chemicals 2.04 (3.11) ..   ..   ..   ..   
52 Inorganic Chemicals 0.45 (1.38) 3.39 (1.49)** 2.58 (1.53)* 5.59 (1.67)*** ..    
53 Dyeing,Tanning, Colouring Materials 3.62 (4.21) ..   ..   ..   ..   
54 Medicinal, Pharmace Utical Products -0.76 (1.54) ..   ..   ..   ..   
55 Essential Oils,Pesinoids,Plshng.,Cleang.Preps. -1.22 (0.84) ..   ..   ..   ..   
56 Fertilizers 6.60 (3.41)* -0.38 (3.88) 11.69 (3.70)*** -2.78 (3.85) -4.87 (3.55) 
57 Plastics In Primary Forms 7.54 (3.83)* ..   ..   ..   ..    
58 Plastics In Non-Primary Forms 3.38 (3.84) -2.29 (3.99) -11.95 (3.80)*** ..   ..    
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code SITC Description ∆ln REXt ∆ln REXt-1 ∆ln REXt-2 ∆ln REXt-3 ∆ln REXt-4 
59 Chemical Materials , Products , N.E.S. 1.75 (1.94) -0.08 (1.95) -5.04 (1.96)** 0.74 (1.96) -5.44 (1.94)*** 
61 Leather,Leather Manfacture,N.E.S 1.99 (2.37) -1.03 (2.23) 7.35 (2.16)*** 2.84 (2.24) -4.12 (2.08)* 
62 Rubber Manufactures 0.90 (3.01) ..   ..   ..   ..    
63 Cork , Wood Manufactures (Excluding Furniture) -0.71 (2.22) ..   ..   ..   ..    
64 Paper,Paperboard,,Articles Of Paper Pulp  -4.26 (3.16) 8.74 (3.16)*** -8.00 (3.19)** 5.49 (3.13)*  ..   
65 Textile Yarn Fabrics Made-Up Art 1.59 (0.67)** 0.28 (0.71) 0.02 (0.69) -1.95 (0.68)*** 1.80 (0.68)** 
66 Non-Metalic Mineral Mnfctrs,N.E.S. 2.01 (1.32) ..   ..   ..   ..    
67 Iron And Steel 4.00 (1.49)** 3.98 (1.40) -0.73 (1.47) -1.45 (1.47) -1.69 (1.40) 
68 Non-Ferrous Metals 0.69 (1.05) ..   ..   ..   ..    
69 Manufactures Of Metals Nes 1.01 (1.34) -1.82 (1.44) -0.72 (1.41) -2.74 (1.3945)* -4.13 (1.42)*** 
71 Power Generating Machinery And Equipment 8.12 (5.23) 5.26 (5.52) 0.15 (5.18) -3.38 (5.32) 12.62 (5.08)* 
72 Mch. Industries 7.56 (3.61)** ..   ..   ..   ..    
73 Netal Working Mchy. -3.29 (4.53) 1.30 (4.59) -2.66 (4.57) -11.68 (4.80)**  ..   
74 General Indus. Machinery, Equip.,Mach. 1.96 (1.41) 2.22 (1.45) 3.28 (1.41)** 2.99 (1.47)**  ..   
75 Office Mch. , Automatic Data Procg 5.89 (3.50)  ..   ..    ..   ..   
76 Telecom,Sound Record,Reproduc.Apprts.,Equp. -5.84 (5.12) 1.07 (5.47) -10.00 (5.03)*  ..   ..   
77 Elecl.Mchy,Apprt., Appl.,Parts Thereof -0.21 (2.16) -2.06 (2.22) 0.45 (2.13) -1.35 (2.34) -2.02 (2.09) 
78 Road Vehicles (Including Air-Cushion Vehicles) -1.64 (3.84) 1.62 (3.69) -9.85 (3.64)** ..   ..    
79 Other Transport Equp -13.42 (4.50)***  ..   ..    ..   ..   
81 Prefabricated-Buildings-Sanitsary Plumbing -0.62 (1.64)  ..   ..    ..   ..   
82 Furniture And Parts Thereof; Bedding 3.33 (0.79)*** 0.81 (0.90) -0.62 (0.87) 0.05 (0.86) -1.39 (0.86) 
83 Travel Goods Handbags And Similar Containers -0.23 (3.78) 7.06 (4.09)* -6.19 (3.96) 10.11 (3.90)** -7.37 (3.77)* 
84 Articles Of Apparel And Clothing Accessories -0.75 (1.31)  ..   ..    ..   ..   
85 Footwear 4.57 (3.34)  ..   ..    ..   ..   
87 Professional, Scientific, Controlling Instuments 1.79 (3.41)  ..   ..    ..   ..   
88 Photographic App. N.E.S. Clocks , Watches 0.66 (4.12) 7.37 (4.51) 11.82 (4.61)** -14.37 (4.46)*** -5.31 (4.70) 
89 Miscellaneous, Manufactured Articles N.E,.S. -1.22 (1.51) -1.26 (1.57)  3.7115 (1.49)**  ..   ..    
Standard errors are in parenthesis 
*** Significant at the 1% significance level 
** Significant at the 5% significance level 
* Significant at the 10% significance level 
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Table 3.3.2: Long Run Coefficient Estimates 
 
code SITC Description constant ln YEU ln YEG ln REX 
  TOTAL -77.30 (17.97)*** 6.25 (1.81)*** -1.57 (0.86)* 1.48 (0.30)*** 
0 Live Animals Other Than Animals of division03 (0.04%) -300.65 (-190.98) 29.80 (-21.16) -13.19 (-11.07) 6.94 (2.63)** 
1 Meat And Meat Preparations (0.02%) -493.36 (236.26)** 39.49 (23.21)* -8.35 (-10.50) 1.81 (3.39) 
2 Dairy Products , Birds Eggs (0.29%) -740.29 (113.69)*** 76.72 (12.60)*** -35.87 (-6.55)*** 9.16 (1.35)*** 
3 Fish Crustaceans, Mollusc, Aquatic invertebrates (0.86%) 167.89 (61.32)** -17.11 (7.09)** 6.80 (3.92)* 0.72 (1.04) 
4 Cereals ,Cereal Preparations (1.99%) -137.68 (47.55)*** 10.80 (5.33)* -2.37 (-2.92) 1.93 (0.75)** 
5 Vegetables , Fruit (4.04%) 80.03 (24.59)*** -7.64 (2.56)*** 2.91 (1.25)** -0.35 (0.33) 
6 Sugars, Sugar Preparations, Honey (0.16%) -721.05 (83.17)*** 69.51 (9.18)*** -27.47 (4.76)*** 7.85 (0.99)*** 
7 Coffee. Tea, Cocoa, Spices, Manufs. Thereof. (0.13%) 27.84 (-34.13) -2.88 (-3.83) 1.20 (-2.1) -0.71 (0.56) 
8 Feeding Stuff For Animals (0.13%) 98.02 (-58.26) -12.82 (6.47)* 7.51 (3.49)** 0.06 (1.09) 
9 Miscellaneous Edible Prod and Preparations (0.52%) -97.12 (-77.38) 8.62 (-8.54) -3.53 (-4.59) 3.69 (1.17)*** 
11 Beverages (0.02%) -369.37 (122.47)*** 35.52 (13.82)** -14.23 (7.41)* 5.58 (1.58)*** 
12 Tobacco , Tobacco Manufactures (0.38%) -172.38 (42.70)*** 9.85 (4.31)** 1.66 (-2.11) 0.16 (0.76) 
22 Oil Seeds , Oleaginous Fruits (0.05%) 96.27 (-89.59) -9.36 (-9.14) 3.33 (-4.53) 2.24 (1.62) 
23 Crude Rubber (0.13%) -97.82 (-89.58) 4.46 (-9.11) 1.91 (-4.54) 2.50 (1.66) 
24 Cork , Wood (2.26%) 19.82 (-28.89) -5.29 (3.13)* 4.50 (1.65)*** 0.29 (0.48) 
26 Textile Fibres , Their Wastes (0.47%) -73.99 (25.13)*** 6.60 (2.54)** -1.71 (-1.22) -1.99 (0.45)*** 
27 Crude Fertilizers And Crude Minerals (0.49%) -199.40 (26.79)*** 18.63 (3.07)*** -6.92 (1.67)*** 2.86 (0.32)*** 
28 Matalliferous Ores , Metal Scrap (1.26%) 11.13 (-45.01) -1.03 (-4.56) 0.64 (-2.2) -3.52 (0.89)*** 
29 Crude Matl.Animal Or Veg.Orign. N.E.S (0.25%) 44.52 (-28.44) -4.04 (-3.18) 1.31 (-1.69) 0.11 (0.35) 
32 Coal, Coke , Briquettes (0.27%) -139.13 (-118.05) 11.02 (-11.86) -2.40 (-5.59) 3.63 (1.87)* 
33 Petroleum, Petrol. products & related materials (18.19%) 59.58 (32.24)* -4.60 (-3.25) 0.73 (-1.60) 1.50 (0.58)** 
34 Gas, Natural, Manufactured (14.09%) -116.57 (48.07)** 10.74 (5.13)** -4.37 (-2.60) 6.52 (0.73)*** 
42 Fixed Veg. Fats , Oils Crude Pefined Or Fraction. (0.03%) -68.69 (-100.71) 0.97 (-10.15) 3.54 (-4.84) 5.63 (1.60)*** 
43 Animal Or Veg.Fats , Oils Processed Or Waxes (0.03%) 116.16 (-83.01) -14.09 (8.32)* 7.40 (3.92)* 1.83 (1.35) 
51 Organic Chemicals (2.79%) -286.87 (143.54)* 31.13 (15.67)* -15.98 (7.95)* 4.67 (1.65)*** 
52 Inorganic Chemicals (0.42%) -99.31 (27.17)*** 8.55 (2.76)*** -1.98 (-1.35) -2.55 (0.58)*** 
53 Dyeing,Tanning , Colouring Materials (0.50%) -33.16 (-56.40) 2.86 (-5.72) -1.54 (-2.85) 1.89 (1.05)* 
54 Medicinal , Pharmace Utical Products (3.81%) 90.95 (-32.54) -8.50 (3.46)** 2.57 (-1.75) -0.10 (0.51) 
55 Essential Oils ,Pesinoids,Plshng.,Cleang.Preps. (0.35%) 1.13 (-18.40) -0.37 (-2.01) 0.24 (-1.06) -0.06 (0.29) 
56 Fertilizers (0.66%) 21.43 (-62.24) -3.44 (-6.49) 2.78 (-3.26) -2.43 (1.18)** 
57 Plastics In Primary Forms (3.93%) -337.11 (68.22)*** 25.38 (7.53)*** -4.12 (-3.96) 4.83 (0.94)*** 
58 Plastics In Non-Primary Forms (0.32%) 62.09 (-94.01) -13.78 (-10.80) 12.07 (5.94)* -1.56 (1.25) 
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code SITC Description constant ln YEU ln YEG ln REX 
59 Chemical Materials , Products , N.E.S. (1.21%) -14.31 (-37.28) 4.42 (-3.81) -4.72 (1.85)** 1.14 (0.66)* 
61 Leather,Leather Manfacture,N.E.S  (0.21%) -254.93 (51.87)*** 21.99 (5.97)*** -5.92 (3.25)* 1.41 (0.67)** 
62 Rubber Manufactures (0.53%) -315.31 (72.58)*** 31.63 (8.18)*** -13.45 (4.48)*** 1.42 (1.01) 
63 Cork , Wood Manufactures (Excl Furniture) (0.09%) -23.07 (-39.30) 1.67 (-3.97) -0.56 (-1.94) 0.19 (0.71) 
64 Paper, Paperboard, Articles of paper (1.52%) 434.45 (234.86)* -50.46 (26.47)* 26.73 (14.11)* -2.11 (3.06) 
65 Textile Yarn Fabrics Made-Up Art (1.65%) -85.58 (21.04)*** 8.73 (2.32)*** -3.73 (1.23)*** 1.17 (0.35)*** 
66 Non-Metalic Mineral Mnfctrs,N.E.S. (1.17%) -89.67 (-97.56) 7.75 (-10.53) -2.81 (-5.51) 4.46 (1.40)*** 
67 Iron And Steel (4.40%) -227.25 (44.72)*** 21.49 (5.01)*** -8.27 (2.66)*** 2.88 (0.59)*** 
68 Non-Ferrous Metals (1.61%) -18.11 (-14.93) 1.51 (-1.51) -0.37 (-0.75) 0.51 (0.27)* 
69 Manufactures Of Metals Nes (2.09%) -76.00 (21.11)*** 4.60 (2.14)** -0.07 (-1.07) 3.75 (0.44)*** 
71 Power Generating Machinery And Equipment (0.83%) -40.72 (-116.33) 0.71 (-12.75) 1.73 (-6.77) 0.96 (2.06) 
72 Mch. Industries (4.33%) -343.96 (109.20)*** 33.37 (12.16)*** -13.95 (6.38)** 3.84 (1.30)*** 
73 Netal Working Mchy. (.68%) -130.85 (-88.49) 12.65 (-9.26) -5.80 (-4.79) 3.16 (1.84)* 
74 General Indus.Machinery, Equip., Parts (5.50%) -108.75 (-75.15) 7.13 (-8.61) 0.01 (-4.71) -1.35 (1.01) 
75 Office Mch. , Automatic Data Procg (0.75%) -216.65 (85.62)** 19.05 (9.64)* -5.97 (-5.34) -1.14 (1.40) 
76 Telecom,Sound Record,Reproduc.Apprts.,Equp. (4.81%) -81.18 (-112.26) 9.18 (-12.61) -5.54 (-6.94) 2.05 (1.84) 
77 Elecl.Mchy,Apprt., Appl.,Parts Thereof (2.15%) -5.74 (-16.60) -0.15 (-1.90) 0.15 (-1.08) 0.35 (0.32) 
78 Road Vehicles (Including Air-Cushion Vehicles) (3.06%) -53.23 (-142.58) -0.87 (-16.18) 5.40 (-8.68) -0.36 (1.66) 
79 Other Transport Equp (0.04%) -143.82 (80.00)* 12.01 (-8.08) -3.16 (3.98) -0.72 (1.46) 
81 Prefabricated-Buildings-Sanitsary Plumbing (0.54%)  -136.82 (62.55)** 12.27 (6.69)* -3.80 (3.41) 0.46 (0.95) 
82 Furniture & Parts Thereof; Bedding, Mattrresses (0.32%) -71.55 (29.24)** 5.85 (3.04)* -1.71 (1.50) 2.67 (0.54)*** 
83 Travel Goods Handbags And Similar Containers (0.02%) 359.97 (-301.21) -41.74 (-35.40) 22.35 (20.14) -2.30 (4.27) 
84 Articles Of Apparel And Clothing Accessories (0.51%) 31.04 (-26.11) -0.91 (-2.61) -1.10 (1.23) -0.43 (0.39) 
85 Footwear (0.01%) 180.38 (54.70)*** -13.68 (5.52)** 1.01 (2.71) 4.29 (0.98)*** 
87 Professional, Scientific , Controlling Instuments (1.35%) -60.10 (-50.74) 3.45 (-5.15) 0.23 (2.56) 0.02 (0.95) 
88 Photographic App. N.E.S. Clocks , Watches (0.11%) -134.92 (-275.86) 14.53 (-31.78) -8.24 (17.50) 4.97 (4.19) 
89 Miscellaneous,Manufactured Articles N.E,.S. (1.57%) 2.98 (-24.55) 0.97 (-2.48) -1.38 (1.22) -1.41 (0.45)*** 
Trade shares for 2007Q4 are in parenthesis following each industry. 
Standard errors are in parenthesis 
*** Significant at the 1% significance level, ** Significant at the 5% significance level, * Significant at the 10% significance level 
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From Table (3.3.2), we gather that when total trade is considered between Egypt 
and the EU, all variables carry significant coefficients with their expected signs. The real 
depreciation of the Egyptian pound against the euro seems to have a long-run and 
favorable effect on Egypt’s trade balance. Which industries contribute to this significant 
favorable effect? As can be seen there are 24 industries in which the real exchange rate 
carries a significantly positive coefficient. These are coded as: 0, 4, 6, 9, 11, 27, 32, 33, 
34, 42, 51, 53, 57, 59, 61, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 72, 73, 82, and 85.
32
  If we follow Rose and 
Yellen (1989, p. 67) and define the J-Curve effect as the negative short-run effect 
combined with the positive long-run effect, clearly the phenomenon receives support in 
the mentioned 24 industries. Note that these 24 industries together have almost 60% 
market share.
33
 Note also that included among these 24 industries that are affected 
favorably are the two largest industries. They are petroleum and related products coded 
33 with 18% market share and the gas industry coded 34 with 14% market share.  
 
The above long-run analysis would be valid only if we establish cointegration 
among the variables. The results of the F-test for joint significance of the lagged level 
variables along with several other diagnostic statistics are reported in Table (3.3.3). 
Clearly, the calculated F-statistic is greater than its upper bound critical value of 3.77 in 
most cases. While in some cases cointegration is due to significant effects of the 
exchange rate, in some others cointegration is due to significance of income variables.  
                                                          
32
 Note that there are six other industries in which the real exchange rate carries a significant coefficient, 
however, with a negative sign.  
33
 The market shares are reported next to the name of each industry in Table 2 and calculated as the sum of 
exports and imports of each industry as a percent of total exports plus total imports of Egypt.  
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Table 3.3.3: Diagnostic Tests 
 
code SITC Description 
F ECMt-1 LM RESET CUSUM 
CUSUM  
SQ 
Adj  
R
2
 
  TOTAL 11.68 -1.08 (0.15)*** 2.69 0.08 Stable Stable 0.69 
0 Live Animals Other Than Animals Division 03 5.86 -0.55 (-0.11)*** 1.71 0.38 Stable Stable 0.40 
1 Meat And Meat Preparations 2.44 -0.28 (0.08)*** 13.64*** 3.34* Stable Stable 0.33 
2 Dairy Products , Birds Eggs 16.06 -1.09 (0.13)*** 2.52 0.09 Stable Unstable 0.59 
3 Fish Crustaceans, Molluscs, Aquatic Invertebrates Preps. 4.80 -1.01 (0.21)*** 13.56*** 4.47** Stable Stable 0.74 
4 Cereals ,Cereal Preparations 5.62 -1.39 (0.28)*** 2.11 0.18 Stable Unstable 0.49 
5 Vegetables , Fruit 4.41 -1.57 (0.35)*** 5.51 0.08 Stable Stable 0.90 
6 Sugars, Sugar Preparations, Honey 9.07 -1.55 (0.24)*** 6.43 7.45*** Stable Stable 0.68 
7 Coffee. Tea, Cocoa, Spices, Manufs.Thereof. 7.16 -0.75 (0.13)*** 6.55 4.05** Stable Unstable 0.48 
8 Feeding Stuff For Animals 16.79 -1.57 (0.18)*** 4.68 0.07 Stable Stable 0.69 
9 Miscellaneous Edible Prod and Preparations 6.02 -0.71 (0.14)*** 2.93 3.43* Stable Stable 0.55 
11 Beverages 8.30 -0.83 (0.14)*** 6.81 4.42** Stable Stable 0.46 
12 Tobacco , Tobacco Manufactures 10.15 -0.86 (0.13)*** 2.54 0.12 Stable Stable 0.40 
22 Oil Seeds , Oleaginous Fruits 5.05 -0.79 (0.17)*** 6.41 2.14 Stable Stable 0.34 
23 Crude Rubber 4.67 -0.48 (0.10)*** 3.70 0.06 Stable Unstable 0.23 
24 Cork , Wood 12.21 -0.93 (0.12)*** 2.68 0.13 Stable Stable 0.54 
26 Textile Fibres, Their Wastes 7.76 -1.10 (0.19)*** 9.51** 7.18*** Stable Stable 0.63 
27 Crude Fertilizers And Crude Minerals 1.61 -0.53 (0.23)** 10.95** 10.48*** Stable Stable 0.13 
28 Matalliferous Ores, Metal Scrap 8.39 -0.86 (0.14)*** 2.11 1.54 Stable Stable 0.47 
29 Crude Matl.Animal Or Veg.Orign. N.E.S 3.93 -1.24 (0.29)*** 23.03*** 4.02** Stable Stable 0.84 
32 Coal, Coke , Briquettes 2.93 -0.76 (0.21)*** 5.99 0.85 Stable Stable 0.50 
33 Petroleum, Petroleum Products And Related Materials 9.38 -0.87 (0.14)*** 4.18 0.07 Stable Stable 0.43 
34 Gas, Natural, Manufactured 7.81 -1.69 (0.29)*** 2.96 5.12 Stable Stable 0.70 
42 Fixed Veg. Fats, Oils Crude Pefined 8.05 -0.83 (0.14)*** 7.70 0.04 Stable Stable 0.54 
43 Animal Or Veg.Fats , Oils Processed or Waxes 11.07 -0.59 (0.08)*** 2.50 0.88 Stable Stable 0.59 
51 Organic Chemicals 4.19 -0.78 (0.18)*** 7.54 0.00 Stable Stable 0.53 
52 Inorganic Chemicals 7.97 -0.83 (0.14)*** 11.10** 4.82** Stable Stable 0.67 
53 Dyeing,Tanning , Colouring Materials 16.41 -1.17 (0.14)*** 1.65 0.06 Stable Unstable 0.58 
54 Medicinal , Pharmace Utical Products 17.09 -1.12 (0.13)*** 4.98 0.41 Stable Stable 0.53 
55 Essential Oils ,Pesinoids,Plshng.,Cleang.Preps. 3.87 -1.07 (0.26)*** 4.58 0.32 Stable Stable 0.54 
56 Fertilizers 10.10 -1.06 (0.16)*** 2.94 1.88 Stable Stable 0.68 
57 Plastics In Primary Forms 6.39 -1.52 (0.29)*** 4.48 0.44 Stable Unstable 0.50 
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code SITC Description 
F ECMt-1 LM RESET CUSUM 
CUSUM  
SQ 
Adj  
R
2
 
58 Plastics In Non-Primary Forms 8.25 -1.39 (0.23)*** 4.52 0.01 Stable Unstable 0.65 
59 Chemical Materials , Products , N.E.S. 12.38 -0.99 (0.13)*** 3.16 0.41 Stable Stable 0.65 
61 Leather,Leather Manfacture, N.E.S  8.27 -2.32 (0.37)*** 4.24 1.43 Stable Stable 0.77 
62 Rubber Manufactures 5.04 -1.15 (0.24)*** 5.48 0.25 Stable Unstable 0.40 
63 Cork , Wood Manufactures (Excl Furniture) 13.90 -0.90 (0.11)*** 3.25 0.15 Stable Stable 0.59 
64 Paper,Paperboard,,Articles Of Paper Pulp Of Paper 4.31 -0.41 (0.09)*** 6.94 3.37 Stable Unstable 0.46 
65 Textile Yarn Fabrics Made-Up Art , Related Products 5.24 -0.89 (0.18)*** 2.63 0.01 Stable Stable 0.62 
66 Non-Metalic Mineral Mnfctrs,N.E.S. 3.20 -0.39 (0.10)*** 2.59 2.09 Stable Unstable 0.53 
67 Iron And Steel 9.05 -1.09 (0.17)*** 4.18 1.13 Stable Stable 0.59 
68 Non-Ferrous Metals 8.55 -0.74 (0.13)*** 3.00 0.47 Stable Stable 0.33 
69 Manufactures Of Metals Nes 7.80 -0.88 (0.15)*** 16.24*** 1.05 Stable Stable 0.43 
71 Power Generating Machinery And Equipment 17.24 -1.15 (0.13)*** 2.92 0.01 Stable Stable 0.63 
72 Mch. Industries 7.11 -1.27 (0.22)*** 3.66 1.62 Stable Stable 0.62 
73 Netal Working Mchy. 4.50 -0.81 (0.18)*** 13.15** 1.28 Stable Stable 0.47 
74 General Indus. Machinery, Equip.,Machinery Parts 9.18 -0.74 (0.11)*** 5.22 1.79 Stable Stable 0.58 
75 Office Mch. , Automatic Data Procg 4.23 -0.96 (0.22)*** 4.26 2.09 Stable Stable 0.64 
76 Telecom,Sound Record,Reproduc.Apprts.,Equp. 12.01 -0.99 (0.14)*** 6.28 0.19 Stable Stable 0.55 
77 Elecl.Mchy,Apprt., Appl.,Parts Thereof 7.56 -2.86 (0.50)*** 7.82 0.78 Stable Stable 0.67 
78 Road Vehicles (Including Air-Cushion Vehicles) 5.72 -1.12 (0.22)*** 9.31 7.50*** Stable Stable 0.61 
79 Other Transport Equp 11.61 -0.86 (0.12)*** 0.37 0.02 Stable Stable 0.52 
81 Prefabricated-Buildings-Sanitsary Plumbing Heating 7.30 -0.71 (0.12)*** 1.38 7.56*** Stable Stable 0.53 
82 Furniture And Parts Thereof; Bedding, Mattrresses 4.26 -0.64 (0.14)*** 2.74 1.26 Stable Stable 0.75 
83 Travel Goods Handbags And Similar Containers 4.11 -0.62 (0.14)*** 7.00 0.23 Stable Stable 0.58 
84 Articles Of Apparel And Clothing Accessories 10.30 -0.91 (0.13)*** 3.76 6.02** Stable Stable 0.51 
85 Footwear 10.01 -0.83 (0.13)*** 7.59 1.60 Stable Stable 0.41 
87 Professional,Scientific, Controlling Instuments 12.25 -0.96 (0.14)*** 8.21* 2.72 Stable Unstable 0.44 
88 Photographic App. N.E.S. Clocks , Watches 5.91 -0.65 (0.12)*** 6.39 2.03 Stable Stable 0.60 
89 Miscellaneous,Manufactured Articles N.E.S. 12.02 -0.93 (0.13)*** 4.38 0.23 Stable Stable 0.50 
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% significance level, and * indicates 
significance at the 10% level 
At the 10% level of significance, the upper bound critical value of F statistic is 3.77. This comes from Pesaran et al. (2001, Table CI, Case III, p. 300).  
Lagrange Multiplier critical value at 5% level is 9.48        
RESET critical value at 5% level is 3.48 
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Several other statistics are also reported in Table (3.3.3). To determine the long-
run adjustment of variables, following Pesaran et al. (2001), the long-run coefficient 
estimates from Table (3.3.2) are used to form an error-correction term, ECM.
34
 After 
replacing the linear combination of lagged level variables in (3.3.2) by ECMt-1 , each 
model is re-estimated at optimum lags. A significantly negative coefficient obtained for 
ECMt-1 reflects adjustment toward equilibrium. As can be seen from Table (3.3.3), this 
coefficient is negative and highly significant in all optimum models. The size of the 
coefficient reflects the adjustment speed. While adjustment is slow in some industries 
like industry coded 1 (Live animals), it is rather fast in some others like industry coded 4 
(Cereals).  
 
Two other statistics are also reported. The Lagrange Multiplier (LM) statistic is 
used to test for serial correlation among the residuals. Since data is quarterly, it is 
distributed as χ2 with four degrees of freedom. Given its critical value of 9.48, there are 
only eight models in which residuals suffer from autocorrelation. These models belong to 
industries that are coded 1, 3, 26, 27, 29, 52, 69, and 73. Ramsey’s RESET test for 
misspecification is also reported. This statistic is also distributed as χ2 but with one 
degree of freedom. Given the critical value of 3.84, only three industries yield statistical 
significance, indicating mis-specified models. These industries are coded as 78, 81, and 
84.  
 
How stable are the short-run and the long-run coefficient estimates? A common 
practice here is to apply CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests of Brown et al. (1975) to the 
                                                          
34
 For details of this step see Bahmani-Oskooee and Tanku (2008).  
122 
 
 
residuals of each error-correction model. Since the residuals are proxies for the linear 
combination of short-run and long-run variables, their volatility will reflect instability of 
all coefficients combined. According to the cumulative sum (CUSUM) test the recursive 
residuals are plotted against the break points while the CUSUM of squares test 
(CUSUMSQ) plots the squared recursive residuals against the break points. These two 
statistics are then plotted within two straight lines which are bounded by a 5% 
significance level. If any point is beyond this 5% level, the null hypothesis of stable 
parameters is rejected. A summary of these tests are reported in Table (3.3.3) and clearly, 
almost all estimated coefficients seem to be stable.
35
 Finally, we report the adjusted R
2
 
for each model where each model reveals a reasonable fit.  
 
3.3.4. Summary and Conclusion 
Like every other macroeconomic variable, the trade balance adjusts to currency 
depreciation with some lags. If a country’s trade balance is deteriorating and policy 
makers decide to devalue their currency or allow their currency to depreciate, because of 
adjustment lags the trade balance still continues to deteriorate. Once adjustment lags are 
realized, the trade balance could improve, resulting in a pattern known as the J-Curve 
phenomenon.  
 
A recent review article by Bahmani-Oskooee and Hegerty (2010) classifies all 
empirical studies into three categories. One group uses trade data between one country 
and the rest of the world while another group uses data between two countries at the 
                                                          
35
 For graphical presentation of these tests see Bahmani-Oskooee et al. (2005).  
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bilateral level. The last group, which uses data at the commodity level between two 
countries, is said to be free from any aggregation bias. As more and more data become 
available at the commodity level, this approach is the preferred approach. 
 
In this study we test the J-Curve phenomenon between Egypt and the European 
Union (EU). We first test the phenomenon between the two regions using aggregate 
bilateral trade data. Suspecting that the results could suffer from aggregation bias, we 
disaggregate the trade data by industry. A total of 59 industries trade between Egypt and 
EU, and using quarterly data over the period 1994I-2007IV, we test the phenomenon for 
each industry using the bounds testing approach to cointegration and error-correction 
modeling. The approach not only does not require pre-unit root testing of the variables, 
but tests for the short-run as well as the long-run effects of currency depreciation on the 
trade balance. The results indicate that in 24 industries the trade balance deteriorates in 
the short run and improves in the long run. The two largest industries were among the 24 
industries. Since its introduction in 1999 the euro has gained in value against the U.S. 
dollar, a reserve currency. Due to arbitrage activities in foreign exchange markets, the 
same has taken place against Egyptian pound. In this paper, we have identified 24 
industries that trade between Europe and Egypt and that have gained by pound 
depreciation.   
 
 
 
 
124 
 
 
3.4. S-Curve 
3.4.1. Motivation and Literature 
In an attempt to improve its trade balance and its international competitiveness, a country 
could adhere to currency devaluation or depreciation. However, deterioration of the U.S. 
trade balance in 1971 despite a 15% devaluation of the dollar led Magee (1973) to 
present a new idea that because of adjustment lags in production and the delivery process, 
the effects of devaluation on the trade balance is not instantaneous. Capitalizing on this 
concept, Backus et al. (1994) introduced yet another approach to test for the short-run 
effects of currency depreciation on the trade balance. They demonstrated that under 
certain conditions such as productivity shocks, while the correlation between the current 
exchange rate and future trade balances could be positive, the same correlation between 
the current rate and past values of the trade balances could be negative. Since the plot of 
these correlation coefficients at various lags and leads of the trade balance resembles the 
letter “S”, they labeled this pattern as the “S-curve”. Bahmani-Oskooee and Hegerty 
(2010) provide a comprehensive review of the literature about both curves.  
 
 Since this paper is about Egypt, a brief review of Egypt-related studies is in order 
so that we can highlight the contribution of this paper. Backus et al. (1994) who 
introduced the concept tested the phenomenon for 11 OECD countries. Senhadji (1998) 
who considered experiences of 30 developing countries did not include Egypt in his 
sample. However, Parikh and Shibata (2004) who tested the S-Curve for 59 less 
developed countries did not find support for the S-curve in the trade between Egypt and 
the rest of the world. It is in this direction that we like to extend the literature by asking 
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whether the lack of the S-curve pattern in the trade between Egypt and the rest of the 
world suffers from aggregation bias. To answer this question, we disaggregate the 
Egyptian trade flows by trading partners and by commodities. We include in our analysis 
the 36 industries that trade between Egypt and the U.S. and 59 industries that trade 
between Egypt and the EU. Data definition and sources appear in an Appendix.  
 
3.4.2. The Methodology and Results 
As mentioned earlier, the S-curve analysis is based on the cross-correlation coefficients 
between the trade balance and the real exchange rate. From a theoretical point of view, 
the two variables should be defined in a way that a positive correlation reflects an 
improvement in the trade balance due to exchange rate depreciation. Let us first consider 
the case of Egypt-U.S. trade and define the trade balance of industry i as TBi = (Xi – Mi)/ 
GDP where Xi is exports of industry i by Egypt to the U.S. and Mi is the imports of 
industry i by Egypt from the U.S. GDP is Egyptian Gross Domestic Product. All 
variables are in nominal terms in Egyptian pounds. The real bilateral exchange rate 
(REX) between the Egyptian pound and the U.S. dollar is defined as REX = (PUS. NEX) / 
PEG where NEX is the nominal exchange rate defined as the number of Egyptian pound 
per dollar, PUS. is the price level in the U.S. and PEG is the price level in Egypt.  Hence an 
increase in REX reflects a real depreciation of the Egyptian pound. Based on these 
definitions, if a real depreciation of the Egyptian pound is to improve industry i’s trade 
balance, contemporaneous correlation between the two variables is expected to be 
positive.  If, however, this correlation is negative, then the Harbeger-Larsen-Metzler 
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(HLM) effect is said to be present. Let ρk denote the correlation coefficient between REX 
and TBt+k. Following Bahmani-Oskooee and Ratha (2007), we construct it as:    
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When k takes a negative values such as -1, -2, -3, . . . the correlation coefficient is 
between the past values of the trade balance and the current real exchange rate. And when 
k takes positive values such as +1, +2, +3, etc. the correlation coefficient is between the 
current exchange rate and the future trade balance. The plot of ρk against k will yield the 
S-Curve. Note that to avoid spurious outcomes, we follow Backus et al. (1994) and use 
the Hodrich-Prescott (HP) filter to estimate the trend path of each time series variable. 
We then take the deviation of each variable from its filtered trend and use it in (3.4.1) to 
calculate the correlation coefficients.  
 
Quarterly data over the period 1994I-2007IV were available on all variables 
involved. By allowing k to take values -6, -5, -4, -3, -2, -1, 0, +1, +2, +3, +4, +5, +6 we 
calculate the cross-correlation coefficients and plot them against k. As mentioned Parikh 
and Shibata (2004) who tested the S-curve for 59 less developed countries including 
Egypt, did not find support for the S-curve in the trade between Egypt and the rest of the 
world. Therefore, we first follow Bahmani-Oskooee and Ratha (2007) and test the 
phenomenon between Egypt and the U.S. using aggregate bilateral trade data. Since no 
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support was found for the S-curve, we disaggregated the trade data between the two 
countries by commodity and test the S-curve pattern for 36 industries that trade between 
the two countries. The results are summarized in Table (3.4.1).  
 
Table 3.4.1: Summary of the Results for Egypt-U.S. Trade 
 
code SITC Description Trade share 
in 2007 
S-Curve  
Confirmed? 
00 Live animals other than animals of division 03 0.05% Yes 
02 Dairy products and birds' eggs 0.46%  
03 Fish, crustaceans, aquatic invertebrates 0.12% Yes 
04 Cereals and cereal preparations 43.06%  
05 Vegetables and fruit 0.40%  
06 Sugars, sugar preparations and honey 0.06%  
07 Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices & manufactures thereof 0.04% Yes 
09 Miscellaneous edible products and preparations 0.09%  
11 Beverages  0.002%  
12 Tobacco and tobacco manufactures 0.25%  
22 Oil-seeds and oleaginous fruits 7.20%  
24 Cork and wood 0.27%  
26 Textile fibers and their wastes 0.21%  
27 Crude fertilizers, and crude minerals 0.22%  
29 Crude animal and vegetable materials 0.18%  
33 Petroleum, petroleum products & related materials 5.45%  
42 Fixed vegetable fats and oils, crude, refined 0.05%  
52 Inorganic Chemicals  0.11%  
54 Medicinal and pharmaceutical products 1.05% Yes 
55 Essential oils &  perfume materials; polishing 0.20% Yes 
56 Fertilizers (other than those of group 27) 0.85%  
59 Chemical materials and products 0.82%  
61 Leather, leather manufactures & dressed furskins 0.0003% Yes 
63 Cork and wood manufactures (excluding furniture) 0.10%  
64 Paper, paperboard and articles of paper pulp 0.67%  
65 Textile yarn, fabrics, made-up articles 0.99%  
66 Non-metallic mineral manufactures 0.40% Yes 
67 Iron and steel  0.24% Yes 
69 Manufactures of metals 0.97%  
74 General industrial machinery and equipment 3.49%  
75 Office machines and automatic data-processing 0.86% Yes 
77 Electrical machinery, apparatus & appliances 1.10%  
81 Prefabricated buildings; sanitary, plumbing  0.04%  
82 Furniture, and parts thereof; bedding, mattresses 0.44%  
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From Table (3.4.1), we gather that the S-curve hypothesis is only confirmed in 9 
industries. Furthermore, all nine industries are small, as reflected by their trade shares in 
2007 reported in the table.
36
 In none of the large industries coded 4, 22, 33, and 74 the S-
curve is supported. Next, we report the S-curve for the industries in which the curve 
received support. Figure (3.4.1) reports these nine S-curves plus the one for bilateral trade 
flows, which did not support the pattern. Apparently, only these nine industries will 
benefit from a real depreciation of the Egyptian pound. 
 
However, the largest trading partner of Egypt is the EU rather than the U.S. in an 
attempt to discover more support for the S-curve we also consider the trade between 
Egypt and the EU. Using the same formula identified by equation (3.4.1) in which the 
trade balance is now defined as the trade balance of industry i which exports from Egypt 
to Europe and imports from Europe to Egypt and the real exchange rate is defined 
between Egyptian pound and euro, we calculate cross-correlation coefficients using, 
again, aggregate trade data between the two regions as well as for 59 industries that trade. 
Following the same steps, we summarize the results in Table (3.4.2) and report the curves 
in Figure (3.4.2). 
 
 
 
                                                          
36
 For each industry trade share is calculated as sum of exports and imports of that industry as a percent of 
total exports plus total imports between Egypt and the U.S.    
84 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories 1.32%  
89 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 0.93%  
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Figure 3.4.1: The S-Curves for Nine Industries and For Total Egypt-US Trade 
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Table 3.4.2: Summary of the Results for Egypt-EU Trade 
 
code SITC Description Trade share 
in 2007 
S-Curve  
Confirmed? 
00 Live animals other than animals of division 03 0.04% Yes 
01 Meat and meat preparations 0.02%  
02 Dairy products and birds' eggs 0.29%  
03 Fish, crustaceans, aquatic invertebrates 0.86%  
04 Cereals and cereal preparations 1.99% Yes 
05 Vegetables and fruit 4.04%  
06 Sugars, sugar preparations and honey 0.16%  
07 Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices & manufactures  0.13%  
08 Feeding stuff for animals 0.13%  
09 Miscellaneous edible products and preps 0.52%  
11 Beverages  0.02% Yes 
12 Tobacco and tobacco manufactures 0.38% Yes 
22 Oil-seeds and oleaginous fruits 0.05%  
23 Crude Rubber  0.13%  
24 Cork and wood 2.26%  
26 Textile fibers and their wastes 0.47%  
27 Crude fertilizers, and crude minerals 0.49%  
28 Metalliferous ores and metal scrap 1.26%  
29 Crude animal and vegetable materials 0.25%  
32 Coal, coke and briquettes 0.27%  
33 Petroleum, petroleum products 18.19%  
34 Gas, natural and manufactured 14.09% Yes 
42 Fixed vegetable fats and oils, crude, refined 0.03%  
43 Animal or vegetable fats and oils, processed 0.03%  
51 Organic Chemicals  2.79%  
52 Inorganic Chemicals  0.42%  
53 Dyeing, tanning and coloring materials 0.50%  
54 Medicinal and pharmaceutical products 3.81% Yes 
55 Essential oils &  perfume materials; polishing 0.35%  
56 Fertilizers (other than those of group 27) 0.66%  
57 Plastics in primary forms  3.93%  
58 Plastics in non-primary forms  0.32% Yes 
59 Chemical materials and products 1.21%  
61 Leather, leather manufactures & dressed furskins 0.21%  
62 Rubber manufactures  0.53%  
63 Cork and wood manufactures 0.09%  
64 Paper, paperboard and articles of paper pulp 1.52%  
65 Textile yarn, fabrics, made-up articles 1.65%  
66 Non-metallic mineral manufactures 1.17% Yes 
67 Iron and steel  4.40%  
68 Non-ferrous metals  1.61%  
69 Manufactures of metals 2.09%  
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71 Power-generating machinery and equipment 0.83%  
72 Machinery specialized for particular industries 4.33%  
73 Metalworking machinery 0.68%  
74 General industrial machinery and equipment 5.50%  
75 Office machines & automatic data-processing 0.75%  
76 Telecommunications and sound-recording 4.81%  
77 Electrical machinery, apparatus & appliances 2.15%  
78 Road vehicles (including air-cushion vehicles) 3.06%  
79 Other transport equipment 0.04% Yes 
81 Prefabricated buildings; sanitary, plumbing 0.54% Yes 
82 Furniture, and parts thereof; bedding, mattresses 0.32%  
83 Travel goods, handbags and similar containers 0.02%  
84 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories 0.51%  
85 Footwear  0.01%  
87 Professional, scientific and controlling instr. 1.35%  
88 Photographic apparatus, equipment and supplies 0.11%  
89 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 1.57%  
 
 
From Table (3.4.2), it appears that the S-curve receives support only in 10 
industries. However, this time there are at least three large industries that conform to the 
pattern. They are industries coded 4, 34, and 54. Obviously, if S-curve is supported only 
in 10 out of 59 cases, we would not expect to find the pattern for the aggregate data. 
Indeed, this is the case from Figure (3.4.2) where no support is found when aggregate 
bilateral data are used to produce the S-curve. Since the 10 industries engage in little over 
22% of the trade between the two regions, we may conclude that only 22% of the trade 
will be affected by a real depreciation of the Egyptian pound against the euro and these 
10 industries coded 0, 4, 11, 12, 34, 54, 58, 66, 79, and 81 will be beneficiaries.  
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Figure 3.4.2: The S-Curves for 10 Industries and For Total Egypt-EU Trade 
 
 
3.4.3. Summary and Conclusion 
The S-curve hypothesis asserts that due to adjustment lags, depreciation improves the 
trade balance in the future. One previous study tested the S-curve using aggregate trade 
data between each of the 59 developing countries and the rest of the world. In the results 
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for Egypt, there was no support for the S-curve. We wonder if the lack of support for the 
S-curve in the case of Egypt is due to aggregation bias. To this end we disaggregated 
Egypt’s trade data by her trading partners and tested for the S-curve pattern using 
quarterly data over the period 1994I-2007IV between Egypt and the U.S. in one relation 
and between Egypt and the EU in another relation. Since we found no support for the S-
curve in either case using aggregate bilateral trade data, we disaggregated bilateral trade 
flows by industry and tested the phenomenon at industry level. 
 
Over the same period of analysis, data were available for 36 industries that trade 
between Egypt and the U.S. and 59 industries that trade between Egypt and the EU. 
While the 36 industries engage in 73% of the trade between Egypt and the U.S., the 59 
industries engage in almost 100% of the trade between Egypt and the EU. Support for the 
S-curve was limited to nine industries in the Egypt-U.S. trade and 10 industries in the 
Egypt-EU trade. Furthermore, while all nine industries in the first case were small, there 
were two large industries in the latter case. The support for the S-curve in a total of 19 
out of 95 industries imply that only these 19 industries will benefit from currency 
depreciation or devaluation. Since most of the industries are small, Egypt cannot improve 
its overall trade balance by devaluing Egyptian pound.      
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Appendix 
Data Definition and Sources 
 
Quarterly data over 1994Q1-2007Q4 are used to carry out the empirical analysis. The data 
sources are as follows: 
a. Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), Arab Republic of 
Egypt. 
b. EuroStat Online Database 
c. Ministry of Economic Development, Arab Republic of Egypt. 
d. International Financial Statistics IMF (CD-ROM) 
Variables: 
Mi = For each commodity i, M is the volume of Egyptian imports from the European 
Union. It is defined as the ratio of the value of Egyptian imports from the European Union 
(EU) over the respective import price of commodity i. The data for both variables and for all 
59 industries come from source a. 
Xi = For each commodity i, X is volume of Egyptian exports to the European Union. 
It is defined as  the ratio of value of Egyptian exports to the European Union (EU) over the 
respective export price of commodity i. The data for both variables and for all 59 industries 
come from source a. 
YEU  =  The European Union real GDP. The data come from source b.   
YEG  =  Egyptian real GDP. The data come from source c. 
PMi / PDEG = For each commodity i, PM is defined as import price of commodity i 
and PDEG is the price level in Egypt. The import price data for all 59 industries come from 
source a, while the CPI data (used as a proxy for PDEG) come from source d.    
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PXi / PDEU = For each commodity i, PX is defined as export price of commodity i 
and PDEU the price level in EU. The export price data for all 59 industries come from source 
a, while the CPI data (used as a proxy for PDEU) come from source d.     
 TBi = For each commodity i, TBi is defined as (Xi – Mi)/ GDP where Xi is Egypt’s 
export of industry i to the U.S.;  Mi is the same industry’s imports from the U.S. and GDP 
is Egypt’s Gross Domestic Product. They are all in nominal terms in terms of Egyptian 
pound. When we used data from 59 industries that traded between Egypt and EU, the U.S. 
was replaced by EU.  
 REX = Real bilateral exchange rate between the Egyptian pound and the U.S. dollar. 
It is defined as (PUS.NEX/PEG) where PUS  is the price level in U.S., NEX is the nominal 
bilateral exchange rate defined as number of Egyptian pounds per U.S. dollar, and PEG is the 
price level in Egypt. Thus, an increase in REX reflects a real depreciation of the Egyptian 
pound.  When the analysis was shifted to the trade between Egypt and EU, REX was 
defined as   (PEU.NEX/PEG) where PEU  is the price level in euro zone and NEX is the 
nominal bilateral exchange rate defined as number of Egyptian pounds per euro.  
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